People v. Daniels

• Citation: 2019 NY Slip Op 34401 (U)
• Decision Date: 02 July 2019
• Docket Number: Indictment 19-0332-09
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. WALTER DANIELS a/k/a "T," KEITH HOLLAR a/k/a "BLAZE," JOSHUA QUINONES a/k/a "H," JAMES HEWLIN a/k/a "TEEKO" a/k/a "TEEKUS," ROY ROGERS a/k/a "FOX," LEON BROOKS a/k/a "ZACK," SAMUEL FORBES a/k/a "JUNIOR," RODERICK RIVERS a/k/a "JUJU," EDVIN MORALES, WILLIAM RUTHERFORD a/k/a "UNIQUE," VICTOR JUSTICE a/k/a "VIC," LAMONT KILLIAN Defendant.
• Court: New York County Court

2019 NY Slip Op 34401(U)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK v. WALTER DANIELS a/k/a "T," KEITH HOLLAR a/k/a "BLAZE," JOSHUA QUINONES a/k/a "H," JAMES HEWLIN a/k/a "TEEKO" a/k/a "TEEKUS," ROY ROGERS a/k/a "FOX," LEON BROOKS a/k/a "ZACK," SAMUEL FORBES a/k/a "JUNIOR," RODERICK RIVERS a/k/a "JUJU," EDVIN MORALES, WILLIAM RUTHERFORD a/k/a "UNIQUE," VICTOR JUSTICE a/k/a "VIC," LAMONT KILLIAN Defendant.

Indictment No. 19-0332-09

County Court, Westchester County

July 2, 2019

Unpublished Opinion

HON ANTHONY A. SCARPINO, JR. District Attorney, Westchester County Attn: A.DA. Cooper W. Gorrie

Karl A. Scully, Esq. 33 Del Rey Drive Mount Vernon, NY 10552 Attorney for defendant Morales

DECISION & ORDER

Hon Anne E. Minihan, A.J.S.C.

Defendant is charged by Westchester County Indictment Number 19-0332-09, acting in concert with all other codefendants with Enterprise Corruption (Penal Law § 460.20) and Conspiracy in the Fourth Degree (Penal Law § 105.10[1]) and is charged separately with Criminal Sale of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 220.39[1]), and Criminal Possession of a Controlled Substance in the Third Degree (Penal Law § 220.16[1]) (two counts), and has filed an omnibus motion which consists of a Notice of Motion and an Affirmation in Support. In response, the People have filed an Affirmation in Opposition together with a Memorandum of Law.

Upon consideration of these papers, the stenographic transcript of the grand jury minutes and the Consent Discovery Order entered in this case, this court disposes of this motion as follows:

A.

MOTION to INSPECT, DISMISS and/or REDUCE CPL ARTICLE 190

The court grants the defendant's motion to the limited extent that the court has conducted, with the consent of the People, an in camera inspection of the stenographic transcription of the grand jury proceedings. Upon such review, the court finds no basis upon which to grant defendant's application to dismiss or reduce the indictment^[1].

The indictment contains a plain and concise factual statement in each count which, without allegations of an evidentiary nature, asserts facts supporting every element of the offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof with sufficient precision as to clearly apprise the defendant of the conduct which is the subject of the indictment (CPL 200.50). The indictment charges each and every element of the crimes, and alleges that the defendant committed the acts which constitute the crimes at a specified place during a specified time period and, therefore, is sufficient on its face (People v Cohen, 52 N.Y.2d 584 [1981]; People v Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589 [1978]).

The defendant, who bears the burden of refuting with substantial evidence the presumption of regularity which attaches to official court proceedings (People v Pichardo, 168 A.D.2d 577 2d Dept 1990]), has offered no sworn factual allegations, in support of his argument that the grand jury proceedings were defective. The minutes reveal a quorum of the grand jurors was present during the presentation of evidence, and that the Assistant District Attorney properly instructed the grand jury on the law and only permitted those grand jurors who heard all the evidence to vote the matter (see People v Calbud, 49 N.Y.2d 389 [1980]; People v Valles, 62 N.Y.2d 36 [1984]; People v Burch, 108 A.D.3d 679 [2d Dept 2013]).

To the extent that defendant seeks to dismiss the indictment on the basis that his arrest was unlawful, that branch of the motion is denied. The grounds for the dismissal of an indictment are purely statutory (see CPL 210.20 et. seq.), and do not include illegal arrest. The remedy for an unlawful arrest would be to exclude evidence obtained from that illegal arrest (see generally People v Winn, 232 A.D.2d 438 [2d Dept 1996]).

The evidence presented, if accepted as true, is legally sufficient to establish every element of each offense charged (CPL 210.30[2]). "Courts assessing the sufficiency of the evidence before a grand jury must evaluate whether the evidence, viewed most favorably to the People, if unexplained and uncontradicted-and deferring all questions as to the weight or quality of the evidence-would warrant conviction" (People v Mills, 1 N.Y.3d 269, 274-275 [2002]). Legally sufficient evidence means competent evidence which, if accepted as true, would establish every element of an offense charged and the defendant's commission thereof (CPL 70.10[1]; see People v Flowers, 138 A.D.3d 1138, 1139 [2d Dept 2016]). "In the context of a Grand Jury proceeding, legal sufficiency means prima facie proof of the crimes charged, not proof beyond a reasonable doubt" (People v Jessup, 90 A.D.3d 782, 783 [2d Dept 2011]). "The reviewing court's inquiry is limited to whether the facts, if proven, and the inferences that logically flow from those facts supply proof of every element of the charged crimes, and whether the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference. That other, innocent inferences could possibly be drawn from those facts is irrelevant to the sufficiency inquiry as long as the Grand Jury could rationally have drawn the guilty inference" (People v Bello, 92 N.Y.2d 523, 526 [1998]).

Based upon the in camera review, since this court does not find release of the grand jury minutes or any portion thereof necessary to assist it in making any determinations and as the defendant has not set forth a compelling or particularized need for the production of the grand jury minutes, defendant's application for a copy of the grand jury minutes is denied (People v Jang, 17 A.D.3d 693 [2d Dept 2005]; CPL 190.25 [4] [a]).

B.

MOTION to CONTROVERT THE WARRANTS and to SUPPRESS PHYSICAL EVIDENCE

Defendant's motion to suppress any evidence obtained by warrant is denied. Defendant was the target of a search warrant pertaining to a vehicle dated April 10, 2019, an eavesdropping warrant dated March 15, 2019, and an arrest warrant dated April 10, 2019.

As for the search warrant of the subject vehicle, the court denies the motion to controvert, and denies suppression of any evidence obtained thereby, finding that the warrant was adequately supported by probable cause and was sufficiently particular. The results of a search conducted pursuant to a facially sufficient search warrant are not subject to a suppression hearing (People v Arnau, 58 N.Y.2d 27 [1982]). The Fourth Amendment to the U.S Constitution provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Article I § 12 of the New York State Constitution contains identical language. Consistent with these constitutional provisions, CPL 690.45(4) requires that when a search warrant authorizes the seizure of property, the warrant must include "[a] description of the property which is the subject of the search." "To meet the particularity requirement, the warrant must be specific enough to leave no discretion to the police" (see People v Cahill, 2 N.Y.3d 14, 41 [2003]). Upon review of the four corners of the search warrant affidavit, the search warrant was adequately supported by probable cause, and sufficiently particular as to the place to be searched and the things to be seized (see People v Keyes, 291 A.D.2d 571 [2d Dept 2002]; see generally People v Badilla, 130 A.D.3d 744 [2d Dept 2015]; People v Elysee, 49 A.D.3d 33 [2d Dept 2007]). To the extent that the supporting affidavit relied upon facts supplied by informant(s) the affidavit demonstrated both the reliability of the informant(s) and the basis of the informant(s)' knowledge (see Aguilar v Texas, 378 U.S. 108 [1964]; Spinelli v United States, 393 U.S. 410 [1969]). The defendant's conclusory allegations failed to demonstrate that the search warrant was based upon an affidavit containing false statements made knowingly or intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth (see People v McGeachy, 74 A.D.3d 989 [2d Dept 2010]), or that it was executed beyond its scope and authorization. Contrary to defendant's claim, the search warrant had a "no knock" provision. Any alleged failure by the People to make a return on the warrant does not undermine the validity of the search warrant or the search (see People v Fernandez, 61 A.D.3d 891 [2d Dept 2009]).

To the extent that defendant's motion seeks to controvert the eavesdropping warrant, the motion is denied. "[T]he probable cause necessary for the issuance of an eavesdropping warrant is measured by the same standards used to determine whether probable cause exists for the issuance of a search warrant" (People v Tambe, 71 N.Y.2d 492, 500 [1988]). Upon review of the four corners of the supporting affidavit, the court finds that the eavesdropping warrant was adequately supported by probable cause. Specifically, there was probable cause to believe that the targeted phone was being used in the commission of the offenses designated in the warrants (see People v Keves, 291 A.D.2d 571 [2d Dept 2002]; see generally People v Badilla, 130 A.D.3d 744 [2d Dept 2015]; People v Elysee, 49 A.D.3d 33 [2d Dept 2007]). To the extent that the supporting affidavit relied upon facts supplied by informant(s) the affidavit satisfied Aguilar-Spinelli (see Aguilar v Texas, 378 U.S. 108 [1964]; Spinelli v United States, 393 U.S. 410 [1969]). . Defendant's conclusory challenges failed to rebut the People's showing in the application for the warrant that the calls were properly recorded and sufficiently minimized.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, defendant's motion to suppress physical evidence is granted to the extent of conducting a Mapp hearing prior to trial to determine the propriety of any search, not conducted pursuant to a warrant resulting...