People v. Bonvicini

• Decision Date: 22 February 2016
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 13SC58
• Citation: 366 P.3d 151
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Lorenzo BONVICINI, Respondent
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

366 P.3d 151

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner

v.Lorenzo BONVICINI, Respondent

Supreme Court Case No. 13SC58

Supreme Court of Colorado.

February 22, 2016

Attorneys for Petitioner: Mitchell R. Morrissey, District Attorney, Second Judicial District Everett Engstrom, Deputy District Attorney, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Respondent: Springer and Steinberg, P.C., Harvey A. Steinberg, Ariel Z. Benjamin, Denver, Colorado.

En Banc

JUSTICE BOATRIGHT delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 We granted certiorari to determine whether the trial court should have sustained a challenge for cause to a potential juror who was an employee of a privately owned and operated prison. The appellate court held that because the private prison used "sovereign police powers characteristic of law enforcement in service of the public interest," it qualified as a "public law enforcement agency" as that term is used in section 16–10–103(1)(k), C.R.S. (2015). Order Regarding Appeal, Bonvicini v. People, No. 11CV6844 (Denv.Dist.Ct. Dec. 12, 2012). Consequently, the appellate court concluded that the trial court should have sustained the defendant's challenge for cause to a compensated employee of the private prison.¹ We now reverse.

¶ 2 We hold that, under the plain language of section 16–10–103(1)(k), a private company that operates a prison is not a "public law enforcement agency" because it is not a division or subdivision of state or federal government that has the authority to investigate crimes and to arrest, prosecute, or detain suspected criminals. The trial court therefore appropriately denied defendant Lorenzo Bonvicini's challenge for cause to the potential juror in question. Because we conclude that the trial court did not err, we do not address the second issue concerning the proper remedy for a trial court's erroneous ruling on a challenge for cause.² Accordingly, we reverse the appellate court and remand the case to that court for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 The People charged Bonvicini with driving under the influence ("DUI"). During jury selection, "Juror F" told the trial court that she worked as a registered nurse at the Hudson Correctional Facility near Hudson, Colorado. In later questioning from the court, Juror F stated that a private national correctional facility company, the GEO Group, Inc., operated the Hudson Correctional Facility and was under contract with the State of Alaska to house Alaskan inmates there. She also disclosed that she worked full-time at the prison and received her compensation from the GEO Group. When directly asked whether the GEO Group was a public entity, Juror F stated it was not.

¶ 4 Bonvicini challenged Juror F for cause, arguing that she was the "functional equivalent" of a public-prison employee and therefore qualified as a "compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency" under section 16–10–103(1)(k). The trial court denied Bonvicini's challenge, concluding that a privately run prison did not qualify as a public law enforcement agency under the statute. In denying the challenge, the trial court stated that "it would be a stretch to ... go beyond the letter of the law where it says a public law enforcement agency." In light of this denial, Bonvicini used a peremptory challenge to dismiss Juror F and ultimately exhausted all of his challenges. After trial, the jury convicted Bonvicini of driving while ability impaired, a lesser included offense of DUI.

¶ 5 Bonvicini appealed, arguing, among other things, that the trial court erred in denying his challenge for cause to Juror F.³ The appellate court reversed the trial court, holding that Juror F was an employee of a public law enforcement agency as defined in section 16–10–103(1)(k) and should have been excused. In its order, the appellate court first acknowledged that prisons qualify as law enforcement agencies. See People v. Scott, 41 Colo.App. 66, 583 P.2d 939, 941 (1978). It then turned to whether a private prison qualified as a "public ... agency."

¶ 6 After analyzing the plain language of the statute, the appellate court concluded that "the statute is ambiguous as to what characteristics make an agency public," and therefore resorted to other statutory-interpretation tools. The appellate court considered a number of prior cases from this court that discuss the main purposes of the statute, particularly Ma v. People, 121 P.3d 205 (Colo.2005). The appellate court also quoted a dictum from People in the Interest of R.A.D., 196 Colo. 430, 586 P.2d 46, 47 (1978), which stated that a trial court should excuse a potential juror who "has even a tenuous relationship with any prosecutorial or law enforcement arm of the state."

¶ 7 Ultimately, the appellate court concluded that "the performance of law enforcement functions is persuasive in reaching the conclusion that an entity is a public agency because law enforcement is the prerogative of the state." Applying this understanding to the private prison in this case, the appellate court concluded that "[t]he important fact is that this company operates, albeit for profit, by using sovereign police powers characteristic of law enforcement in service of the public interest. Therefore, it is a ‘public ... agency’ under [section] 16–10–103(1)(k)." As a result, the appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in denying Bonvicini's challenge for cause to Juror F. In light of this finding of error, and pursuant to then-binding precedent requiring automatic reversal, People v. Macrander, 828 P.2d 234, 244 (Colo.1992), overruled by People v. Novotny, 2014 CO 18, ¶ 2, 320 P.3d 1194, 1196, the appellate court reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a new trial.

¶ 8 We granted certiorari.

II. Standard of Review

¶ 9 This case requires us to interpret the statute governing challenges for cause to potential jurors. Statutory construction is a question of law, which we review de novo. People v. Johnson, 2015 CO 70, ¶ 9, 363 P.3d 169, 174.

III. Analysis

¶ 10 As we explain in Mulberger v. People, 2016 CO 10, ¶ 9, 366 P.3d 143, which we also issue today, challenges for cause to potential jurors are statutory tools designed in part to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a trial before a fair and impartial jury. Section 16–10–103(1) includes several grounds upon which either party in a criminal case may make a challenge for cause;⁴ if the proponent of a challenge demonstrates to the trial court that a potential juror falls within any of those categories, the statute implies their bias as a matter of law and requires the trial court to sustain challenges brought against them in an attempt to eliminate any appearance of prejudice or partiality. Id. at ¶ 9–10. However, when interpreting section 16–10–103(1)(k), "we must bear in mind that a representative cross-section of the community is an essential component of the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury." Id. at ¶ 9 (quoting Binkley v. People, 716 P.2d 1111, 1112 (Colo.1986) ).

¶ 11 At issue in this case is section 16–10–103(1)(k), which requires a trial court to sustain a challenge for cause to a potential juror who is a "compensated employee of a public law enforcement agency."⁵ After analyzing section 16–10–103(1)(k) and our precedent interpreting it, we hold that, under the plain language of the statute, a "public law enforcement agency" is a division or subdivision of state or federal government that has the authority to investigate crimes and to arrest, prosecute, or detain suspected criminals. Hence, we conclude that the GEO Group is not a public law enforcement agency because it is not an official division (or subdivision) of state or federal government. Therefore, Juror F does not fall within the scope of section 16–10–103(1)(k), and the trial court did not err in denying Bonvicini's challenge for cause.

A. "Public Law Enforcement Agency"

¶ 12 In interpreting the applicability of section 16–10–103(1)(k), we seek to "ascertain and give effect to the purpose and intent of the General Assembly in enacting it." Johnson, ¶ 11, 363 P.3d at 175 (quoting Shaw v. 17 W. Mill St., LLC, 2013 CO 37, ¶ 13, 307 P.3d 1046, 1049 ). To do so, we first look to the plain meaning of the statutory language, reading words and phrases in context and construing them according to common usage unless they have acquired a technical or particular meaning, whether by legislative definition or otherwise. Id. ; Ma, 121 P.3d at 210.

¶ 13 In this case, we must determine whether "public ... agency" in section 16–10–103(1)(k) extends beyond official divisions of government to include certain private entities under certain circumstances. The People argue that use of the word "public" in the statute makes a bright-line distinction between government agencies and private, nongovernment agencies, and does not allow a private entity to cross that line into the "public" realm for purposes of challenges for cause. In response, Bonvicini asserts that, at least in the context of private entities that operate detention facilities, we should eschew such a bright-line understanding of the word "public" in favor of a more nuanced "functional equivalent" test. In his view, a bright-line rule in this context fails to account for the modern proliferation of private prisons that contract with state or federal governments to house inmates. Because private detention facilities derive their ability to house suspected and convicted criminals from the state and could not operate without that grant of authority, see § 17–1–104.5(2), C.R.S. (2015), Bonvicini asserts that they should be included under section 16–10–103(1)(k) just like state-operated detention facilities. In his view, excluding private prisons from the statute's scope would undermine the statute's intent to ensure that a jury is impartial, both in fact and appearance, because the concern that a potential juror might possess a bias in favor of the prosecution is...