People v. Anonymous

• Decision Date: 18 February 2020
• Docket Number: No. 8,8
• Citation: 145 N.E.3d 924,34 N.Y.3d 631,123 N.Y.S.3d 41
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. ANONYMOUS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

34 N.Y.3d 631

145 N.E.3d 924

123 N.Y.S.3d 41

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.ANONYMOUS, Appellant.

No. 8

Court of Appeals of New York.

February 18, 2020

OPINION OF THE COURT

RIVERA, J.

A court is without authority to consider for sentencing purposes erroneously unsealed official records of a prior criminal action or proceeding terminated in favor of the defendant. Where violation of the sealing mandate of CPL 160.50 impacts the ultimate sentence, the error warrants appropriate correction. Such is the case here, where the court imposed on defendant a higher sentence than promised at his plea, based on its finding that the unsealed trial record—which the court mistakenly believed it could consider—established defendant's violation of a pre-sentence condition of his plea. The order of the Appellate Division should therefore be reversed, and the matter remitted for resentencing without reference to or consideration of the contents of the sealed record.

I.

Defendant pleaded guilty to fourth-degree criminal possession of a controlled substance in exchange for a four-year sentence of imprisonment followed by three years of post-release supervision. As relevant to this appeal, after defendant pleaded guilty, the court adjourned sentencing and imposed as a condition to the promised sentence that defendant "stay out of trouble."

Before sentencing, defendant was arrested and prosecuted for a crime allegedly committed after entering his plea. At defendant's request, the sentencing court agreed to adjourn defendant's sentencing pending resolution of the matter. The jury acquitted defendant of the new charge and the official record, including the trial transcript, was sealed in accordance with CPL 160.50.

The day following that acquittal, the prosecutor informed the court which had accepted defendant's criminal possession plea that the People would be requesting an enhanced sentence on the criminal possession conviction because defendant violated a pre-sentence condition of the plea by engaging in criminal conduct during the sentencing adjournment, as made clear by defendant's trial testimony in the other case. The prosecutor then moved to unseal the records in the prior criminal action terminated by acquittal, arguing "justice requires" unsealing because the trial testimony was relevant to defendant's request to be sentenced under the terms of his plea. The court granted the motion.

Thereafter, the prosecutor submitted defendant's unsealed trial testimony in support of the People's argument that defendant should be sentenced to the maximum nine-year sentence (see Penal Law § 70.70[4][b][ii] ). Defense counsel objected to the unsealing and to the court's consideration of the trial testimony for purposes of sentencing, citing this Court's decision in Matter of Katherine B. v. Cataldo , 5 N.Y.3d 196, 800 N.Y.S.2d 363, 833 N.E.2d 698 (2005). Counsel argued the court should sentence defendant to the four years, as promised.

The court found, based on defendant's trial testimony in the sealed proceeding, that defendant violated the condition of his plea that he not commit any further crimes, i.e., he "stay out of trouble." Accordingly, the court determined it was not bound by its promised four-year sentence and imposed an eight-year term of incarceration.

The Appellate Division affirmed the judgment ( People v. Anonymous , 161 A.D.3d 401, 402, 77 N.Y.S.3d 10 [1st Dept. 2018] ). A divided Court concluded that Katherine B. controlled and it was error to unseal the records, but a unanimous court held that, under People v. Patterson , 78 N.Y.2d 711, 579 N.Y.S.2d 617, 587 N.E.2d 255 (1991), the violation of the sealing statute "without more" did not require resentencing or a reduced sentence ( Anonymous , 161 A.D.3d at 402, 77 N.Y.S.3d 10 ; id. at 403, 77 N.Y.S.3d 10 [Tom, J., concurring] ). A Judge of this Court granted defendant leave to appeal ( People v. Anonymous , 32 N.Y.3d 1063, 1063, 89 N.Y.S.3d 117, 113 N.E.3d 951 [2018] ).

II.

Defendant argues that the sentencing court erred by unsealing the records and then relying on his unsealed trial testimony to deviate from the court's promised sentence. Defendant maintains that the court's unsealing and reliance on the unsealed records for sentencing purposes (1) violates the statutory scheme of CPL 160.50 and the prescriptive holding in Katherine B. , and (2) undermines the legislative goals of preserving the presumption of innocence and ensuring that an individual suffers no consequences as a result of unsubstantiated accusations. The People respond that the court properly unsealed the records to determine whether defendant violated the plea. Alternatively, the People contend that even if it was error to unseal the records, under the reasoning of Patterson , the error does not require defendant to be resentenced without consideration of the unsealed records.

We conclude that the court erroneously granted the prosecutor's motion to unseal the records of the proceeding terminated by acquittal and improperly considered defendant's trial testimony in deciding not to adhere to the promised sentence. Further, because the court's sentence is based on that testimony, the proper remedy is to remit for defendant's resentencing without reference to the contents of the sealed records.

III.

Whether the sealing was improper turns, foremost, on the language of CPL 160.50. "As the clearest indicator of legislative intent is the statutory text, the starting point in any case of interpretation must always be the language itself, giving effect to the plain meaning thereof" ( People v. Golo , 26 N.Y.3d 358, 361, 23 N.Y.S.3d 110, 44 N.E.3d 185 [2015], quoting Majewski v. Broadalbin–Perth Cent. School Dist. , 91 N.Y.2d 577, 583, 673 N.Y.S.2d 966, 696 N.E.2d 978 [1998] ). This is not the first time we have considered the sealing mandate of CPL 160.50 and thus we are bound and guided by the Court's previous exposition on the statute's scope and legislatively specified exceptions, as well as the salutary purposes of the sealing regime.

A.

CPL 160.50(1) provides, in relevant part:

"Upon the termination of a criminal action or proceeding against a person in favor of such person, ... unless the district attorney upon motion with not less than five days notice to such person ... demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that the interests of justice require otherwise, ... the record of such action or proceeding shall be sealed...."

"[T]he Legislature's objective in enacting CPL 160.50 ... was to ensure that the protections provided be ‘consistent with the presumption of innocence, which simply means that no individual should suffer adverse consequences merely on the basis of an accusation, unless the charges were ultimately sustained in a court of law’ " ( Patterson , 78 N.Y.2d at 716, 579 N.Y.S.2d 617, 587 N.E.2d 255, citing Governor's Approval Mem, 1976 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 2451). In other words, "[t]he sealing requirement was designed to lessen the adverse consequences of unsuccessful criminal prosecutions by limiting access to official records and papers in criminal proceedings which terminate in favor of the accused" ( Katherine B. , 5 N.Y.3d at 202, 800 N.Y.S.2d 363, 833 N.E.2d 698 [citation omitted] ). The "articulated rationale for the enactment of the sealing statutes—the ‘presumption of innocence’ ... [—]directed usually at pending charges can surely have been viewed by the Legislature as even more germane in relation to favorably terminated matters" ( Matter of Alonzo M. v. New York City Department of Probation , 72 N.Y.2d 662, 668–669, 536 N.Y.S.2d 26, 532 N.E.2d 1254 [1988] ). At its core, "[t]he statute serves the laudable goal of [e]nsuring that one who is charged but not convicted of an offense suffers no stigma as a result of [the accused] having once been the object of an unsustained accusation" ( Hynes v. Karassik , 47 N.Y.2d 659, 662, 419 N.Y.S.2d 942, 393 N.E.2d 1015 [1979] ).

The sealing mandate of CPL 160.50(1), in combination with CPL 160.60 —which provides that "the arrest and prosecution shall be deemed a nullity and the accused shall be restored, in contemplation of law, to the status the [accused occupied] before the arrest and prosecution"—requires more than a court's acknowledgment that the arrest and prosecution ended favorably. The law clearly intends that the criminal action and proceedings be treated as if they never occurred—as if they are not part of defendant's past. As the Court summarized in Matter of Alonzo M. ,

"when an action is favorably disposed of in an adult proceeding the records are sealed under CPL 160.50, the arrest and prosecution are deemed a nullity, the accused is restored to the status occupied before arrest and unless specifically required by statute, or directed by a superior court, the accused is not required to divulge information regarding the favorably terminated action. This statutory safety net protecting adults ensures that records and materials generated from an arrest and a favorably terminated proceeding are eliminated as facets of the accused's criminal pedigree" ( 72 N.Y.2d at 667–668, 536 N.Y.S.2d 26, 532 N.E.2d 1254 [citations omitted] ).

B.

In CPL 160.50(1)(d), the legislature identified a restricted list of six exceptions to the sealing mandate's prohibition on access, including (d)(ii), relied upon by the People here.¹ That exception allows access to sealed records by "a law enforcement agency upon ex parte motion ..., if such agency demonstrates to the satisfaction of the court that justice requires that such records be made available to it ... " ( CPL 160.50[1][d][ii] ).

"These six statutory exceptions are precisely drawn. This underscores the Legislature's commitment to prohibiting disclosure of sealed records—once initial sealing has not been forestalled by the court in the interest of justice—except where the statute explicitly provides otherwise" ( Katherine B. , 5 N.Y.3d at 203, 800 N.Y.S.2d 363, 833...