People v. Alvas

• Decision Date: 06 July 1990
• Docket Number: No. C005511,C005511
• Citation: 271 Cal.Rptr. 131,221 Cal.App.3d 1459
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 1 NDLR P 11 The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis ALVAS, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 131

271 Cal.Rptr. 131

221 Cal.App.3d 1459, 1 NDLR P 11

The PEOPLE of the State of California, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Dennis ALVAS, Defendant and Appellant.

No. C005511.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

July 6, 1990.

Harry D. Roth, Davis, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for defendant and appellant.

John D. Phillips, Dist. Atty., and David Wellenbrock, Chief Deputy Dist. Atty., for plaintiff and respondent.

EVANS, Associate Justice.

Following a trial by court, defendant was found to be mentally retarded and a danger to himself or others (Welf. & Inst.Code, § 6500) ¹ and was involuntarily committed to the Stockton Developmental Center for one year.

On appeal defendant contends the judgment must be reversed because (1) the record fails to show an advisement and waiver of the right to a jury trial on the issues of dangerousness and retardation, and (2) section 6500 is unconstitutionally vague for failure to define "dangerousness" as it is used in that section. ²

Conceding that defendant's first contention has merit and that reversal is therefore required, the People have not addressed defendant's contention challenging the constitutionality of section 6500. The concession is appropriate, although not on the authority cited by the parties to this appeal.

The People and defendant each rely on O'Brien v. Superior Court (1976) 61 Cal.App.3d 62, 132 Cal.Rptr. 13, for the proposition that where a court trial results in the defendant's commitment pursuant to section 6500 proceedings, reversal is required unless the record shows an advisement and waiver of the defendant's right to a jury trial. Neither O'Brien nor any other case disclosed by our research reaches such a conclusion.

The defendant in O'Brien was the subject of section 6500 proceedings and unsuccessfully moved for a jury trial on the issues of his alleged mental retardation and dangerousness. Following a court trial in which those issues were determined adversely to him, defendant was committed for treatment for one year; he sought habeas corpus relief. The O'Brien court held, on equal protection and impliedly on due process grounds, that even though there was no statutory right to a jury trial for a defendant subject to section 6500 proceedings, that "in commitment or recommitment proceedings under Welfare and Institutions Code section 6500 et seq. allegedly mentally retarded persons are entitled to a jury trial upon request." (61 Cal.App.3d at p. 69, 132 Cal.Rptr. 13, emphasis added.)

The record in this instance does not contain such a request. However the lack of a request for a jury trial notwithstanding, and for reasons to be explained, we conclude that defendant's contention must be sustained pursuant to both the equal protection and the due process clauses of the federal and state Constitutions (U.S. Const., 14th Amend.; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a)) and as a consequence this matter must be reversed and remanded for retrial.

Effective July 1, 1969, the Legislature enacted a sweeping revision of the mental health laws (§ 5000 et seq.), known as the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act (hereafter LPS Act). The LPS Act, which expressly excludes the mentally retarded (§ 5002), applies, inter alia, to those who as a result of mental disorder are a danger to themselves or others or are gravely disabled, and provides for 72-hour and 14-day periods of detention for treatment and evaluation. (§ 5150, 5170, 5200, 5225, and 5250.) If further detention is required, sections 5300, 5301, and 5304 provide the procedural mechanism for commitment and recommitment periods of 180 days each. With respect to these extended commitments, the trial court is statutorily required (§ 5302) to advise the defendant of his right to a jury trial on the allegations. No similar safeguard exists for those accused of being dangerously mentally retarded.

Where two groups are similarly situated, constitutional mandates of equal protection require equal treatment of both groups, unless the state can show a compelling interest in discriminating between them. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 530, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549; In re Gary W. (1971) 5 Cal.3d 296, 303, 96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201; People v. Feagley (1975) 14 Cal.3d 338, 352, 121 Cal.Rptr. 509, 535 P.2d 373.)

With respect to involuntary commitments, we cannot conceive of any rational distinction to be made between the class of persons who due to mental disorder constitute a danger or are gravely disabled and the class of persons who pose a similar danger because of their mental retardation. At stake for the members of each class is the fundamental interest of liberty. As to each class, liberty of its members is put at risk through no apparent fault of their own, but solely because of mental deficiencies beyond their control. Indeed, in People v. Colvin (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 614, 171 Cal.Rptr. 32, it was held on equal protection grounds that a defendant in a mentally disordered sex offender proceeding (former § 6300 et seq., repealed by Stats. 1981, ch. 928, § 2, p. 3485) must be given notice of his right to a jury trial on the issue of his commitment because a comparable right was provided for the mentally disordered under the LPS Act. (At pp. 622-625, 171 Cal.Rptr. 32.)

This being the case, no compelling reason exists for the disparate treatment in involuntary commitments between the two classes by providing those alleged to come within the LPS Act with the procedural safeguard of advisement of the right to a jury trial while denying it to those defendants charged with dangerous mental retardation. We conclude that equal protection requires that a defendant in a section 6500 proceeding be advised of his right to a jury trial.

Although the parties have not so argued, we believe the same conclusion is compelled under a due process analysis.

The due process interest at stake is the defendant's personal liberty, a " 'fundamental interest, second only to life itself....' " (In re Hop (1981) 29 Cal.3d 82, 89, 171 Cal.Rptr. 721, 623 P.2d 282, quoting from People v. Olivas (1976) 17 Cal.3d 236, 251, 131 Cal.Rptr. 55, 551 P.2d 375.) In Duncan v. Louisiana (1968) 391 U.S. 145, 88 S.Ct. 1444, 20 L.Ed.2d 491, it was held that in serious criminal cases, i.e., where the punishment was not less than six months and the offense otherwise qualified as petty, that liberty was such a fundamental interest that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause required that it be protected by the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the right to a jury trial. (At p. 149, 88 S.Ct. at p. 1447, 20 L.Ed.2d at p. 496.) In In re Gary W., supra, 5 Cal.3d 296, 96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201, it was concluded that due process, as well as equal protection, required that in proceedings to extend the commitments of Youth Authority wards predicated upon their need for further treatment owing to their continuing dangerousness to the public due to mental or physical abnormalities (§ 1800), the wards were entitled to jury trials. In so holding, Gary W. observed that loss of liberty occasioned by involuntary confinement for treatment is not made less fundamental by virtue of its purpose, and that in extending the right to trial by jury to persons subject to civil commitment proceedings (§ 5303 of the LPS Act) the Legislature recognized that the interest involved was no less fundamental than that involved in criminal proceedings. (At pp. 306-307, 96 Cal.Rptr. 1, 486 P.2d 1201.)

Following the reasoning of the cited authority makes clear that the focus is on the resultant deprivation of liberty, rather than upon the procedural mechanism, be it designated civil or criminal, used in achieving that result. We think it is beyond dispute that the right to a jury trial in adult involuntary commitment proceedings is a right of constitutional dimension. Where "a constitutional right exists, it must be observed unless waived and ... a waiver implies, among other things, a knowledge that the right existed." (People v. Ruiz (1969) 1 Cal.App.3d 992, 1000, 82 Cal.Rptr. 408; People v. Hunter (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 683, 685, 76 Cal.Rptr. 101.) Consequently, a defendant proceeded against under section 6500 must be advised of his right to a jury trial.

Moreover, in order to insure an adequate record for appellate review and to forestall collateral proceedings challenging the giving of such advisement, which often necessitate additional hearings, we hold that before adjudicating a section 6500 proceeding for commitment or recommitment in a trial by court the record must show an advisement and waiver of the right to a jury trial. (Cf. In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 132, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449; Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274, each holding the record must show that the constitutional rights to confrontation, against self-incrimination, and to a jury trial, were enumerated for and waived by the accused.) Of course, "[i]f the person is so mentally retarded as to be unable to comprehend the advisal of the right [to a jury trial], the record should affirmatively reflect that fact ... [with that determination being] made by the trial judge based upon competent evidence." (In re Watson (1979) 91 Cal.App.3d 455, 462, 154 Cal.Rptr. 151.)

Since we have stated a new rule of law, we must consider whether the decision should have retroactive effect. (People v. Whittington (1977) 74 Cal.App.3d 806, 823, 141 Cal.Rptr. 742.)

"Whether a judicial decision establishing new constitutional standards is to be given retroactive effect is customarily determined by weighing the following factors: '(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of reliance by ... authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of retroactive application of the new standards.' (Stovall v. Denno (1967) 388 U.S. 293, 297 [18 L.Ed.2d 1199, 1203, 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970]; accord, ...