People v. Mendoza

• Decision Date: 20 June 2003
• Docket Number: Docket No. 120630, Calendar No. 4.
• Citation: 664 N.W.2d 685,468 Mich. 527
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard J. MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

664 N.W.2d 685

468 Mich. 527

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Richard J. MENDOZA, Defendant-Appellee.

Docket No. 120630, Calendar No. 4.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued March 11, 2003.

Decided June 20, 2003.

Michael A. Cox, Attorney General, Thomas L. Casey, Solicitor General, Michael E. Duggan, Prosecuting Attorney, Timothy A. Baughman, Chief, Research, Training and Appeals, and Deborah K. Blair, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Detroit, for the people.

Ashford & Associates, P.C. (by Linda D. Ashford), Detroit, for the defendant-appellee.

Amici Curiae David L. Morse, President, David G. Gorcyca, Prosecuting Attorney, Joyce F. Todd, Chief, Appellate Division, and Kathryn G. Barnes and John S. Pallas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys, Pontiac, for the Prosecuting Attorneys Association of Michigan.

State Appellate Defender (by Peter Jon Van Hoek), Detroit, for the Criminal Defense Attorneys of Michigan.

YOUNG, Justice.

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.316, but convicted by a jury of second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317. The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, reasoning that the trial court erred when it declined to give an involuntary-manslaughter instruction. This Court granted leave to appeal to consider whether manslaughter is an "inferior" offense of murder under M.C.L. § 768.32(1), and if so, whether a rational view of the evidence supported an instruction in this case.

We conclude that manslaughter is an inferior offense of murder. However, an involuntary-manslaughter instruction was not appropriate in this case because a rational view of the evidence did not support it. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and reinstate defendant's conviction. To the extent that People v. Van Wyck, 402 Mich. 266, 262 N.W.2d 638 (1978), and its progeny conflict with this opinion, they are overruled.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Defendant and codefendant Ivan Tims visited the home of victim William Stockdale and Stockdale's nephew, Thurman Chillers, with the intent to purchase marijuana. Tims initially waited outside in the car while defendant discussed the price of the drugs with Stockdale and Chillers in the house. Agreeing on a price, defendant indicated to Stockdale that he had to return to the car to get additional money. When defendant returned to the house, he was accompanied by Tims. Both men brandished handguns.

Chillers testified that, upon entering the home, defendant instructed Tims to "shoot him." In response, Tims alternately pointed his gun at Chillers and Stockdale. Stockdale, in turn, rushed at defendant, grabbed defendant's gun and swung it downwards. Chillers ran out of the house. As he ran, he saw Stockdale "tussling" with defendant. Chillers further testified that he heard one shot while he was in the house and four or five more shots when he was outside. In the end, Stockdale was shot twice, once in the leg and once in the chest. The chest wound proved fatal.

Defendant was charged with first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.316, and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony, M.C.L. § 750.227b. His defense was that Tims shot Stockdale. Defendant elicited testimony from various witnesses establishing that defendant was not in the house when the victim was fatally wounded and that the fatal bullet came from a gun traceable to Tims.

At the close of proofs, defendant requested instructions for voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, M.C.L. § 750.321, and careless, reckless, or negligent discharge of a firearm, M.C.L. § 752.861. The trial court denied the requests and instructed the jury on first-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.316, and second-degree murder, M.C.L. § 750.317. Defendant was convicted of second-degree murder and felony-firearm.

The Court of Appeals reversed defendant's conviction and remanded the case for a new trial, 2001 WL 1198937. The panel treated the manslaughter-instruction requests as requests for instructions on a "cognate" lesser included offense and concluded that the trial court erred in refusing to give the involuntary-manslaughter instruction because there was evidence from which the jury could conclude that the victim's death was unintended and occurred while defendant was engaged in an unlawful act not amounting to a felony. Slip op. at 2.

The prosecutor applied for leave to appeal.¹ We granted leave to consider whether manslaughter is an inferior offense of murder within the meaning of M.C.L. § 768.32 and, if so, whether an involuntary-manslaughter instruction was supported by a rational view of the evidence.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether manslaughter is an inferior offense of murder within the meaning of M.C.L. § 768.32 is a question of law that the Court reviews de novo. Weakland v. Toledo Engineering Co., 467 Mich. 344, 347, 656 N.W.2d 175 (2003).

III. ANALYSIS

A. MCL 768.32

MCL 768.32 governs inferior-offense instructions. Subsection 1 provides in pertinent part:

... [U]pon an indictment for an offense, consisting of different degrees, as prescribed in this chapter, the jury, or the judge in a trial without a jury, may find the accused not guilty of the offense in the degree charged in the indictment and may find the accused person guilty of a degree of that offense inferior to that charged in the indictment, or of an attempt to commit that offense.

We recently examined this statute in People v. Cornell, 466 Mich. 335, 646 N.W.2d 127 (2002).² In Cornell, the Court considered whether necessarily included lesser offenses³ and cognate lesser included offenses⁴ were "inferior" offenses under M.C.L. § 768.32. In consideration of this issue, we examined the meaning of the word "inferior":

"We believe that the word `inferior' in [MCL 768.32] does not refer to inferiority in the penalty associated with the offense, but, rather, to the absence of an element that distinguishes the charged offense from the lesser offense. The controlling factor is whether the lesser offense can be proved by the same facts that are used to establish the charged offense." [Cornell, supra at 354, 646 N.W.2d 127, quoting People v. Torres (On Remand), 222 Mich.App. 411, 419-420, 564 N.W.2d 149 (1997) ].

Relying on this definition of "inferior," this Court concluded that M.C.L. § 768.32 only permitted consideration of necessarily included lesser offenses. Cornell, supra at 353-354, 646 N.W.2d 127. Thus, we held that an inferior-offense instruction is appropriate only if the lesser offense is necessarily included in the greater offense, meaning, all the elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater offense, and a rational view of the evidence would support such an instruction.⁵ Id. at 357, 646 N.W.2d 127.

B. MANSLAUGHTER IS AN INFERIOR OFFENSE OF MURDER

Manslaughter is an inferior offense of murder because manslaughter is a necessarily included lesser offense of murder.

1. The Elements Of Common-Law Murder And Manslaughter

Common-law murder encompasses all killings done with malice aforethought and without justification or excuse. People v. Scott, 6 Mich. 287, 292-293 (1859). See also People v. Potter, 5 Mich. 1, 6 (1858)("Murder is where a person of sound memory and discretion unlawfully kills any reasonable creature in being, in the peace of the state, with malice prepense or aforethought, either express or implied.").

First-degree murder is defined in M.C.L. § 750.316.⁶ All other murders are murders in the second degree. MCL 750.317. See also People v. Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 463-464, 579 N.W.2d 868 (1998), which enumerated the elements of second-degree murder as (1) death, (2) caused by defendant's act, (3) with malice, and (4) without justification.

Manslaughter is murder without malice. See Potter, supra at 9 (noting that without malice aforethought, "a killing would be only manslaughter, if criminal at all"). See also People v. Palmer, 105 Mich. 568, 576, 63 N.W. 656 (1895), remarking:

"Manslaughter is perfectly distinguishable from murder, in this: That though the act that causes death be unlawful or willful, though attended with fatal results, yet malice, either expressed or implied, which is the very essence of murder, is to be presumed to be wanting in manslaughter." [Quoting the trial court jury instructions.]

The common law recognizes two forms of manslaughter: voluntary and involuntary. People v. Townes, 391 Mich. 578, 589, 218 N.W.2d 136 (1974).

Common-law voluntary manslaughter is defined as:

[T]he act of killing, though intentional, [is] committed under the influence of passion or in heat of blood, produced by an adequate or reasonable provocation, and before a reasonable time has elapsed for the blood to cool and reason to resume its habitual control, and is the result of the temporary excitement, by which the control of reason was disturbed, rather than of any wickedness of heart or cruelty or recklessness of disposition....[Maher v. People, 10 Mich. 212, 219 (1862).]

See also Townes, supra at 590, 218 N.W.2d 136 ("A defendant properly convicted of voluntary manslaughter is a person who has acted out of a temporary excitement induced by an adequate provocation and not from the deliberation and reflection that marks the crime of murder."). Thus, to show voluntary manslaughter, one must show that the defendant killed in the heat of passion, the passion was caused by adequate provocation, and there was not a lapse of time during which a reasonable person could control his passions. See People v. Pouncey, 437 Mich. 382, 389, 471 N.W.2d 346 (1991).⁷ Significantly, provocation is not an element of voluntary manslaughter. See People v. Moore, 189 Mich.App. 315, 320, 472 N.W.2d 1 (1991). Rather, provocation is the circumstance that negates the presence of malice. Scott, supra at 295.

Involuntary manslaughter is the unintentional killing of another, without malice, during the commission of an unlawful act...