People v. Feldmann, Docket No. 95302

• Decision Date: 22 January 1990
• Docket Number: Docket No. 95302
• Parties: PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robin Denise FELDMANN, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

Page 692

449 N.W.2d 692

181 Mich.App. 523

PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Robin Denise FELDMANN, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 95302.

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted Oct. 12, 1988.

Decided Dec. 19, 1989.

Released for Publication Jan. 22, 1990.

Frank J. Kelley, Atty. Gen., Louis J. Caruso, Sol. Gen., John D. O'Hair, Pros. Atty., Timothy A. Baughman, Chief of the Criminal Div., Research, Training and Appeals, and Mary Sue Czarnecki, Asst. Pros. Atty., for the People.

Ilsa Draznin, Southfield, for defendant-appellant.

Before HOLBROOK, P.J., and SAWYER and BATZER, ^* JJ.

PER CURIAM.

Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of two counts of armed robbery, M.C.L. Sec. 750.529; M.S.A. Sec. 28.797. The jury was unable to reach a verdict on two counts of first-degree murder, and a mistrial was declared. Defendant was retried to the bench and was convicted of two counts of second-degree murder, M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549. She received concurrent prison sentences of two to twenty years on the armed robbery convictions and fifteen to forty years on the murder convictions, and now appeals as of right.

I

Defendant's convictions stem from the robbery and execution-style deaths of James Hoos and Sally Tuck in the early hours of September 22, 1985. The crimes occurred at Hoos' home in Dearborn, Michigan, where he resided in a lower flat below the intended victim, drug dealer Kenneth Kondratko. Hours after the Dearborn killings, defendant was also involved in the robbery and killing of drug dealer James Visel at his home in Washtenaw County. Also implicated in the foregoing crimes were defendant's coaddict boyfriend, Allen Lumsden, who was separately convicted in the Dearborn and Washtenaw County homicides, and Rodney Crawford, a drug dealer also charged in the Washtenaw homicide.

Washtenaw County sheriff's officers apprehended Lumsden following a high-speed chase of his pickup truck early September 24, 1985. It was suspected that he was going to Crawford's home in Ypsilanti to harm someone. Officers then proceeded to the Crawford residence where they found defendant, Crawford and Deborah Schmidt. The three were taken to the Washtenaw County sheriff's office for questioning. Washtenaw County Sheriff's Detective Lloyd Stamper read defendant her Miranda [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966) ] rights and offered her immunity if she would come forward with information about the Washtenaw County homicide. Defendant initially denied knowledge of the crime but a few hours later, after again being read her Miranda rights and being interviewed in preparation for a polygraph test which was never taken, defendant confessed to the polygraph examiner that she was aware of the killing and that she, along with Lumsden and Crawford, had planned the robbery.

Crawford and Schmidt left the sheriff's office mid-morning after being told that they were free to leave. Stamper had not told defendant that she could leave but defendant signed a polygraph waiver form acknowledging her right to leave at any time and the polygraph examiner informed her of her right to do so. Defendant was placed under arrest for the Washtenaw County crimes after Stamper took a taped statement from her at approximately 2:00 p.m. At the conclusion of the statement, defendant's comments indicated she did not understand that Stamper's immunity offer was limited to the initial questioning period only.

Defendant was next questioned by Dearborn Police Detective Michael Stanczyk from approximately 2:30 to 3:45 p.m. regarding the Dearborn homicides. Defendant had previously denied knowledge of the Dearborn crimes during questioning by Washtenaw County detectives. After being readvised of her Miranda rights, defendant gave a signed statement to Stanczyk explaining that she and Lumsden went to drug dealer Kondratko's Dearborn residence to rob him. When they were unable to gain entry to the upstairs flat from outside, they entered the downstairs apartment and robbed its occupants. Defendant admitted to binding the victims and then entering and ransacking Kondratko's apartment. As defendant left to pull Lumsden's truck into the driveway, Lumsden told her "they saw us, so they have to go." Defendant heard two shots as she waited for Lumsden in the truck.

The following morning, Stanczyk interviewed Lumsden about the Dearborn homicides and was given a statement which did not totally comport with defendant's statement. That afternoon, Stanczyk again questioned defendant at the Washtenaw County Jail. Defendant gave a second signed statement with a revised version of the Dearborn homicides, this time implicating Crawford as the one who fired the fatal shots while defendant and Lumsden waited in the truck.

Following a suppression hearing held pursuant to People v. Walker (On Rehearing), 374 Mich. 331, 132 N.W.2d 87 (1965), defendant's confession to the Washtenaw County offenses was suppressed on the ground that she had been promised immunity. Defendant's motion to suppress her two confessions to the Dearborn offenses was denied for the reason that the taint of the immunity promise did not accrue to the statements taken by Officer Stanczyk.

II

On appeal, defendant argues that her statements to the Dearborn police should have been suppressed because they were the fruit of her unlawful arrest and prior coerced statements to Washtenaw County authorities, and were taken in violation of her right against self-incrimination and the prompt arraignment statute. We disagree with these contentions.

To determine whether police conduct amounts to a seizure of an individual implicating the Fourth Amendment, a court must take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the incidents in each individual case. Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, ----, 108 S.Ct. 1975, 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d 565, 571 (1988). A Fourth Amendment seizure occurs "only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to leave." Id., at ----, 108 S.Ct. at 1979, 100 L.Ed.2d at 572, quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877, 64 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980) (opinion of Stewart, J.).

A review of the instant record reveals that the lower court judge made no determination whether defendant's initial custody violated her Fourth Amendment rights against unreasonable seizure of her person. However, even assuming that her initial custody violated her constitutional rights, U.S. Const., Am. IV; Const.1963, art. 1, Sec. 11, we do not find defendant's statements to be the products of the violation.

A defendant's unlawful detention does not mandate suppression of the defendant's confession unless there exists a causal nexus between the illegal arrest and the confession. People v. Emanuel, 98 Mich.App. 163, 176, 295 N.W.2d 875 (1980), lv. den. 414 Mich. 871 (1982), cert. den. sub nom Emanuel v. Michigan, 459 U.S. 1220, 103 S.Ct. 1226, 75 L.Ed.2d 461 (1983). Whether the connection between a defendant's detention and confession is sufficiently attenuated to purge the confession of its primary taint is determined by focusing upon: (1) the temporal proximity between arrest and confession; (2) the flagrancy of official misconduct; (3) any intervening circumstances occurring after arrest; and (4) any circumstances antecedent to arrest. People v. Mallory, 421 Mich. 229, 243, n. 8, 365 N.W.2d 673 (1984), reh. den. 422 Mich. 1201 (1986). See also Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603-604, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 2261-62, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975).

The application of the foregoing factors to the instant case leads us to conclude that defendant's custodial statements were sufficiently acts of free will to justify their admission. First, defendant's statements were made over eight hours after she was taken into custody. Second, even if during the initial three hours of detention the Washtenaw County detectives failed to effectively apprise defendant that she was free to leave, we do not find such conduct so flagrantly improper as to militate against admissibility. Third, during the latter hours of her preconfession custody, defendant was repeatedly reminded that she was there voluntarily and was shown that the door to the interrogation room was not locked. Additional intervening circumstances included defendant's statements regarding the Washtenaw County homicide, elicited not by the inherent coerciveness of her detention, but, rather, a mistaken expectation of immunity. Defendant's arrest for the Washtenaw County crimes further dissipated any taint from her initial detention. Finally, defendant's first statement regarding the Dearborn homicides, implicating Lumsden as the sole gunman, would appear to have been fostered more by Crawford's antecedent instruction to let Lumsden take the blame than by defendant's unlawful arrest.

We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that her confessions to the Dearborn crimes were involuntary and taken in violation of her right against self-incrimination. Our examination of the totality of the circumstances surrounding defendant's confessions convinces us that the statements were made voluntarily.

Though defendant appears to have been tired during the initial day of interrogation, we find that she was at all times sufficiently mentally alert to make an intelligent waiver of her right to remain silent. While advanced intoxication from drugs may preclude an effective waiver of Miranda rights, the fact that a person is under the influence of drugs is not dispositive of the issue of voluntariness. People v. Leighty, 161 Mich.App. 565, 571, 411 N.W.2d 778 (1987), lv. den. 430 Mich. 895, 425 N.W.2d 90 (1988). Although defendant appeared to be on some kind of narcotics or alcohol when initially taken into custody, her confessions to the Dearborn crimes were made over eight hours later. Officer Stanczyk testified that,...