People v. Hampton

• Decision Date: 09 May 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93SC77,93SC77
• Citation: 876 P.2d 1236
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. Russell Millard HAMPTON, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1236

876 P.2d 1236

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner/Cross-Respondent, v. Russell Millard HAMPTON, Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.

No. 93SC77.

Supreme Court of Colorado En Banc.

May 9, 1994.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing

June 6, 1994.

Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Stephen K. ErkenBrack, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timothy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., John Daniel Dailey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Robert Mark Russel, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Laurie A. Booras, Asst. Atty. Gen., Crim. Enforcement Section, Denver, for petitioner/cross-respondent.

Callaway & Turner, John Turner, Colorado Springs, for respondent/cross-petitioner.

David F. Vela, Colo. State Public Defender, Thomas R. Williamson, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, as amicus curiae Colo. State Public Defender on Behalf of respondent/cross-petitioner.

Justice VOLLACK delivered the Opinion of the Court.

We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals decision in People v. Hampton, 857 P.2d 441 (Colo.App.1992), to determine whether the time limits imposed by section 16-5-402(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986), for collateral attack on a conviction begin to run after the conviction in the trial court or after the appellate process is exhausted, where there has been a direct appeal of the conviction. ¹ We also granted certiorari to decide whether section 16-5-402(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986), applies to a collateral attack on a habitual criminal adjudication.

The People petitioned this court to review the decision of the court of appeals holding that the time limits imposed by the statute do not begin to run until after the final decision on appeal. The defendant cross-petitioned, asserting that section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), does not apply to attacks on habitual criminal adjudications.

The trial court held that the defendant's Crim.P. 35(c) motion was timely made when it was brought within three years after his conviction was affirmed on appeal. The issue of whether the statute applies to attacks on habitual criminal adjudications was not before the court of appeals or the trial court but we now address it to better define the scope of postconviction review.

We affirm the ruling of the court of appeals and hold that the time limits of section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986), do not begin to run until after a defendant's appeal has been exhausted. We further hold that, because a habitual criminal adjudication is one component of the overall conviction, collateral attacks are properly analyzed and limited under section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986).

I.

The defendant, Russell Hampton (Hampton), was found guilty in 1984 of first degree sexual assault ² and was adjudicated a habitual criminal. ³ The trial court originally sentenced him to thirty-five years' imprisonment, but in response to Hampton's motion, reduced the sentence to thirty years. On direct appeal, the court of appeals reversed Hampton's conviction on an issue unrelated to those now being raised. People v. Hampton, 728 P.2d 345 (Colo.App.1986). In People v. Hampton, 746 P.2d 947 (Colo.1987), this court reversed the court of appeals and ordered that the conviction be reinstated. Accordingly, on January 19, 1988, the court of appeals issued a mandate affirming Hampton's conviction.

Hampton later sought postconviction relief under Crim.P. 35(c), challenging several aspects of the habitual criminal phase of his trial. On June 30, 1989, he filed a pro se Crim.P. 35(c) motion, alleging that he had been denied effective assistance of counsel at trial. On October 29, 1989, he supplemented that motion, asserting errors in the instructions and verdict form presented to the jury. On January 17, 1990, the public defender filed a new Crim.P. 35(c) motion on Hampton's behalf, reiterating the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and instructional error.

At a March 7, 1991, hearing, the prosecution asserted that Hampton's motions were barred because they had not been filed within the three-year limitations period set forth in section 16-5-402, 8A C.R.S. (1986). The trial court, citing the statute and, alternatively, People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689 (Colo.1989) (allowing a five-year grace period for collateral attacks made under section 16-5-402(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986)), rejected this argument and found that Hampton's motions had been timely raised. ⁴ The trial court addressed the merits of Hampton's motions and denied his claims for relief.

The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's decision, and held that Hampton's Crim.P. 35(c) motions had been filed within the time limits set out in section 16-5-402(1), 8A C.R.S. (1986). The court of appeals ruled that, "for purposes of § 16-5-402 and postconviction review, a conviction occurs when the trial court enters judgment and sentence is imposed, if there is no appeal. If an appeal is pursued, then the conviction is not final for purposes of § 16-5-402 and postconviction review until the appellate process is exhausted." People v. Hampton, 857 P.2d 441, 444 (Colo.App.1992). In this case, the time limits of section 16-5-402(1) did not begin to run until January 19, 1988, the date on which Hampton's conviction was affirmed on appeal. Because Hampton filed his motions within three years of that date, the court of appeals concluded they were timely filed under the statute.

II.

The prosecution claims that the court of appeals erred in ruling that the time limits imposed by section 16-5-402(1) do not begin to run until a defendant's appeal has been exhausted. The prosecution asserts that the use of the word "conviction" in the statute means no more than entry of the judgment and imposition of the sentence, and does not include the time during which a defendant pursues his appeal. The prosecution claims that including appeals within the statutory time limits frustrates the policy behind section 16-5-402(1).

A.

Section 16-5-402(1) establishes a statute of limitations for collateral attacks on the validity of a conviction. A defendant may only raise a collateral attack if it is brought within the time limits of the statute, or if the case meets one of the exceptions of section 16-5-402(2), 8A C.R.S. (1986). ⁵

The purpose behind section 16-5-402(1) is to avoid litigation over stale claims by prohibiting collateral attacks on past convictions if not commenced within specific time periods. People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689, 691 (Colo.1989). The statute is applicable to Crim.P. 35(c) motions and does not violate the Colorado or United States Constitutions. People v. Wiedemer, 852 P.2d 449 (Colo.1993).

The question we address is whether the time limits imposed by section 16-5-402(1) begin to run upon conviction in the trial court, or whether they do not run during the pendency of an appeal.

B.

Our decision turns on the meaning of "conviction" as it is used in the statute. Our primary task in construing a statute is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the legislature. Charnes v. Boom, 766 P.2d 665 (Colo.1988). We look first to the language of the statute. People v. Warner, 801 P.2d 1187 (Colo.1990). Statutory words and phrases are given effect according to their plain and ordinary meaning. Charnes v. Lobato, 743 P.2d 27 (Colo.1987). We read and consider the statutory scheme as a whole to ascertain the intent of the legislature. R & F Enterprises, Inc. v. Board of County Comm'rs of Adams County, 199 Colo. 137, 606 P.2d 64 (1980).

The meaning of "conviction" may vary depending on the statute in which it is used. Generally, however, a conviction is not final and has no legal force until after appeals have been exhausted. See, e.g., Zoske v. People, 625 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Colo.1981) (finding that a conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor became final "when the judgment of conviction is rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and time for discretionary review has elapsed"); People v. Carter, 186 Colo. 391, 395, 527 P.2d 875, 877 (1974) ("We again reiterate, with the expectation that the running argument is finally settled, that for the purposes of reviewing and granting relief from sentences validly imposed the judgment and sentence is not final until after appellate remedies for review have been exhausted."); Read v. Read, 119 Colo. 278, 202 P.2d 953 (1949) (holding that, although the wife had been twice convicted at trial of the murder of a couple's daughter, the husband still had a duty of support and could not be granted a divorce because, until the wife's appeals were completed, she had not been convicted of a felony for which the husband could maintain an action in divorce).

However, we have found that, for the purposes of using a prior conviction as a statutory aggravator in the sentencing phase of a death penalty trial, a conviction means a judgment of conviction in the trial court, not a final determination of conviction after appeal. People v. District Court, 191 Colo. 558, 554 P.2d 1105 (1976). In that case, we held that the legislative intent was clear that "convicted" meant convicted at trial and that a practical application of the statute required that result.

If a sentencing hearing were to be postponed until all appeals of another case or cases had been finally determined, the resulting situation would be chaotic. Further, the statute provides that the sentencing hearing should be before the same jury which tried the defendant's guilt. Obviously, an empanelled jury cannot be held in cold storage for thawing out and use years later.

Id. at 560, 554 P.2d at 1106. The definition of conviction in this case reflects the unique situation of using a conviction for sentence-enhancement purposes. It is unlike the other applications of the definition of conviction that are noted above.

Based on these cases, we hold that the meaning of the word "conviction" in section 16-5-402(1) refers to a conviction after a defendant's appeal has been exhausted. ⁶

C.

We also find it instructive to look to Crim.P. 35(b) for...