People v. Escobales

• Decision Date: 09 February 1990
• Citation: 551 N.Y.S.2d 757,146 Misc.2d 573
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Angel ESCOBALES, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 757

551 N.Y.S.2d 757

146 Misc.2d 573

The PEOPLE of the State of New York v. Angel ESCOBALES, Defendant.

Supreme Court, Bronx County,

Part N.

Feb. 9, 1990.

Robert M. Baum and Carol Turner, for defendant.

Robert T. Johnson, Dist. Atty. (Joseph M. Sise, Amsterdam, and Lisa M. Localzo, of counsel), for plaintiff.

VINCENT T. QUATTROCHI, Justice:

On July 28, 1989, pursuant to a negotiated plea arrangement, defendant, Angel Escobales, was sentenced to an indeterminate term of imprisonment having a minimum of two years and a maximum of four years. Defendant moves pursuant to CPL 440.20 to set aside this sentence. In order to prevail on this motion, it must be established that the sentence was "unauthorized, illegally imposed or otherwise invalid as a matter of law" [CPL 440.20(1) ].

Background

On July 2, 1989, the defendant was arraigned on a felony complaint charging two B felonies, Criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree and Criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree based upon his involvement in the street sale of drugs to an undercover police officer. By his plea of guilty to a class D felony in full satisfaction of these charges, defendant, a predicate drug felon, negotiated a very favorable outcome (see, CPL 220.10-5(a)(iii)). Additionally, the court imposed the minimum sentence permissible under the statute (P.L. § 70.06).

However, subsequent to his plea negotiations and sentencing, it was discovered during his incarceration that defendant is afflicted with AIDS (acquired immune deficiency syndrome). The disease is in an advanced stage and has required constant care and treatment at Rikers Island Hospital. Defendant's prognosis is grave. His life expectancy is from twelve to eighteen months.

The defendant now urges to find his otherwise authorized sentence invalid as a matter of law since it constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of constitutional proscription (N.Y. Const., art. 1, § 5; U.S. Const. 8th Amend.) inasmuch as the imposition of this sentence renders it one of life imprisonment in confinement given his dire medical condition.

Findings

Ordinarily, a sentence of imprisonment that is within the limits of a valid statute is not cruel and unusual punishment in a constitutional sense. (People v. Jones, 39 N.Y.2d 694, 385 N.Y.S.2d 525, 350 N.E.2d 913). However, there may be exceptional circumstances which justify judicial review in exceedingly rare cases (Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 272, 100 S.Ct. 1133, 1138, 63 L.Ed.2d 382; People v. Broadie, 37 N.Y.2d 100, 119, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338 cert. den. 423 U.S. 950, 96 S.Ct. 372, 46 L.Ed.2d 287).

Typically, in these exceptional cases, an analysis of whether a sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment involves an objective evaluation whereby the gravity of the offense is weighed against danger the offender poses to society (People v. Broadie, supra). This type of inquiry considers the particular mitigating circumstances of the defendant's commission of the offense to determine whether the punishment imposed was grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crime (See, e.g., People v. Rivera, 128 Misc.2d 593, 490 N.Y.S.2d 688, revd. 119 A.D.2d 705, 501 N.Y.S.2d 122; People v. Alvarez, 65 A.D.2d 146, 154, 410 N.Y.S.2d 840; People v. Hooks, 96 A.D.2d 1001, 467 N.Y.S.2d 8; People v. Dowd, 140 Misc.2d 436, 530 N.Y.S.2d 733).

However, it is not the defendant's position that an objective analysis of the particular circumstance of his criminal behavior does not justify the punishment imposed. Indeed, because the defendant was the recipient of a favorable plea negotiation with the imposition of the minimum allowable statutory sentence, his punishment must be considered lenient under the circumstances of his offense. At any rate, using an objective standard, it is well settled that severe punishment of drug offenders has not been considered irrationally harsh given the alarming pervasiveness of drug use in our modern society (People v. Broadie, supra; see also, People v. Mizell, 72 N.Y.2d 651, 655, 536 N.Y.S.2d 21, 532 N.E.2d 1249).

Although the defendant does not ask the court to consider an objective evaluation, his argument, in effect, asks consideration of a subjective evaluation of his particular imprisonment. Such an evaluation, although not recommended, is not precluded (People v. Broadie, supra, 37 N.Y.2d at 111, 371 N.Y.S.2d 471, 332 N.E.2d 338). It requires that the court examine the extent to which its conscience is shocked by the punishment imposed. Thus, when a subjective evaluation is made, the specific...