PEOPLE EX REL. TA, 02CA2314.

• Decision Date: 25 March 2004
• Docket Number: No. 02CA2314.,02CA2314.
• Citation: 91 P.3d 473
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee, In the Interest of T.A., Juvenile-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

91 P.3d 473

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner-Appellee,

In the Interest of T.A., Juvenile-Appellant.

No. 02CA2314.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

March 25, 2004.

Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Jess A. Redman, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Petitioner-Appellee.

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Beth Kelley, Deputy State Public

Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Juvenile-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge PICCONE.

T.A., a juvenile, appeals from a judgment adjudicating him delinquent based on a finding that he committed acts that, if committed by an adult, would constitute two counts of the crime of menacing. We affirm.

At the initial detention hearing on July 25, 2002, the juvenile court found probable cause to support the charges, and concluded that the juvenile was a danger to himself and to the community. Accordingly, pursuant to § 19-2-508(3)(a)(IV)(D), C.R.S.2003, the court ordered that the juvenile remain in custody without bond. The People then filed a delinquency petition pursuant to § 19-2-508(3)(a)(V), C.R.S.2003.

Shortly thereafter, the juvenile court committed the juvenile to the Department of Youth Corrections (DYC) following his adjudication of delinquency in another case.

At the August 20, 2002, preliminary hearing in this case, the juvenile pleaded not guilty. Based on its determination that the sixty-day speedy trial period began to run on July 25, 2002, when the no-bond hold was issued, the court calculated that period to expire on September 23, 2002. The court then scheduled the trial to begin on September 10, 2002.

On August 30, 2002, over the juvenile's objection, the court vacated the no-bond hold, based on its conclusion that continued detention without bond in this case jeopardized the juvenile's progress in treatment in DYC in the other case. The court then recalculated the speedy trial period as beginning on August 20, 2002, the date the juvenile entered his not guilty plea, and expiring on October 21, 2002.

Because the juvenile was not transported to court for trial on September 10, 2002, the court rescheduled the trial to begin on October 9, 2002. On the first day of trial, the juvenile moved to dismiss the charges on the ground that the speedy trial period had expired on September 23, 2002. The court denied the motion and, at the conclusion of the proceeding, found that the juvenile had committed the acts alleged in the petition and adjudicated him a delinquent.

The juvenile's sole contention on appeal is that the court violated his statutory and constitutional rights to a speedy trial. Specifically, the juvenile argues that, because he was subject to a no-bond hold, § 19-2-509(4)(b), C.R.S.2003, applies and that the speedy trial period began to run on July 25, 2002, when the no-bond hold was issued. We are not persuaded.

Resolution of defendant's contention requires us to determine which of two speedy trial statutes governs the calculation of the speedy trial period applicable here—§ 19-2-508(3)(a)(IV)(D) or § 19-2-509(4)(b).

Our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. Martin v. People, 27 P.3d 846 (Colo.2001); People in Interest of J.M.N., 39 P.3d 1261 (Colo.App. 2001). In determining legislative intent, a reviewing court should look to the language of the statute, giving effect to words and phrases according to their plain and ordinary meaning. People v. Dist. Court, 713 P.2d 918, 921 (Colo.1986). When the statutory language is clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted as written, without resort to other principles of statutory construction. People v. J.J.H., 17 P.3d 159 (Colo.2001); People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234 (Colo. 1994). If a statute potentially conflicts with another statute, a court must attempt to harmonize them to effectuate their purposes. People v. Hampton, 876 P.2d 1236, 1240 (Colo.1994).

Section 19-2-509(4)(b) provides in relevant part:

Any juvenile who is held without bail or whose bail or bail bond is revoked or increased under an order entered at any time after the initial detention hearing pursuant to subsection (3) of this section and who remains in custody or detention, must be tried on the charges on which the bail is denied or the bail or bail bond is revoked or increased within sixty days after the entry of such order or within sixty days after the juvenile's entry of a plea, whichever date is earlier....

(Emphasis added.)

Section 19-2-508(3)(a)(IV)(D) provides that when the trial court determines at the initial detention hearing that the juvenile should be detained without bail, he must be tried on the charges "within the time limit set forth in § 19-2-108," C.R.S.2003. Section 19-2-108(2)(d), C.R.S.2003, by reference to § 19-2-708(1), C.R.S.2003, provides that, unless the juvenile requests a jury trial, the court must hold an adjudicatory trial within sixty days following the entry of a not guilty plea.

Here, the juvenile was held without bail pursuant to an order issued at the initial detention hearing. The juvenile court vacated the no-bond hold ten days after the preliminary hearing and released him on the charges in this case. We recognize that the juvenile remained in custody as a result of the sentence imposed following his delinquency adjudication in another case. However, his continued detention in DYC was not attributable to the charges pending in this case. Cf. § 18-1.3-405, C.R.S.2003 (to be...