P.J.H. v. Cabinet for Human Resources

• Decision Date: 18 September 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-CA-2176-MR,86-CA-2176-MR
• Citation: 743 S.W.2d 852
• Parties: P.J.H., Appellant, v. CABINET FOR HUMAN RESOURCES, L.A.H., an infant, and M.H., an infant, Appellee.
• Court: Kentucky Court of Appeals

Page 852

743 S.W.2d 852

P.J.H., Appellant, v. CABINET FOR HUMAN RESOURCES, L.A.H., an infant, and M.H., an infant, Appellee.

No. 86-CA-2176-MR.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky.

Sept. 18, 1987.

Rehearing Denied Nov. 20, 1987.

Discretionary Review Denied

by Supreme Court Feb. 23, 1988.

Amy Karn Turner, Appalachian Research and Defense Fund of Kentucky, Inc., Hazard, for appellant.

J. William Hernandez, Cabinet for Human Resources, Office of Counsel, Frankfort, for Cabinet for Human Resources.

James D. Holliday, Hazard, for L.A.H. and M.H.

Before COMBS, COOPER and DYCHE, JJ.

COOPER, Judge.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the trial court terminating the parental rights of the appellant, P.J.H. in her infant children, the appellees, L.A.H. and M.H. On appeal, the principal issue is whether the appellant was denied her right of due process as a result of her not being given notice that evidence would be presented during a hearing noted for motions only. Reviewing the record below, we reverse and remand.

Without reciting all of the facts relating to the underlying problems experienced by the appellant and the attempts of the appellee, Cabinet for Human Resources, to terminate her parental rights, the essential facts are as follows: On May 25, 1983 an initial hearing was held on the question of whether the appellant's parental rights should be terminated. Subsequent to this initial hearing, no decision was entered by the trial court and the action was continued to allow the appellant an opportunity to prove that she could provide a suitable and adequate home for her children. Apparently, from the record, the appellant was given six months from the hearing date, or until December of 1983, to establish such a home environment.

On September 30, 1983, the appellee moved the trial court to enter an order deciding the action on its merits. On October 19, 1983, the trial court entered its own order that as a result of the decision of the court in Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 71 L.Ed.2d 599 (1982), a termination of parental rights could only exist upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence. Again, on December 2, 1983, the appellee filed an order of submission with the trial court, requesting a decision on the merits. Although an order was apparently entered in December of 1983 submitting the case for a decision, the trial court subsequently entered an order in May of 1984 setting aside the order of submission on the basis that the complaint was not verified as required by KRS 199.609(2). The petition was thereafter verified.

In July of 1984, the appellant filed a motion requesting the trial court to direct the appellee to allow her temporary custody of her children on a trial basis. That motion was apparently never acted upon. On April 11, 1986, the appellee filed a motion requesting the trial court to enter a final judgment. The appellant opposed the motion and filed a separate motion requesting the trial court for an extension of time to take further discovery of out-of-state witnesses in order to demonstrate her progress in parenting skills. At this hearing, the trial court overruled the appellant's motion to take additional discovery and allowed the appellee to present additional proof concerning the appellant's activities since May of 1983. Appellant's counsel objected on the basis that no notice was given that an evidentiary hearing would be scheduled. Thereafter, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law terminating the parental rights of the appellant in her children. It is from such judgment that she now appeals.

The threshold issue herein is whether the appellant was denied due process of law as a result of the trial court allowing the appellee to present substantive evidence during a hearing which was noted for motions only. Reviewing the record below we find that the appellant was, in fact, denied her due process rights as a result of the trial court's actions.

It is a fundamental principle of our jurisprudence that the minimum requirements of due process require adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 90 S.Ct. 1011, 25 L.Ed.2d 287 (1970); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91 S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971). The importance of such due process rights is underscored in any action which seeks to sever the natural bond or relationship between a parent and a child. When such proceedings are begun, the need for fundamental fairness becomes paramount. As stated by the Santosky court, when a state or agency of the state attempts to sever familial...