People v. Copeland
| Docket Number | 351231 |
| Decision Date | 16 December 2021 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. HOWARD CALVERT COPELAND, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
UNPUBLISHED
Wayne Circuit Court LC No. 19-002436-01-FC
Before: Sawyer, P.J., and Riordan and Redford, JJ.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, MCL 750.227b(1). He was sentenced to serve the statutorily required two years in prison. Defendant appeals as of right. We affirm.
This case arose out of a shooting that occurred in the early morning hours of December 27, 2018, outside the Horse Gentleman's Club in Detroit, where individuals had congregated after closing. Trial testimony established that the victim, Denard Burton, who was intoxicated, entered the car of defendant's female cousin and refused to leave. This upset the woman, prompting defendant to ask Burton to exit the car. Burton eventually did so, but a confrontation ensued between Burton and the women in defendant's party. The women argued with, and yelled at, Burton, and, according to defendant, Burton and Cortez Gardener, an associate of Burton's, started making threats. Defendant testified that he heard "I'm about to kill you and then [sic] bitches." Defendant further testified that he then saw Cortez flag down another car and Burton walk to that car reach inside, and then "sprint" toward defendant with his hands up. Defendant stated that he believed that Burton had something in his hand as he was coming toward him and that he heard a gunshot, turned, and saw Burton in front of him with an object "like an ice pick" in his hand. Defendant drew his handgun, fired one shot at Burton, and fled the scene. Burton sustained a graze gunshot wound to his outer left elbow and a fatal gunshot wound to his chest.
Defendant did not dispute that he fired the shot that killed Burton, but claimed self-defense at trial. The jury returned a seemingly inconsistent verdict, finding defendant not guilty of second- degree murder and the lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter, but guilty of felony-firearm. This appeal ensued.
Defendant first argues that the jury's verdict finding him not guilty of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter established that the jury found that he acted in lawful self-defense when he fired his gun at Burton. Thus, defendant argues, he could not have committed the underlying homicide offense to support his felony-firearm conviction, which requires the possession of a firearm during the commission of, or attempt to commit, a felony. See People v Avant, 235 Mich.App. 499, 505; 597 N.W.2d 864 (1999); MCL 750.227b(1). We disagree.
This Court reviews de novo whether there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, this Court must view the evidence—whether direct or circumstantial—in a light most favorable to the prosecutor and determine whether a rational trier of fact could find that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. A jury, and not an appellate court, observes the witnesses and listens to their testimony; therefore, an appellate court must not interfere with the jury's role in assessing the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. Circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inferences that arise from such evidence can constitute satisfactory proof of the elements of a crime. The prosecution need not negate every reasonable theory of innocence; it need only prove the elements of the crime in the face of whatever contradictory evidence is provided by the defendant. All conflicts in the evidence must be resolved in favor of the prosecution. [People v Kenny, 332 Mich.App. 394, 402-403; 956 N.W.2d 562 (2020) (quotation marks and citations omitted).]
As an initial matter, it was within the jury's purview to find that defendant committed second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter for purposes of the felony-firearm charge, while declining to render a guilty verdict for purposes of the underlying homicide charge. See People v Lewis, 415 Mich. 443, 453-455; 330 N.W.2d 16 (1982). Michigan does not require consistency in jury verdicts. Id. at 449. Thus, the jury's rejection of the homicide offense here does not mean that the jury necessarily found that defendant acted in self-defense, thereby excusing his otherwise felonious conduct. Rather, the inconsistency in the verdict suggests that the jury exercised leniency. See id. Indeed, the jury's consideration of the predicate offense and the compound offense is separate and distinct. See People v Goss, 446 Mich. 587, 597; 521 N.W.2d 312 (1994). Accordingly, the jury's finding on the homicide offense did not preclude it from reaching a different finding on the felony-firearm offense.
Our Supreme Court has held that, while the commission of, or the attempt to commit, a felony is an element of felony-firearm, actual conviction of the underlying felony is not an element of the offense and thus is not necessary. See Lewis, 415 Mich. at 454-455. As this Court has explained, "in the compound-felony setting, the jury is fully instructed on the elements of both offenses and is therefore aware that conviction of a compound felony is logically inconsistent with acquittal of the predicate felony." People v McKewen, 326 Mich.App. 342, 354; 926 N.W.2d 888 (2018). If a jury nevertheless chooses to enter inconsistent verdicts, the conviction remains valid. See Lewis, 415 Mich. at 448. Accordingly, that the jury found defendant not guilty of the underlying homicide offense is not dispositive here, and its seemingly inconsistent verdicts did not invalidate the felony-firearm conviction.
The question then becomes whether a rational trier of fact, viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, could reasonably find beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant possessed a firearm during the commission of second-degree murder or voluntary manslaughter in light of his claim of self-defense. We conclude that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's conviction.
The elements of second-degree murder are People v Henderson, 306 Mich.App. 1, 9-10; 854 N.W.2d 234 (2014) (quotation marks and citations omitted), overruled in part on other grounds, People v Reichard, 505 Mich. 81, 90 n 18; 949 N.W.2d 64 (2020).
"The elements of voluntary manslaughter are (1) the defendant must kill in the heat of passion, (2) the passion must be caused by an adequate provocation, and (3) there cannot be a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions." People v Sullivan, 231 Mich.App. 510, 518; 586 N.W.2d 578 (1998). "[T]he element distinguishing murder from manslaughter— malice—is negated by the presence of provocation and heat of passion." People v Mendoza, 468 Mich. 527, 540; 664 N.W.2d 685 (2003).
However, "[o]nce a defendant raises the issue of self-defense and satisfies the initial burden of producing some evidence from which a jury could conclude that the elements necessary to establish a prima facie defense of self-defense exists, the prosecution must exclude the possibility of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt." People v Stevens, 306 Mich.App. 620, 630; 858 N.W.2d 98 (2014) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Self-defense is" 'a complete defense to such crimes against the person as murder and manslaughter, attempted murder, assault and battery and the aggravated forms of assault and battery, and perhaps other crimes as well.'" People v Dupree, 486 Mich. 693, 707; 788 N.W.2d 399 (2010), quoting 2 LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law (2d ed), § 10.4(a), pp 143-144. Pertinent here, self-defense is also a complete defense to felony-firearm. People v Goree, 296 Mich.App. 293, 303-305; 819 N.W.2d 82 (2012). In essence, "self-defense justifies otherwise punishable criminal conduct, usually the killing of another person, 'if the defendant honestly and reasonably believes his life is in imminent danger or that there is a threat of great bodily harm and that it is necessary to exercise deadly force to prevent such harm to himself.'" Dupree, 486 Mich. at 707, quoting People v Riddle, 467 Mich. 116, 127; 649 N.W.2d 30 (2002). See also MCL 780.972. "[T]he touchstone of any claim of self-defense, as a justification for homicide, is necessity." Riddle, 467 Mich. at 127 (emphasis in original)." 'The question to be determined is, did the accused, under all the circumstances of the assault, as it appeared to him, honestly believe that he was in danger of losing his life, or great bodily harm, and that it was necessary to do what he did in order to save himself from such apparent threatened danger?'" Id., quoting People v Lennon, 71 Mich. 298, 300-301; 38 N.W. 871 (1888) (alterations omitted).
Clearly there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the victim's death was caused by defendant's act of possessing and firing the gun. Defendant disputes neither that he drew a handgun and fired it at Burton while Burton was coming at him, nor that in doing so he inflicted a fatal wound. That defendant knowingly fired a loaded gun at Burton at close range supported the inference that he acted with the intent to kill or cause great bodily harm, or, at a minimum, in wanton and wilful disregard of the likelihood...
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