People v. Addimando

• Decision Date: 14 July 2021
• Docket Number: 2020–02485,Ind. No. 74/18
• Citation: 152 N.Y.S.3d 33,197 A.D.3d 106
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Nicole ADDIMANDO, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

197 A.D.3d 106

152 N.Y.S.3d 33

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Nicole ADDIMANDO, appellant.

2020–02485

Ind. No. 74/18

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

Argued—April 22, 2021

July 14, 2021

Sullivan & Cromwell, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Garrard R. Beeney, Timothy J. Weinstein, James J. Browne, Samantha R. Briggs, Amanda F. Davidoff, Kamil R. Shields, Alexander M. Self, and Jennifer B. Lee of counsel), for appellant.

Robert V. Tendy, Special District Attorney, Carmel, N.Y. (Larry Glasser of counsel), for respondent.

Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz, P.C., New York, N.Y. (Tyler Maulsby of counsel), Walden Macht & Haran, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Jeffrey A. Udell of counsel), Rubin Law, PLLC, New York, N.Y. (Denise A. Rubin of counsel), and Joseph Hage Aaronson, LLC, New York, N.Y. (Christopher J. Stanley of counsel), for amicus curiae New York City Bar Association (one brief filed).

Davis Polk & Wardwell, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Marissa K. Perry, Maura Douglas, and Brianne Holland–Stergar of counsel), for amici curiae Sanctuary for Families, Day One New York, National Network to End Domestic Violence, Safe Horizon, Inc., Her Justice, Urban Resource Institute, Urban Justice Center, Empire Justice Center, Legal Momentum, New York Legal Assistance Group, New York City Alliance Against Sexual Assault, and Lawyers Committee Against Domestic Violence.

Duane Morris, LLP, New York, N.Y. (Sharon L. Caffrey and Leah A. Mintz, pro hac vice, and Eric R. Breslin of counsel), for amici curiae Jeffrion L. Aubry, Brian A. Benjamin, Alessandra Biaggi, David Carlucci, Andrew Gounardes, Brad Hoylman, Monica R. Martinez, Shelley B. Mayer, Zellnor Myrie, Kevin S. Parker, Roxanne J. Persaud, Gustavo Rivera, Diane J. Savino, and Luis R. Sepúlveda.

WILLIAM F. MASTRO, J.P., REINALDO E. RIVERA, SYLVIA O. HINDS–RADIX, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, JJ.

OPINION & ORDER

RIVERA, J.

On the instant appeal, this Court is presented, inter alia, with the question of whether the County Court properly applied the Domestic Violence Survivors Justice Act ( Social Services Law § 459–a et seq. ), effective May 14, 2019, which amended Penal Law § 60.12 (hereinafter the DV Survivor's Act or Penal Law § 60.12 ). The DV Survivor's Act permits courts to impose reduced alternative sentences in certain cases involving defendants who are victims of domestic violence. This case appears to be the first time that an appellate court has the opportunity to address the DV Survivor's Act.

For the reasons now set forth, we hold that the County Court did not properly apply the DV Survivor's Act when sentencing the defendant. Upon considering the plain language of the DV Survivor's Act, the legislative history of the statute, and the particular circumstances of this case, we modify the judgment, on the facts and as a matter of discretion in the interest of justice, by reducing (1) the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of murder in the second degree from an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 19 years to life to a determinate term of imprisonment of 7½ years to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision, and (2) the term of imprisonment imposed on the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree from a determinate term of imprisonment of 15 years to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision to a determinate term of imprisonment of 3½ years to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision, which terms shall run concurrently with each other.

Sometime during the night of September 27, 2017, and the morning of September 28, 2017, the defendant fatally shot Christopher Grover, who was her domestic partner and the father of her two children. According to the defendant and several others who testified at the approximately one-month jury trial, the defendant had been repeatedly subjected to brutal physical and sexual abuse at the hands of Grover for many years. The jury rejected the defendant's battered women's syndrome justification defense, and found her guilty of murder in the second degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

The defendant moved to be sentenced under the DV Survivor's Act. Following a hearing at which the defendant adduced additional evidence that she had been abused, the County Court denied her motion and sentenced the defendant to an indeterminate term of imprisonment of 19 years to life on the conviction of murder in the second degree and a concurrent determinate term of imprisonment of 15 years to be followed by 5 years of postrelease supervision on the conviction of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree.

I. The DV Survivor's Act/ Penal Law § 60.12

As long-recognized, "[w]hen presented with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature" ( People v. Wallace, 31 N.Y.3d 503, 507, 80 N.Y.S.3d 658, 105 N.E.3d 1238 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Kuzmich v. 50 Murray St. Acquisition LLC, 34 N.Y.3d 84, 91, 108 N.Y.S.3d 431, 132 N.E.3d 624 ; Samiento v. World Yacht Inc., 10 N.Y.3d 70, 77–78, 854 N.Y.S.2d 83, 883 N.E.2d 990 ; Matter of DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Spitzer, 7 N.Y.3d 653, 660, 827 N.Y.S.2d 88, 860 N.E.2d 705 ). As the statutory text is the clearest indicator of legislative intent (see People ex rel. Negron v. Superintendent, Woodbourne Corr. Facility, 36 N.Y.3d 32, 36, 136 N.Y.S.3d 819, 160 N.E.3d 1266 ; Matter of New York County Lawyers’ Assn. v. Bloomberg, 19 N.Y.3d 712, 721, 955 N.Y.S.2d 835, 979 N.E.2d 1162 ), the starting point of interpretation must always be the language of the text itself (see Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 ). The text is interpreted "according to its natural and obvious sense, without resorting to an artificial or forced construction" (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 94).

Penal Law § 60.12(1) provides:

"the court, upon a determination following a hearing that (a) at the time of the instant offense, the defendant was a victim of domestic violence subjected to substantial physical, sexual or psychological abuse inflicted by a member of the same family or household as the defendant as such term is defined in subdivision one of section 530.11 of the criminal procedure law ; (b) such abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior; (c) having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character and condition of the defendant, that a sentence of imprisonment pursuant to section 70.00, 70.02, 70.06 or subdivision two or three of section 70.71 [of the Penal Law] would be unduly harsh may instead impose a sentence in accordance with this section."

The language of the DV Survivor's Act clearly and unambiguously sets forth three factors for a court to consider, namely: (1) whether the defendant was a victim of domestic violence inflicted by a member of the same family or household; (2) whether the abuse was a significant contributing factor to the defendant's criminal behavior; and (3) whether, having regard for the nature and circumstances of the crime and the history, character, and condition of the defendant, a sentence in accordance with the customary statutory sentencing guidelines would be unduly harsh.

The statute does not expressly set forth the standard of proof or the appropriate evidentiary burden that must be borne by the defendant, as the movant. Utilizing as comparison the evidentiary standard applicable on a motion to vacate a judgment and set aside a sentence (see CPL 440.30[6] [at a hearing on a motion to vacate a judgment and set aside a sentence, the defendant has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence every fact essential to support the motion]), we apply the preponderance of the evidence standard to our review and analysis herein. At the commencement of the subject hearing, the parties agreed that this was the appropriate standard of proof, and the County Court applied this standard. The preponderance of the evidence standard requires enough evidence to "produce a reasonable belief in the truth of the facts asserted" ( Jarrett v. Madifari, 67 A.D.2d 396, 404, 415 N.Y.S.2d 644 [internal quotation marks omitted]). "A party who has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence must prove his or her contention by the greater weight of evidence" ( 8 Carmody–Wait 2d § 56:14 ).

Although the strongest indication of the statute's meaning is in its plain language, "the legislative history of an enactment may also be relevant and is not to be ignored, even if words be clear" ( People v. Badji, 36 N.Y.3d 393, 399, 142 N.Y.S.3d 128, 165 N.E.3d 1068 [internal quotation marks omitted]). The legislative history reveals that the statute sought to address harsh punishment received by victims of domestic violence who commit crimes against their abusers. "[A]ll too often in our court system when women are defending themselves against domestic violence, instead of being met with a judge with compassion and assistance and help, the judge is just putting forth punishment" (Stenographic Record at 1572, N.Y. Senate Bill S1077, Mar. 12, 2019 [statement of Senator Carlucci]).

The sponsors of this law intended for a sentencing court to exercise discretion in its analysis of the aforementioned three factors:

"We are not saying that you throw out what they've done out of the window in the sentencing. The judge still has the discretion. We're asking the judge to take into consideration what they have gone through, what they were living with" (Stenographic Record at 1570, N.Y. Senate Bill S1077, Mar. 12, 2019 [statement of Senator Persaud]).

"MR. RA: Okay. Now you mentioned earlier that there are certain exceptions in terms of crimes that this would not apply to, but there are some violent offenses that this still would apply to like manslaughter, first degree assault, battery, robbery; it would apply to

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