People v. Antonio-Antimo

• Decision Date: 18 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99SC384.,99SC384.
• Citation: 29 P.3d 298
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Jorge ANTONIO-ANTIMO, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

29 P.3d 298

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner, v. Jorge ANTONIO-ANTIMO, Respondent.

No. 99SC384.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

September 18, 2000.

Rehearing Denied October 10, 2000.

Ken Salazar, Attorney General, Peter J. Cannici, Assistant Attorney General, Appellate Division, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioner.

David S. Kaplan, Colorado State Public Defender, Keyonyu X O'Connell, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent. Justice RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This court granted certiorari to address whether a plea must be vacated when a plea agreement results in an illegal sentence being imposed on a defendant.¹ We hold that when a legal plea bargain is enforced by means of an illegal sentence, the proper remedy, if possible, is to modify the illegal sentence but permit the valid and enforceable plea agreement to stand.

I. Facts and Procedural History

Respondent, Jorge Antonio-Antimo, was charged with unlawful sale of a schedule II controlled substance and possession of a schedule II controlled substance. See § 18-18-405(2)(a)(I), 6 C.R.S. (1999). On July 28, 1995, Respondent appeared before the district court, represented by a court-appointed attorney. On July 28, Respondent, a Mexican national, entered into a written plea agreement with the district attorney in which he promised to plead guilty to "sale of a controlled [substance]," in exchange for dismissal of the possession charge. In addition, the parties stipulated to a sentence concession of: "No jail[,] deportation."

When Respondent's case was called before the district court, his attorney indicated that Respondent had entered into a plea agreement with the district attorney in which he would plead guilty to sale of a controlled substance in exchange for a dismissal of the possession charge. Respondent's attorney then stated, "The sentence concession is no jail time and being held for deportation." (R. at 28.)

The district court then proceeded to question Respondent in order to ensure that Respondent understood. When explaining the possible consequences of his plea, the court stated, "In addition [to jail time], you can be deported. You can be barred from ever returning to this country and prohibited from getting United States citizenship. Do you understand that as well?" (R. at 30.) Respondent answered that he understood.

The sentencing court accepted the guilty plea and entered the following order:

It's the judgment and sentence of the Court that the defendant be granted probation for a period of 5 years. A condition of probation is that the defendant cooperate with deportation authorities. That he leave this country and not return unless he does so legally with proper authorization and documentation. That he pay the fees did [sic] costs required by statute and do 50 hours of useful community service, which I now waive.

(R. at 31-32.) The Order for Release, signed by the trial judge, stated that Respondent be "release[d] to INS for [a] deportation hearing on or before August 10, 1995." (R. at 22.) The written judgment of conviction and sentence indicated that Respondent was sentenced to probation "for a term of: 5 years, defendant to cooperate with INS." (R. at 22.) The sentencing court ordered Respondent released to the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS") for a deportation hearing and Respondent was subsequently ordered deported by the immigration court.

Respondent reentered the United States illegally and was charged with federal felony re-entry offenses. Respondent filed a Crim. P. 35(c) motion, asserting that the sentence imposed by the sentencing court was illegal because the court lacked the authority to order deportation. The district court agreed and struck the portion of the sentence ordering the defendant to "leave this country." However, the court did not vacate the plea, and allowed the language that "defendant cooperate with deportation authorities" to remain in the agreement.

Subsequently, the state moved to revoke Respondent's probation on the grounds that he was deported and he "reentered the country" in violation of his probation conditions. The state requested that a prison sentence be imposed, and the district court agreed, but delayed imposition of a sentence until after Respondent was sentenced in federal court. The federal court sentenced Respondent to thirty-nine months in federal prison. The district court then sentenced Respondent to a two-year prison sentence.

Respondent appealed the state court's initial sentence to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the district court's denial of Respondent's Crim. P. 35(c) motion for post-conviction relief. Relying on this court's decision in Chae v. People, 780 P.2d 481 (Colo.1989), the court of appeals held that the language "leave this country" was an illegal sentence that formed an integral part of the guilty plea.

We granted certiorari to address the question of the proper remedy when a plea bargain is enforced by means of an illegal sentence. We hold that when a plea agreement itself is lawful, the proper remedy, if possible, is to modify the illegal sentence but permit the valid and enforceable plea agreement to stand.

II. Effect of Illegal Sentences on Plea Agreements

A plea of guilty must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made in order to be valid and constitutional. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 644-45, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976)

; Lacy v. People, 775 P.2d 1, 4-6 (Colo.1989). A guilty plea that is induced by misrepresentation, fraud, or coercion is not voluntary. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748, 90 S.Ct. 1463, 25 L.Ed.2d 747 (1970); People v. Kyler, 991 P.2d 810, 816 (Colo.1999). When a defendant enters into a plea that is not voluntary or knowing, he may withdraw his plea and plead anew.

The voluntary nature of a plea agreement may come into question when an agreement includes provisions for an illegal sentence. Several courts, including this one, have addressed this situation and held that under certain circumstances, a plea of guilty cannot stand where subsequently it is determined the sentence recommended and imposed is illegal. See Chae v. People, 780 P.2d 481, 486 (Colo.1989)

; see also Forbert v. State, 437 So.2d 1079, 1081 (Fla.1983) ("It is a well-established principle of law that a defendant should be allowed to withdraw a plea of guilty where the plea was based upon a misunderstanding or misapprehension of facts considered by the defendant in making the plea."); Rojas v. State, 52 Md.App. 440, 450 A.2d 490, 492 (1982); People v. Benard, 164 Misc.2d 323, 624 N.Y.S.2d 744, 748 (N.Y.Sup.1995); State v. Turgeon, 161 Vt. 561, 641 A.2d 88, 89 (1993).

In Chae, the defendant entered into a plea agreement that provided that any prison sentence would be suspended as long as he complied with three conditions. See 780 P.2d at 482. The trial court accepted the plea agreement, sentenced the defendant to an eight-year term of incarceration, and suspended the sentence subject to the defendant satisfying certain conditions. See id. at 483. The defendant subsequently failed to satisfy the agreed-upon conditions and he was arrested on a bench warrant. See id. The court of appeals held that the sentence imposed by the trial court was illegal because the criminal sentencing provisions did not authorize a trial court to suspend execution of a sentence of imprisonment. However, the court of appeals held that the defendant received the sentence for which he had bargained, and was thus subject to its terms. See id. at 484. We affirmed the court's holding that the sentence was illegal, but reversed on the issue of the proper remedy. We held:

[W]hen a defendant enters into a plea agreement that includes as a material element a recommendation for an illegal sentence and the illegal sentence is in fact imposed on the defendant, the guilty plea is invalid and must be vacated because the basis on which the defendant entered the plea included the impermissible inducement of an illegal sentence.

Id. at 486. We rejected the "benefit of the bargain" theory, stating that no sound public policy supported permitting parties to bargain for an illegal sentence. See id. at 487.

Four years later, in Montoya v. People, 864 P.2d 1093 (Colo.1994), we addressed a similar situation in which a defendant was sentenced to an illegal sentence after accepting a plea agreement. However, Montoya differed from Chae in one significant respect: although the sentence imposed was illegal, the plea bargain itself was legal and enforceable. As such, we reached a different conclusion, upholding the plea agreement despite the illegal sentence. See Montoya, 864 P.2d at 1095

.

In Montoya, the defendant accepted an agreement in which he would plead guilty to two charged counts, and in exchange, the state would dismiss all remaining counts and would stipulate to a four-year concurrent probationary sentence. See id. at 1094. The district court accepted the plea agreement, sentenced the defendant to two years on each count to run consecutively, suspended the sentence, and placed the defendant on a four-year probation period. See id. In subsequent proceedings, the district court held that the initial sentence was illegal² but found that the defendant received precisely what he had bargained for and refused to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea. Id. at 1095. The court of appeals affirmed. See id. We affirmed the court of appeals, stating, "Although the district court's suspension of Montoya's prison sentence and imposition of probation was invalid, the plea agreement supports the sentence of probation. . . . Montoya got exactly what he bargained for — four years of probation." Id. Because the plea bargain itself was legal, issues of constitutionality and public policy present in Chae were not present in Montoya. The illegal sentence in Montoya could be...