People v. Wallace

• Decision Date: 08 May 2018
• Docket Number: No. 49,49
• Citation: 80 N.Y.S.3d 658,105 N.E.3d 1238,31 N.Y.3d 503
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Akeem WALLACE, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

31 N.Y.3d 503

105 N.E.3d 1238

80 N.Y.S.3d 658

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Akeem WALLACE, Appellant.

No. 49

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 8, 2018

David C. Schopp, The Legal Aid Bureau of Buffalo, Inc., Buffalo (Robert L. Kemp and Timothy P. Murphy of counsel), for appellant.

John J. Flynn, District Attorney, Buffalo (Daniel J. Punch and Donna A. Milling of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

FEINMAN, J.

The question presented on this appeal is whether the "place of business" exception to Penal Law § 265.03(3) applies to an employee who possessed an unlicensed firearm at work. Defendant contends that "place of business" simply means one's place of employment, and therefore the exception applies. We read the exception to narrowly encompass a person's "place of business," when such person is a merchant, storekeeper, or principal operator of a like establishment.

I.

On June 9, 2013, defendant was working as a "swing manager"—a newer manager who has not been trained as an assistant manager—at a McDonald's restaurant in Buffalo, New York. At approximately 6:00 p.m., defendant was seated at a table in the lobby area of the restaurant, conversing with other employees and his cousin. When defendant stood up from the table to leave, a gun in the pocket of his pants fired, causing an injury to the lower part of his right leg. Defendant headed to the back of the restaurant, followed by his cousin, where he attempted to clean the blood off his leg. When another employee called 911, defendant ordered her to hang up; defendant then handed the gun to his cousin, who left through the back door of the establishment.

Police, responding to a "shots fired" call, proceeded to the scene, but were initially told by customers and employees that no shooting had occurred. After leaving, police received a dispatch that an individual with a gunshot wound had been admitted to a hospital a few blocks from the McDonald's. One officer then returned to the restaurant and requestioned an employee, who admitted that defendant had shot himself in the leg. Around this time, another officer proceeded to the hospital, where he found defendant, still in his McDonald's uniform, being treated for a gunshot wound to his lower right leg. Defendant explained to the officer that he had been shot by an unknown individual at a nearby bus shelter. After the officer's investigation at that location revealed no evidence of a shooting, the officer returned to the McDonald's and discovered blood droplets, a shell casing, and bloody towels in the back of the establishment. The police then arrested defendant and charged him with criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree in violation of Penal Law § 265.03, a class C violent felony.

In a pretrial omnibus motion, defendant moved to inspect the grand jury minutes and dismiss the indictment "or [t]o reduce the charges to a misdemeanor," arguing that because he possessed the firearm at his workplace, the "place of business" exception to Penal Law § 265.03(3) applies. Supreme Court denied defendant's motion. Defendant waived his right to a jury trial, and was convicted after a bench trial.

The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that

"[a]lthough the ‘place of business’ exception is not statutorily defined, it has been construed narrowly by the courts in an effort to balance the State's strong policy to severely restrict possession of any firearm ... with its policy to treat with leniency persons attempting to protect certain areas in which they have a possessory interest and to which members of the public have limited access" ( People v. Wallace, 147 A.D.3d 1494, 1494, 47 N.Y.S.3d 603 [4th Dept. 2017] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted] ).

The dissenter opined that because defendant possessed the weapon at his "place of business," the evidence was legally insufficient to establish that defendant violated Penal Law § 265.03(3) ( id. at 1495 ). The dissent reasoned that "the statute [was] clear and unambiguous on its face .... [and] if the legislature had wanted to limit the places of business to which the exception of section 265.03(3) applies, it could easily have done so" ( id. ). The dissenting Justice granted defendant leave to appeal to this Court ( 2017 N.Y. Slip Op. 97796[U] [2017] ).

II.

Penal Law § 265.03(3) provides that "[a] person is guilty of criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree when ... such person possesses any loaded firearm." "Such possession shall not, except as provided in subdivision one or seven of section 265.02 of this article, constitute a violation of this subdivision if such possession takes place in such person's home or place of business " ( Penal Law § 265.03[3] [emphasis added] ). Recognizing that "possession of a loaded firearm to protect the persons or property in one's home or place of business is less reprehensible than possession for other purposes" ( People v. Powell, 54 N.Y.2d 524, 526, 446 N.Y.S.2d 232, 430 N.E.2d 1285 [1981] [citations omitted] ), the legislature has classified such possession as a misdemeanor and possession outside the home or place of business as a felony. Thus, possession of an unlicensed firearm under the exception does not render criminal conduct legal, but only serves to reduce the level of offense.

Defendant argues that the "place of business" exception encompasses any place where a person earns their livelihood. The People contend that the use of the possessive pronoun implies ownership over the "place of business." As "place of business" is undefined within the Penal Law (see Penal Law § 265.00 ), this Court must interpret its meaning within the exception.

"When presented with a question of statutory interpretation, our primary consideration is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the Legislature" ( Yatauro v. Mangano, 17 N.Y.3d 420, 426, 931 N.Y.S.2d 36, 955 N.E.2d 343 [2011] [internal quotation marks and citations omitted] ). "Generally, inquiry must be made of the spirit and purpose of the legislation, which requires examination of the statutory context of the provision as well as its legislative history" ( Sutka v. Conners, 73 N.Y.2d 395, 403, 541 N.Y.S.2d 191, 538 N.E.2d 1012 [1989] ; see Ferres v. City of New Rochelle, 68 N.Y.2d 446, 451, 510 N.Y.S.2d 57, 502 N.E.2d 972 [1986] ). In "construing provisions ... qualified by an exception, we usually read the exception narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision" ( CIR v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 739, 109 S.Ct. 1455, 103 L.Ed.2d 753 [1989] ; see generally Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 [1991] ; People v. Rivera, 25 N.Y.3d 256, 263, 11 N.Y.S.3d 509, 33 N.E.3d 465 [2015] ), with a mind towards results that do not lead to unreasonableness or absurdity (see People v. Pabon, 28 N.Y.3d 147, 156, 42 N.Y.S.3d 659, 65 N.E.3d 688 [2016] ; People v. Garson, 6 N.Y.3d 604, 614, 815 N.Y.S.2d 887, 848 N.E.2d 1264 [2006] ; see also People v. Ryan, 274 N.Y. 149, 152, 8 N.E.2d 313 [1937] ; People ex rel. Wood v. Lacombe, 99 N.Y. 43, 1 N.E. 599 [1885] ; McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes §§ 95, 97, 143, 145).

Understanding that "[t]he intention of the Legislature [may] first ...be sought from ... all the statutes relating to the same general subject matter " (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 92[b], Comment [emphasis added]; see Betz v. Horr, 276 N.Y. 83, 11 N.E.2d 548 [1937] ), it is notable that the subject of firearm possession, along with the "place of business" language, is not exclusive to section 265.03, but can also be found in its counterpart, Penal Law § 400.00 —the licensing statute. Under Penal Law § 400.00, subject to qualifications, "[a] license for a pistol or revolver ... shall be issued to ... have and possess in [one's] place of business by a merchant or storekeeper " ( Penal Law § 400.00[2][b] [emphasis added] ). As

"[o]ne part of an act of the legislature may be referred to in aid of the interpretation of other parts of the same act[,] .... in [the] case of doubt or uncertainty, acts in pari materia ... may be referred to in order to discern the intent of the legislature in the use of particular terms " ( Smith v. People, 47 N.Y. 330, 339 [1872] [emphasis added]; see also McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 221[b] ).

"These principles of statutory construction assume particular significance where ... the Legislature has spoken to an issue simultaneously in separate laws ... and has repeatedly adopted and amended pertinent provisions piecemeal throughout decades " ( Sutka v. Conners, 73 N.Y.2d at 403–404, 541 N.Y.S.2d 191, 538 N.E.2d 1012 [emphasis added]; Seligman v. Friedlander, 199 N.Y. 373, 376, 92 N.E. 1047 [1910] ); Morgan v. Hedstrom, 164 N.Y. 224, 58 N.E. 26 [1900] ).

III.

Penal Law §§ 265.03 and Penal Law § 400.00 trace their origins to the same ancestor statute, Penal Law § 1897, as amended in 1909 (L 1909, ch 88). In 1913, the "merchant or storekeeper" and "place of business" language that is substantially recognizable in today's licensing statute was first introduced through an amendment to section 1897 (L 1913, ch 608, § 1). Exactly 50 years later, in 1963, the Penal Law received a major overhaul, "introduced on behalf of the Joint Legislative Committee on Firearms and Ammunition" (the Committee), in an effort to standardize its provisions (L 1963, ch 136, § 1 n *). That year, the licensing language was completely moved to Penal Law § 1903 (L 1963, ch 136, § 8; see 1963 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y. at 155). In 1964, subdivision (2) of section 1897, criminalizing possession of a loaded firearm, implemented the "place of business" exception language now found in Penal Law § 265.03(3) (L 1964, ch 521, § 1; see 1964 McKinney's Session Laws of N.Y. Penal Law at 791).

Prior to the 1963 and 1964 amendments, the Committee generated two reports discussing the purpose and intent of such legislation. As the...