People v. Class

• Decision Date: 29 May 1986
• Citation: 494 N.E.2d 444,503 N.Y.S.2d 313,67 N.Y.2d 431
• Parties: , 494 N.E.2d 444 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Benigno CLASS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 313

503 N.Y.S.2d 313

67 N.Y.2d 431, 494 N.E.2d 444

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Benigno CLASS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

May 29, 1986.

Mark C. Cogan and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for appellant.

Mario Merola, Dist. Atty. (Roger L. Stavis and Steven R. Kartagener, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

In our earlier opinion in this case, we held that the police "officer's nonconsensual entry into [defendant's] automobile to determine the vehicle identification number violates the Federal and State Constitutions where it is based solely on a stop for a traffic infraction (US Const, 4th Amdt; NY Const, art I, § 12)" (63 N.Y.2d 491, 493, 483 N.Y.S.2d 181, 472 N.E.2d 1009). The Supreme Court reversed on the Federal Constitution, holding that "the police officer's action does not violate the Fourth Amendment" (475 U.S. 106, ---, 106 S.Ct. 960, 963, 89 L.Ed.2d 81), and the case is now before us again.

In support of its own jurisdiction to hear the case, the Supreme Court stated that our decision did not rest on "an independent and adequate state ground" because it lacked the requisite "plain statement" (475 U.S., at p. ---, 106 S.Ct., at p. 964; see, Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-1042, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3477, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201). At this juncture, in our consideration of the case under State law, we cannot disregard the fact that we held that article I, § 12 of our State Constitution was violated by the search. Although on remand we have in the past, as a matter of State law, followed Supreme Court decisions in several cases (see, e.g., People v. Quarles, 63 N.Y.2d 923, 483 N.Y.S.2d 678, 473 N.E.2d 30, on remand from New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 104 S.Ct. 2626, 81 L.Ed.2d 550; People v. Ferber, 57 N.Y.2d 256, 455 N.Y.S.2d 582, 441 N.E.2d 1100, on remand from New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 102 S.Ct. 3348, 73 L.Ed.2d 1113; cf., People v. Belton, 55 N.Y.2d 49, 447 N.Y.S.2d 873, 432 N.E.2d 745, on remand from New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 101 S.Ct. 2860, 69 L.Ed.2d 768), in none of those cases had we initially and expressly relied on the State Constitution (see, People v. Quarles, 58 N.Y.2d 664, 458 N.Y.S.2d 520, 444 N.E.2d 984; People v. Ferber, 52 N.Y.2d 674, 439 N.Y.S.2d 863, 422 N.E.2d 523; People v. Belton, 50 N.Y.2d 447, 429 N.Y.S.2d 574, 407 N.E.2d 420).

Where, as here, we have already held that the State Constitution has been violated, we should not reach a different result following reversal on Federal constitutional grounds unless respondent demonstrates that there are extraordinary or compelling circumstances. That showing has not been made.

Accordingly, upon reargument, on remand...