People v. DeLeon, 80SA97

• Decision Date: 16 March 1981
• Docket Number: No. 80SA97,80SA97
• Citation: 625 P.2d 1010
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angel DeLEON, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1010

625 P.2d 1010

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Angel DeLEON, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 80SA97.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

March 16, 1981.

J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Richard F. Hennessey, Deputy Atty. Gen., Mary J. Mullarkey, Sol. Gen., Nathan B. Coats, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

J. Gregory Walta, State Public Defender, Thomas M. Van Cleave III, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellant.

LOHR, Justice.

The Morgan County district court entered a judgment of conviction against the appellant, Angel DeLeon, for Driving After Judgment Prohibited, section 42-2-206, C.R.S.1973. DeLeon brought this appeal, claiming that the statute upon which his conviction is based is unconstitutional and that the traffic offense convictions which underlie the charge of Driving After Judgment Prohibited were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

In an administrative hearing before a hearing officer of the Colorado Department of Revenue, Motor Vehicle Division (DMV), the defendant was found to be an habitual traffic offender because he had been convicted of three traffic offenses within a seven-year period as provided in section 42-2-202(2)(a), C.R.S.1973. As a result, his license to operate a motor vehicle was revoked by the DMV for a period of five years, pursuant to section 42-2-203 (1973). Thereafter, during the time the revocation was in effect, a Colorado state patrolman stopped the appellant while the latter was driving a car west of Brush, Colorado. As a result of the stop, the officer learned that the appellant's license had been revoked. The appellant then was charged with Driving After Judgment Prohibited. He was convicted after a trial to the court, and this appeal followed.

I.

The appellant asserts that the Driving After Judgment Prohibited statute, section 42-2-206, C.R.S.1973, and the statutory plan upon which it is based are unconstitutional. See sections 42-2-201 to 208, C.R.S.1973. The principal bases for this assertion are (1) that the administrative proceeding which results in a determination that a defendant is an habitual traffic offender is a critical stage of a subsequent judicial trial on a charge of Driving After Judgment Prohibited, and that important constitutional safeguards are absent from that administrative proceeding; (2) that due process of law requires that a defendant be advised at the time his license is revoked that to drive in violation of the order of revocation is a felony-level criminal offense, and that DeLeon was not so advised; and (3) that the statutory plan imposes a cruel and unusual punishment in that the penalty prescribed is greatly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense. In People v. McKnight, Colo., 617 P.2d 1178 (1980) we considered the legal issues involved in these arguments and resolved each of them adversely to the appellant's contentions. There, in treating the cruel and unusual punishment argument, we relied on our opinion in People v. Scott, Colo., 615 P.2d 35 (1980). We are not persuaded that either McKnight or Scott should be reconsidered.

II.

The appellant asserts that two of the three traffic offense convictions which form the basis for the determination that he is an habitual traffic offender were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights.

We have held that a defendant may collaterally attack such convictions when later charged with Driving While Judgment Prohibited. People v. Roybal, Colo., 618 P.2d 1121 (1980) (Roybal I); People v. Heinz, 197 Colo. 102, 589 P.2d 931 (1979). See People v. Able, Colo., 618 P.2d 1110 (1980). In order to assert the constitutional invalidity of a traffic offense conviction, a defendant must make a prima facie showing of invalidity; the People must then prove the conviction was obtained in a manner consistent with the defendant's constitutional rights. People v. Roybal, Colo., 617 P.2d 800 (1980) (Roybal II); Roybal I, supra; see People v. Meyers, Colo., 617 P.2d 808 (1980); People v. Able, supra; People v. Heinz, supra; People v. Morrison, 196 Colo. 319, 583 P.2d 924 (1978); People v. Woll, 178 Colo. 443, 498 P.2d 935 (1972).

In the case before us, the appellant sought dismissal of the charge of Driving After Judgment Prohibited on the basis that two of the three traffic offense convictions supporting the revocation of his driver's license were obtained in violation of his constitutional rights. A hearing was held immediately prior to the trial to determine the merit of the appellant's position. At that hearing the parties stipulated that the transcripts relating to the two traffic offense convictions had been destroyed, based upon the age of...