Parrett v. State
Decision Date | 18 December 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 21A01-0301-PC-12.,21A01-0301-PC-12. |
Citation | 800 N.E.2d 620 |
Parties | David D. PARRETT, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
David D. Parrett, Bunker Hill, IN, Appellant Pro Se.
Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Zachary J. Stock, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.
David Parrett ("Parrett") pled guilty to Class C felony operating a vehicle after driving privileges are forfeited for life,1 Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated,2 Class A misdemeanor false informing,3 and to being an habitual offender4 in Fayette Circuit Court. He was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of five years for the operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture for life conviction, three years for the operating while intoxicated conviction, and 180 days for the false informing conviction. His sentence was enhanced by an additional five years because of his habitual offender status, for an aggregate ten-year sentence. Parrett later filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence, which was denied. He appeals arguing that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence under the habitual offender statute. Concluding that Parrett's sentence was illegal, we reverse and remand.
Parrett was charged with and pled guilty to Class C felony operating a vehicle after driving privileges are forfeited for life, Class D felony operating a vehicle while intoxicated, Class A misdemeanor false reporting, and to being an habitual offender in Fayette Circuit Court. On September 12, 1997, he was sentenced to serve concurrent terms of five years for the operating a motor vehicle after forfeiture for life conviction, three years for the operating while intoxicated conviction, and 180 days for the false informing conviction. His sentence was enhanced by an additional five years because of his habitual offender status, for an aggregate ten-year sentence.
On September 28, 1998, Parrett filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence alleging that "the legislature did not intend that a conviction under [Indiana Code section] X-XX-XX-XX a Class C felony be subject to further enhancement under the general habitual offender statute [Indiana Code section] XX-XX-X-X." The motion was denied that same day, and Parrett did not file an appeal.
On October 2, 2002, Parrett filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence alleging for a second time that the trial court improperly enhanced his sentence under the habitual offender statute and requesting that the court vacate his habitual offender determination and sentence. Appellant's App. pp. 13-14. On December 6, 2002, the trial court found that it was unnecessary to hold a hearing on Parrett's motion and denied his motion to correct erroneous sentence. Id. at 21. Parrett now appeals.
Parrett filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence alleging that his sentence was improperly enhanced under the habitual offender statute. Although the preferred procedure for presenting a sentencing error is a petition for post-conviction relief, a motion to correct erroneous sentence may be used to correct those errors where the sentence is erroneous on its face. Funk v. State, 714 N.E.2d 746, 748-49 (Ind.Ct.App.1999),trans. denied.
A trial court may correct an erroneous sentence when a sentence is facially defective. Mitchell v. State, 726 N.E.2d 1228, 1243 (Ind.2000); Ind.Code § 35-38-1-15 (1998). A sentence is facially defective if it violates express statutory authority at the time it is imposed. Mitchell, 726 N.E.2d at 1243. When we review the trial court's decision on such a motion, we "defer to the trial court's factual finding" and review its decision "only for abuse of discretion." Id. An abuse of discretion occurs when the trial court's decision is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before it. Myers v. State, 718 N.E.2d 783, 789 (Ind.Ct.App.1999). However, we will "review a trial court's legal conclusions under a de novo standard of review." Mitchell, 726 N.E.2d at 1243.
Parrett argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied his motion to correct erroneous sentence because his "sentence for operating a vehicle after lifetime suspension ... could not legally be further enhanced under the general habitual offender statute[.]" Br. of Appellant at 3. The State contends that Parrett waived this issue when he pled guilty to being an habitual offender.
trans. denied. Therefore, we must consider whether his claim is waived.
We initially observe that a judge cannot impose a sentence that does not conform to the mandate of the relevant statutes. Mitchell v. State, 659 N.E.2d 112, 115 (Ind.1995). "A sentence that is contrary to or violative of a penalty mandated by statute is illegal in the sense that it is without statutory authorization." Lane v. State, 727 N.E.2d 454, 456 (Ind.Ct. App.2000) (citing Rhodes v. State, 698 N.E.2d 304, 307 (Ind.1998)). Further, "[a] sentence that exceeds statutory authority constitutes fundamental error" and is "subject to correction at any time." Id. (citations omitted); see also Weaver v. State, 725 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ind.Ct.App. 2000)
(); Becker v. State, 719 N.E.2d 858, 861 (Ind. Ct.App.1999) () .
In Badger v. State, 754 N.E.2d 930 (Ind. Ct.App.2001), the defendant pled guilty to murder and the trial court ordered the sentence on his murder conviction to be served consecutive to a sentence previously imposed for an unrelated rape conviction. Id. at 932. The defendant filed a motion to correct erroneous sentence in 1995, which the trial court denied and the defendant appealed. On appeal, we affirmed the trial court's denial "holding that although the sentence was erroneous, Badger had benefited from the illegality." Id. The defendant filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief in 1999 alleging that his sentence was illegal, his guilty plea was not voluntary or knowingly made, and ineffective assistance of counsel. The petition was denied, and the defendant appealed. Id.
Once again, our court concluded that the trial court improperly ordered the murder sentence to be served consecutive to the previously imposed rape sentence. Id. at 935. Although we recognized that the principles of the res judicata and law of the case doctrines generally preclude review of an issue that has previously been decided, we also noted:
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