People v. Craft

• Decision Date: 31 March 1986
• Docket Number: Cr. 23800
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 715 P.2d 585 The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Henry CRAFT, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 626

224 Cal.Rptr. 626

41 Cal.3d 554, 715 P.2d 585

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. John Henry CRAFT, Defendant and Appellant.

Cr. 23800.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

March 31, 1986.

Rehearing Denied April 30, 1986.

Quin Denvir and Frank O. Bell, Jr., State Public Defenders, San Francisco, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, David Y. Stanley and Harvey R. Zall, Deputy State Public Defenders, Sacramento, for defendant and appellant.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Ramon M. de la Guardia and Maureen A. Daly, Deputy Attys. Gen., Sacramento, for plaintiff and respondent.

MOSK, Justice.

When a perpetrator commits sex offenses against the same victim on "separate occasions," Penal Code section 667.6 subdivision (d) (hereafter subdivision (d)), ¹ requires the imposition of full, separate, and consecutive terms of imprisonment. We granted a hearing in this case to construe the foregoing crucial phrase.

Karen S. was driving alone one morning and stopped at a drive-in restaurant to use the restroom. As she returned to her car, defendant seized her from behind, threw her to the ground, and raped her. He then ordered her into the back seat of her car and drove away. While driving, he repeatedly struck her with his fist. After about an hour he stopped the car, climbed into the back seat, and raped her again. He resumed driving, but stopped after 20 minutes to lock her in the trunk of her car. Again he resumed driving. About an hour later he stopped and left the car for some five minutes. He returned, drove once more, stopped, opened the trunk, and there raped her for the third time. He then abandoned the car and the victim.

Defendant appeals from a judgment convicting him, inter alia, of three counts of rape ( § 261, subd. (2)), and sentencing him to full, separate, and consecutive terms on those counts. The court, however, failed to identify the authority under which it acted or to state its reasons for imposing such terms.

The Legislature has established a special sentencing scheme for multiple sexual offenses. Section 667.6, subdivision (c) (hereafter subdivision (c)) provides that generally the court has discretion to impose full, separate, and consecutive terms "whether or not the crimes were committed during a single transaction." ² When the court sentences under subdivision (c), however, it must state its reasons not only for imposing consecutive sentences (People v. Smith (1984), 155 Cal.App.3d 539 at p. 543, 202 Cal.Rptr. 259, People v. Wilson (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 343, 352, 185 Cal.Rptr. 498) but also for sentencing under this provision rather than under the principal/subordinate scheme of section 1170.1, subdivision (a). (People v. Belmontes (1983) 34 Cal.3d 335, 347, 193 Cal.Rptr. 882, 667 P.2d 686; People v. Smith, supra, at p. 543, 202 Cal.Rptr. 259.)

Subdivision (d), by contrast, provides that the court is without discretion in the matter, but must impose full, separate, and consecutive terms "if such crimes involve separate victims or involve the same victim on separate occasions." ³ When the court sentences under subdivision (d), it need not give a statement of reasons. Id.; see People v. Fleming (1983), 140 Cal.App.3d 540 at p. 545, 189 Cal.Rptr. 619.)

Defendant contends the sentence imposed on him cannot stand: if the court acted under subdivision (c), it erred by failing to state its reasons; if under subdivision (d), it erred because the offenses did not occur on separate occasions. The People assert that the rapes were committed on separate occasions, and hence defendant was properly sentenced under subdivision (d).

Central to this case is the meaning of "separate occasions" in subdivision (d). In construing the phrase we rely on well settled principles of statutory construction. A court should "ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (Select Base Materials v. Board of Equalization (1959) 51 Cal.2d 640, 645, 335 P.2d 672; accord, People v. Davis (1981) 29 Cal.3d 814, 828, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186.) In determining such intent, the court "turns first to the words themselves for the answer" (People v. Knowles (1950) 35 Cal.2d 175, 182, 217 P.2d 1, cert. den., 340 U.S. 879, 71 S.Ct. 117, 95 L.Ed. 639; accord, People v. Black (1982) 32 Cal.3d 1, 5, 184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104), giving to them "their ordinary and generally accepted meaning" (People v. Castro (1985) 38 Cal.3d 301, 310, 211 Cal.Rptr. 719, 696 P.2d 111). Moreover, "the various parts of a statutory enactment must be harmonized by considering the particular clause or section in the context of the statutory framework as a whole." (People v. Black, supra, 32 Cal.3d at p. 5, 184 Cal.Rptr. 454, 648 P.2d 104.) Similarly, a statute should not be given a construction that results in rendering one of its provisions nugatory. (See Select Base Materials v. Board of Equalization, supra, 51 Cal.2d at p. 647, 335 P.2d 672; People v. Hawes (1982) 129 Cal.App.3d 930, 939, 181 Cal.Rptr. 456.) Finally, we keep in mind that " '[t]he defendant is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable doubt, whether it arise out of a question of fact, or as to the true interpretation of words or the construction of language used in a statute.' " (People v. Davis, supra, 29 Cal.3d at p. 828, 176 Cal.Rptr. 521, 633 P.2d 186; quoting In re Tartar (1959) 52 Cal.2d 250, 256-257, 339 P.2d 553.)

We look first to the language of the statute itself. The phrase "separate occasions" appears to be susceptible of several meanings in the context of subdivision (d). In ordinary language, an "occasion" may be defined as a particular, momentary point in time, or an event or episode of any duration. (Webster's New Internat. Dict. (3d ed. 1961) p. 1560 ["occasion" may mean, inter alia, "a particular time at which something takes place," a "special event" and an "episode"].) It may also be defined as a period of time in which an opportunity of some kind exists. (Ibid. ["occasion" may mean "opportunity"].) Thus, read broadly, the statutory phrase may simply denote distinct moments in time. Read narrowly, however, it may refer to criminal episodes of indefinite duration between which the perpetrator loses the opportunity to continue his attack or abandons that attack to engage in other, unrelated activities. Because "separate occasions" is thus ambiguous, we must look beyond the language of the statute.

Section 667.6, which deals with certain sex offenses and offenders, has the purpose and effect of permitting in some cases and mandating in others the imposition of more severe criminal penalties than would otherwise have been available. Subdivisions (a) and (b) apply to repeat offenders; subdivisions (c) and (d), as we have noted, apply to perpetrators who commit multiple offenses. Inasmuch as subdivision (c) merely permits full, separate, and consecutive terms, while subdivision (d) mandates them, we must presume that the Legislature regarded some multiple offenders as automatically deserving of the harsher punishment, and that it must have used the language it did to single out such persons.

In view of the purpose that we attribute to the Legislature, it is more reasonable to construe "separate occasions" in a narrow manner. Specifically, we hold that subdivision (d) only applies to offenses against the same victim between which the perpetrator temporarily lost or abandoned the opportunity to continue his attack: such opportunity is lost when the victim becomes free of any ongoing criminal activity; it is abandoned when the offender keeps the victim within his control but engages in some significant activity unrelated to continuing his attack. This interpretation effectively distinguishes multiple offenders who commit crimes against a single victim on separate occasions from those who merely assault a victim several times in one uninterrupted sequence of events.

As opposed to the person who commits several rapes on a single occasion, the one who rapes his victim on "separate occasions" seems to deserve the harsher punishment automatically. Common moral sense teaches that other things being equal he is both more culpable because he turns away from one attack and after an opportunity for reflection undertakes another, and more harmful because he inflicts distinct traumata on his victim. Moreover, similar reasoning seems to underlie the decision of the Legislature to subject to the provisions of subdivision (d) the person who commits offenses against "separate victims." This person has also abandoned one attack and turned his attention elsewhere--i.e., towards his next victim--before committing yet another offense. The construction of "separate occasions" as merely distinct moments in time, by contrast, does little if anything to distinguish the multiple offender who automatically deserves the harsher punishment from the multiple offender who does not. Indeed, because each offense committed by practically every multiple offender occurs at a distinct point in time, such a reading of the phrase would distinguish no significant subgroup from the whole, but rather would embrace them all.

The rule that a statute should not be given a construction that would result in rendering one of its provisions nugatory reinforces our conclusion. Such a result would follow if "separate occasions" were taken to refer merely to distinct points in time. That interpretation, as we have just observed, would lead to the inclusion of virtually all multiple offenders within subdivision (d)--and would thereby make subdivision (c) empty, since all cases would fall within the mandatory provisions of subdivision (d) and none within the discretionary provisions of subdivision (c).

Finally, to construe the statutory phrase in a narrow manner results in limiting the instances in which the court is without discretion but must impose full, separate, and consecutive terms. Because "separate occasions" is ambiguous, a...