Mathewson v. City of Cheyenne
Decision Date | 23 January 2003 |
Docket Number | No. 02-187.,02-187. |
Citation | 2003 WY 10,61 P.3d 1229 |
Parties | James D. MATHEWSON, Appellant (Plaintiff), v. CITY OF CHEYENNE, Wyoming, Appellee (Defendant). |
Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
James D. Mathewson, Cheyenne, Wyoming, pro se, Representing Appellant.
Michael D. Basom, City Attorney; Mary B. Guthrie, Assistant City Attorney; and Bill Hibbler, Special Assistant City Attorney, Cheyenne, Wyoming, Representing Appellee.
Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ. KITE, Justice.
[¶ 1] James D. Mathewson, a citizen of the City of Cheyenne, objected to the City's authorization of the sale of bonds to finance construction of a parking facility by resolution instead of by ordinance. The district court granted summary judgment to the City finding the statutes allowed the use of a resolution. We affirm.
[¶ 2] The issue we must decide in this case is whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the City.
[¶ 3] On May 13, 2002, the Cheyenne City Council passed Resolution No. 4307 authorizing the sale and issuance of Refunding and Improvement Revenue Bonds in the amount of $9,575,000, the proceeds from which were to be used to construct an off-street parking facility in downtown Cheyenne. As authority for the bond issue, the resolution cited Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 15-1-801(b)(iii) (LexisNexis 2001), which provides that the procedure for issuing revenue or refunding revenue bonds is the same as prescribed by Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-2-424 through 35-2-436 (LexisNexis 2001). Those statutes provide the procedures for issuance of revenue bonds by hospital districts and allow such bonds to be authorized by resolution. The bonds were to be paid with the proceeds from the use of the parking facility. As additional security for the payment of the bonds, the City pledged its share of certain federal mineral royalties which it was entitled to receive. However, those royalties were also pledged to the repayment of revenue bonds issued by the City eight years earlier to finance the construction of the George S. Cox parking facility. In 1994, when the City issued those revenue bonds, it did so by ordinance instead of by resolution. Some of the 1994 revenue bonds remained outstanding, and, therefore, a portion of the proceeds from the sale of the 2002 revenue bonds was to go toward payment or refunding of those bonds, thereby enabling the City to provide the 2002 bond purchasers with a first lien on its federal mineral royalties. The closing for the City's bonds was scheduled for May 28, 2002. However, the filing of this action on May 24, 2002, prevented the sale from occurring.
[¶ 4] We review summary judgments according to the following standards:
Summary judgment is appropriate when no genuine issue as to any material fact exists and the prevailing party is entitled to have a judgment as a matter of law. A genuine issue of material fact exists when a disputed fact, if it were proven, would have the effect of establishing or refuting an essential element of the cause of action or defense which the parties have asserted. We examine the record from the vantage point most favorable to the party who opposed the motion, and we give that party the benefit of all the favorable inferences which may fairly be drawn from the record. We evaluate the propriety of a summary judgment by employing the same standards and by using the same materials as were employed and used by the lower court. We do not accord any deference to the district court's decision on issues of law.
Andersen v. Two Dot Ranch, Inc., 2002 WY 105, ¶ 10, 49 P.3d 1011, ¶ 10 (Wyo.2002) (citations omitted).
[¶ 5] Mr. Mathewson objects to the City's use of a resolution instead of an ordinance to authorize the parking facility revenue bonds because citizens who opposed such a resolution did not have the right to petition for an initiative pursuant to which they could have elected to reverse the City's action—a right they would have had if the action had been pursuant to an ordinance. See Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 22-23-1005 (LexisNexis 2001). He bases his objection to the City's use of a resolution rather than an ordinance on an interpretation of the statutes governing the issuance of those bonds. He concedes these revenue bonds were not subject to the mandatory election requirement established by Article 16, Section 4 of the Wyoming Constitution because they were payable solely from a special fund and not from taxes. Frank v. City of Cody, 572 P.2d 1106 (Wyo.1977); Snyder v. City of Cheyenne, 79 Wyo. 405, 334 P.2d 750 (1959).
[¶ 6] To determine what the statutes require with regard to the issuance of revenue bonds, we must follow our well established rules of statutory construction.
¶ 18 (Wyo.2002). Fundamental to this effort is our duty to give effect to the plain meaning of the language of the statute.
Cooper v. Town of Pinedale, 1 P.3d 1197, 1207 (Wyo.2000).
[¶ 8] Mr. Mathewson does not even suggest the term "resolution" itself is ambiguous. Instead, he argues that, when § 15-1-801 is read together with § 35-2-425, an ambiguity is created. He contends the ambiguity stems from the language "[e]xcept as otherwise provided" which precedes the requirement for a resolution to authorize bonds and from the fact that the latter statute is directed to hospital trustees. We must presume that, when the legislature imposed the provisions contained in the hospital district statutes on municipalities seeking to construct off-street parking, it did so with full knowledge of the content of those provisions, and we can glean no ambiguity from the statutes themselves. Mr. Mathewson fails to direct us to any provision of § 15-1-801 or §§ 35-2-424 through 35-2-436 which "otherwise provides" in connection with procedures for the issuance of revenue bonds for off-street parking facilities. Consequently, we are left with the clear language of the statute as the final statement of legislative intent regarding the procedures to be followed in issuing revenue bonds for that purpose.
[¶ 9] Mr. Mathewson urges, without authority, the legislature must have intended a municipality should use its "highest form of authorization,"—e.g., an ordinance—because a resolution is the "highest form of authorization" for a hospital district. We simply cannot engage in such creative reasoning in an effort to insert language into the statutes that the legislature omitted. Miller v. Bradley, 4 P.3d 882, 888 (Wyo.2000) ( ); Erhart v. Flint Engineering & Construction, 939 P.2d 718, 722 (Wyo.1997) ( ).
[¶ 10] In a final effort to create ambiguity where none existed, Mr. Mathewson points to an entirely different statute— the Downtown Development Authority (Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 15-9-201 through 15-9-223 (LexisNexis 2001))—adopted after the statutes upon which the City relied for its actions, which allows municipalities through a separate development authority or on their own to issue bonds for public parking facilities and requires such be done by ordinance. The City complains Mr. Mathewson did not raise this issue below. A review of the record indicates that, although he did not provide the district court with a discussion of that statute, he did mention it as an example of other revenue bond statutes which required ordinances. In the interest of affording this citizen a full and complete hearing of his complaints, we will address this argument.
[¶ 11] Simply because the legislature chose to make two different options available to...
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