People v. Frawley, A088519.
| Decision Date | 31 July 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. A088519.,A088519. |
| Citation | 98 Cal.Rptr.2d 555,82 Cal.App.4th 784 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Michael FRAWLEY, Defendant and Respondent. |
On the basis of evidence that he possessed a rifle and a shotgun after having been convicted of a felony, defendant was charged with violating Penal Code section 12021, which makes it a felony for any such person to possess any firearm.1 The trial court dismissed the charge under section 995 on the ground that defendant could lawfully possess nonconcealable firearms by virtue of having obtained an order under section 1203.4 dismissing the prior conviction. The court held that because of an express reference to concealable firearms in section 1203.4, one who has obtained a dismissal of a prior conviction under that statute may possess nonconcealable firearms without violating section 12021. We hold that this was error, and reverse the order dismissing the charge.
Defendant sustained a felony conviction in the early 1990s. In August 1997 the court dismissed that conviction under section 1203.4.2 On April 23, 1999, the district attorney filed a six-count complaint in the instant matter charging defendant with (1) possession of methamphetamine for sale (Health & Saf.Code, § 11378); (2) maintaining a place for sale of controlled substances (Health & Saf.Code, § 11366); (3) possession of a controlled substance for sale within 1,000 feet of a public school (Health & Saf.Code, § 11353.6, subd. (b))3; (4) possession of a controlled substance and firearm at the same time (Health & Saf.Code, § 11370.1); (5) possession by an ex-felon of ammunition (§ 12316, subd. (b)(1)); and (6) possession by an ex-felon of a firearm (§ 12021). Counts 4 and 6 specified that the firearms in question were a rifle and a shotgun. Count 5 specified that defendant possessed .22-caliber ammunition.
Defendant was held to answer on the complaint. He moved under section 995 to dismiss counts 5 and 6 on the ground that the relief previously granted to him under section 1203.4 precluded his prosecution for possessing nonconcealable firearms or associated ammunition. The trial court granted the motion as to count 6 (firearms possession), but denied it as to count 5 (possession of ammunition). The district attorney filed a timely notice of appeal.
Section 12021, subdivision (a)(1), declares it a felony for "[a]ny person who has been convicted of a felony" to possess "any firearm." Defendant contends that, notwithstanding this blanket prohibition, he was entitled to possess nonconcealable firearms because he had obtained an order dismissing his prior conviction under section 1203.4.4 He relies on the proviso in that section that the dismissal of a prior conviction "does not permit a person to own, possess, or have in his or her custody or control any firearm capable of being concealed upon the person or prevent his or her conviction under Section 12021." (§ 1203.4, subd. (a), italics added.)
Defendant does not contend, of course, that this language directly grants him a right to possess nonconcealable firearms. On its face it says nothing about what firearms a convicted felon may possess; it states only that such a person may not possess firearms of a specified type. More precisely, it forbids interpreting the statute to grant the right to possess such firearms. Defendant's argument therefore relies, necessarily, on an implied grant of the privilege he asserts. He seeks to establish this implication through three interrelated constructional preferences developed by courts to address potential statutory uncertainties: first, that statutes should be construed so as to give effect to all of their provisions (Moyer v. Workmen's Comp. Appeals Bd. (1973) 10 Cal.3d 222, 230, 110 Cal.Rptr. 144, 514 P.2d 1224); second, that the Legislature is presumed not to engage in "idle act[s]" (Steiner v. Superior Court (1996) 50 Cal.App.4th 1771, 1786-1787, fn. 22, 58 Cal.Rptr.2d 668); and third, that courts should avoid constructions which render statutory language superfluous or unnecessary (Dix v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 442, 459, 279 Cal. Rptr. 834, 807 P.2d 1063). (See Woodmansee v. Lowery (1959) 167 Cal.App.2d 645, 650, 334 P.2d 991; Moore v. City Council (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 892, 897, 53 Cal.Rptr. 603 [].)
These and other constructional preferences, however, are properly understood not as mechanical rules for the determination of statutory meaning but as aids in support of "[t]he fundamental task of statutory construction," which is to "`ascertain the intent of the lawmakers so as to effectuate the purpose of the law.'" (People v. Cruz (1996) 13 Cal.4th 764, 774-775, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 117, 919 P.2d 731, quoting People v. Pieters (1991) 52 Cal.3d 894, 898, 276 Cal.Rptr. 918, 802 P.2d 420.) Constructional preferences "are mere guides and will not be used to defeat legislative intent." (People v. Cruz, supra, 13 Cal.4th at p. 782, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 117, 919 P.2d 731.)
Our goal, then, is the ascertainment of relevant legislative intent. The starting point in that endeavor is "`the language of the statute.'" (Id. at p. 775, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 117, 919 P.2d 731; see id. at p. 782, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 117, 919 P.2d 731.) "To the extent that uncertainty remains in interpreting statutory language, `consideration should be given to the consequences that will flow from a particular interpretation' (Dyna-Med, Inc. v. Fair Employment & Housing Com. (1987) 43 Cal.3d 1379, 1387 [241 Cal.Rptr. 67, 743 P.2d 1323]), and both legislative history and the (Id. at pp. 782-783, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 117, 919 P.2d 731; see People v. Rizo (2000) 22 Cal.4th 681, 688, 94 Cal.Rptr.2d 375, 996 P.2d 27.)
In testing a proposed interpretation we must also consult the text of associated and related statutes, attempting to identify the role of each in the larger system of laws. "[E]very statute should be construed with reference to all other statutes of similar subject so that each part of the law as a whole may be harmonized and given effect." (Franchise Tax Bd. v. Superior Court (1998) 63 Cal. App.4th 794, 799, 73 Cal.Rptr.2d 889.) (People v. Johnson (1995) 33 Cal. App.4th 623, 631-632, 39 Cal.Rptr.2d 463.)
As shall appear, defendant's argument relies on purely formalistic parsing which bypasses the all-important issue of legislative purpose as well as competing constructional preferences. Not surprisingly, this road leads to a conclusion divorced from the central purpose and most plausible meaning of the affected statutes as reflected in their language, history, and interrelationship.
As noted above, we must (People v. Anderson (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 331, 340, 270 Cal.Rptr. 516.)
The meaning of section 12021 as applicable to this case, seems quite clear, subject to the effect, if any, of section 1203.4. As noted, it makes it a crime for "[a]ny person who has been convicted of a felony" to possess "any firearm." (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1).) That these terms apply to defendant is not, for present purposes, disputed: he is a "person" who was "convicted of a felony" and who thereafter possessed a "firearm," i.e., rifle and shotgun. (Ibid.; see § 12001, subd. (b).) It thus appears that defendant fell squarely within the apparent purview of that section, as judged according to its own terms.
Section 1203.4, as potentially applicable to defendant, presents a more difficult problem. The central "rule" of the statute is that one who obtains the relief provided "shall thereafter be released from all penalties and disabilities resulting from the offense." (§ 1203.4, subd. (a).) If this language stood alone, without qualification, it would almost certainly be understood to effect a true "expungement," such that the prior conviction would cease to exist in the eyes of the law, or at least of the criminal law. It could then be argued with considerable if not compelling force that the expunged prior conviction could not be used to prove a violation of section 12021.
However, while a number of courts have used forms of the word "expunge" to describe the relief made available by section 1203.4 (e.g., People v. Acuna (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1056, 1058, 92 Cal.Rptr.2d 224), the statute does not in fact produce such a dramatic result. To "expunge" means "to strike out, obliterate ... efface completely: DESTROY" (Webster's 9th New Collegiate Diet. (1984), p. 439) or "blot out, erase ... wipe out, ..., annihilate, annul ... put an end to" (5 Oxford English Diet. (2d ed.1989), p. 588). As used in the criminal law, "expungement" means the "`...
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