People v. Dimacali
Decision Date | 28 February 2019 |
Docket Number | D074680 |
Citation | 244 Cal.Rptr.3d 268,32 Cal.App.5th 822 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Lourdes Ortiz DIMACALI, Defendant and Respondent. |
Mara W. Elliott, City Attorney, John C. Hemmerling, Assistant City Attorney, Michael L. Ficken, Deputy City Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Angela Bartosik, Chief Deputy, Primary Public Defender, Peter Tran and Euketa Oliver, Deputy Public Defenders for Defendant and Respondent.
California law allows the civil compromise of certain offenses involving a person "injured by an act constituting a misdemeanor" who "has a remedy by a civil action" so long as the criminal defendant compensates the injured person and pays all costs incurred. ( Pen. Code,1 §§ 1377, 1378 ; see People v. Gokcek (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th Supp. 8, 11, 42 Cal.Rptr.3d 405.) This appeal presents the question of whether a misdemeanor charge of leaving the scene of an accident causing only property damage in violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) ( ) is subject to disposition by such a civil compromise. The People contend such a violation cannot be compromised as a matter of law; that the damages must flow from the criminal conduct and People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1093, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 140, 394 P.3d 1066 ( Martinez ) confirms the crime is not the accident but the failure to stop and provide information, which cannot in any scenario cause the property damage suffered by the victim of the misdemeanor offense. They urge us to reject authority to the contrary— People v. Tischman (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 174, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 650 ( Tischman )—as flawed and no longer good law. The nature of the hit-and-run offense at issue and a plain reading of the civil compromise statutes compels us to agree. We reverse.
The People filed a complaint charging Lourdes Ortiz Dimacali with a single count of misdemeanor hit-and-run driving after Dimacali was involved in an August 2016 incident with M.T. The People alleged Dimacali was the driver of a vehicle involved in an accident resulting in property damage, but failed to locate and notify M.T. or appropriate authorities in violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a). Dimacali pleaded not guilty to the offense.
Thereafter, Dimacali moved to stay prosecution and for discharge and dismissal of her case under sections 1377 and 1378, based in part on a declaration from M.T. in which M.T. stated she had sustained $1,166.78 in damages as a result of the incident, Dimacali had reimbursed her that amount, and M.T. did not want Dimacali prosecuted. Dimacali argued that hit-and-run accidents qualified for compromise under Tischman , supra , 35 Cal.App.4th 174, 40 Cal.Rptr.2d 650 because her criminal offense shared a common element—monetary damage—with the civil cause of action.
The People opposed the motion on three grounds. They argued (1) the hit-and-run offense did not qualify for civil compromise because the California Supreme Court in Martinez , supra , 2 Cal.5th 1093, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 140, 394 P.3d 1066 held the act constituting the Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) offense was fleeing the scene, not the collision, implicitly overruling Tischman ; (2) Dimacali did not meet the statutory requirements for civil compromise because M.T. was not present before the court to acknowledge satisfaction; and (3) the public interest was not vindicated by a civil compromise so as to permit the court to exercise its discretion to grant Dimacali's requested relief. Following a hearing on the matter, the superior court granted Dimacali's motion and dismissed her case on condition she pay court fees and costs.
The People appealed to the San Diego Superior Court's appellate division. (§ 1466, subd. (a)(2).) They argued a violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) could not be civilly compromised as a matter of law, repeating the arguments that the collision was not an element of the crime and thus damages did not flow from the criminal act, but rather under Martinez , supra , 2 Cal.5th 1093, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 140, 394 P.3d 1066 the gravamen of the crime was the flight. They argued Tischman 's reasoning was flawed and contrary to Martinez . The appellate division rejected these arguments and affirmed the superior court's order. We granted the People's request to have the matter transferred to this court for review.2
The relevant facts—that Dimacali was charged with a violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) and thereafter satisfied the victim's damages—are not in dispute. Under the circumstances, whether her misdemeanor offense qualifies for civil compromise is a question of statutory interpretation that we review independently. (See Lopez v. Sony Electronics, Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 627, 633, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 856, 420 P.3d 767 [ ]; Poole v. Orange County Fire Authority (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1378, 1384, 191 Cal.Rptr.3d 551, 354 P.3d 346 [ ]; Huntington Continental Townhouse Assn., Inc. v. Miner (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 590, 598, 179 Cal.Rptr.3d 47 [ ].)
We apply settled standards for construing a statute: " ’ ( Lopez v. Sony Electronics , supra , 5 Cal.5th at pp. 633-634, 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 856, 420 P.3d 767.)
We begin by examining the nature of the offense committed by a violation of Vehicle Code section 20002. The statute makes it a misdemeanor if a driver of a vehicle in an accident resulting in damage to property fails to stop and give specified information to the owner of the other vehicle. (See People v. Holford (1965) 63 Cal.2d 74, 80, fn. 3, 45 Cal.Rptr. 167, 403 P.2d 423.)3
The California Supreme Court has characterized the crime as "leaving the scene of the accident." ( People v. Carbajal , supra , 10 Cal.4th at p. 1124, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67 ; see also Martinez , supra , 2 Cal.5th at p. 1102, 218 Cal.Rptr.3d 140, 394 P.3d 1066 [ ].) Vehicle Code section 20002 was " ‘enacted by the Legislature to protect owners of unattended vehicles from financial loss caused by irresponsible persons who damage such vehicles and attempt to escape liability by departing from the scene of the accident without leaving any identification or evidence by which to trace them.’ " ( Carbajal , at pp. 1124-1125, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67.) The statute is aimed at "all persons who drive automobiles in California" and thus is " ‘directed at the public at large.’ " ( California v. Byers , supra , 402 U.S. at p. 430, 91 S.Ct. 1535.) It was "not intended to facilitate criminal convictions but to promote the satisfaction of civil liabilities arising from automobile accidents." ( Ibid . )
"The essential elements of a violation of [Vehicle Code] section 20002, subdivision (a) are that the defendant: (1) knew he or she was involved in an accident; (2) knew damage resulted from the accident; and (3) knowingly and willfully left the scene of the accident (4) without giving the required information to the other driver(s)." ( People v. Carbajal , supra , 10 Cal.4th at p. 1123, fn. 10, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67.) " ( Id . at p. 1124, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67, citing in part People v. McWhinney (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d Supp. 8, 12, 254 Cal.Rptr. 205 ( McWhinney ).)
Indeed, a person's act of driving at the time of an accident is "conduct that is not in itself necessarily criminal ...." ( People v. Carbajal , supra , 10 Cal.4th at p. 1123, 43 Cal.Rptr.2d 681, 899 P.2d 67.) In California v. Byers , a plurality of the United States Supreme Court pointed out with respect to Vehicle Code section 20002's reporting requirement that ...
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