People v. Gallegos

• Decision Date: 01 July 2013
• Docket Number: Supreme Court Case No. 09SC1084
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner v. Carlos Anthony GALLEGOS, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

307 P.3d 1096

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Petitioner

v.Carlos Anthony GALLEGOS, Respondent.

Supreme Court Case No. 09SC1084

Supreme Court of Colorado.

July 1, 2013

Certiorari to the Colorado Court of Appeals, Court of Appeals Case No. 07CA2373.

Attorneys for Petitioner: John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Rhonda L. White, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado.

Attorneys for Respondent: Leslie A. Goldstein, L.L.C., Leslie A. Goldstein, Steamboat Springs, Colorado.

En Banc

JUSTICE RICE delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶ 1 This sexual assault case requires us to interpret the phrases “established a relationship” and “promoted a relationship” in the relationship criterion of the sexually violent predator (“SVP”) statute, section 18–3–414.5(1)(a)(III), C.R.S. (2012). We hold that an offender “established a relationship” with his victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization where he created, started, or began a relationship primarily for that purpose. Applying the definition of “established a relationship” to the record in this case, we affirm the court of appeals' decision reversing Respondent Carlos Anthony Gallegos' SVP designation because Gallegos had not “established a relationship” with the victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization by living with the victim and treating her as his stepdaughter for the three years preceding the assault.

¶ 2 In addition, we hold that an offender “promoted a relationship” if, excluding the offender's behavior during the commission of the sexual assault that led to his conviction, he otherwise encouraged a person with whom he had a limited relationship to enter into a broader relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization. Because the trial court determined that Gallegos met the relationship criterion by having “established a relationship” with his victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization, it did not make factual findings regarding whether Gallegos “promoted a relationship” for the same purpose. Therefore, we remand to the court of appeals with instructions to remand to the trial court to make specific factual findings and determine whether Gallegos “promoted a relationship” with his victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization.

I. Facts and Procedural History

¶ 3 Gallegos pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault on a child after admitting to sexually assaulting his live-in girlfriend's six-year-old daughter. The trial court found that Gallegos met the relationship criterion of the SVP statute because he established a relationship with the victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization. Specifically, the trial court consulted the police report, the victim's report, and Gallegos' statements and determined that “no other legitimate relationship [existed] other than [one established primarily] for the purpose of sexual victimization.” In making its determination, the trial court employed the definition of “established a relationship” ¹ prescribed in the Sex Offender Management Board's (the “SOMB”) risk assessment screening instrument (the “Screening Instrument”).

¶ 4 Gallegos appealed his SVP designation and the court of appeals reversed. People v. Gallegos, 240 P.3d 882, 886 (Colo.App.2009). The court of appeals determined that “the facts in the record do not support the [trial] court's finding that Gallegos ‘established’ the relationship with the victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization.” Id. at 883. Ignoring the Screening Instrument's definition of “established,” the court of appeals instead interpreted the term “established” in the relationship criterion consistent with its plain meaning: “The commonly accepted definition of ‘establish,’ when used as a verb, is ‘to bring into existence, create, make, start, originate, or found.’ ” Id. at 884 (quoting Webster's Third New International Dictionary 778 (2002)). Applying this definition, the court of appeals concluded that Gallegos did not “establish a relationship” primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization with his victim as required by the SVP statute because the relationship already existed at the time of the sexual victimization. Id. at 886.

¶ 5 Contrary to its decision to disregard the Screening Instrument's definition and separately define “established a relationship,” the court of appeals deferred to the Screening Instrument's definition of “promoted a relationship” ² later in its analysis. Despite this deference, the court of appeals “express[ed] no opinion as to whether Gallegos might fit the definition of an SVP under the ‘promoted a relationship’ ” component of the relationship criterion. Id. Instead, the court of appeals simply reversed Gallegos' SVP designation on the grounds that Gallegos did not “establish the relationship” primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization. Id.

¶ 6 The People then petitioned this Court for certiorari review of the court of appeals' decision. We granted certiorari to address: (1) whether the court of appeals erred by proffering its own definition of “established a relationship” in the relationship criterion; and (2) whether the court of appeals should have addressed whether Gallegos met the relationship criterion by having “promoted a relationship” with his victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization.³ We address each issue in turn.

II. Analysis

¶ 7 This case requires us to construe the relationship criterion in the SVP statute. We review questions of law involving statutory interpretation de novo. Grant v. People, 48 P.3d 543, 546 (Colo.2002). This Court's familiar role interpreting statutes requires that we interpret the plain language of a statute to “give full effect to the intent of the General Assembly.” Colo. Water Conservation Bd. v. Upper Gunnison River Water Conservancy Dist., 109 P.3d 585, 593 (Colo.2005). Where “the statutory language is clear, we apply the plain and ordinary meaning of the provision,” Lobato v. Indus. Claim Appeals Office, 105 P.3d 220, 223 (Colo.2005), giving that language “consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to each part whenever possible,” People v. Banks, 9 P.3d 1125, 1127 (Colo.2000) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, “[w]e interpret every word, rendering none superfluous; undefined words and phrases are read in context and construed literally according to common usage.” Sooper Credit Union v. Sholar Grp. Architects, P.C., 113 P.3d 768, 771 (Colo.2005). We first describe the SVP designation in light of our holding in Allen v. People, 2013 CO 44, 307 P.3d 1102, 2013 WL 3323904 (released concurrently).

A. The SVP Designation and Allen v. People

¶ 8 The trial court designates an offender as an SVP when the offender: (1) was eighteen years of age or older as of the date of the offense; (2) was convicted of an enumerated sexual offense; (3) committed the offense against a victim who was a stranger or was a person with whom the offender established or promoted a relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization; and (4) is likely to recidivate. § 18–3–414.5(1)(a)(I)–(IV).

The SVP designation process is unique. SeeAllen, ¶ 6. When an offender is convicted of an enumerated offense, see§ 18–3–414.5(1)(a)(II), a SOMB-trained evaluator administers the Screening Instrument ⁴ to determine whether an offender meets the recidivism criterion of the SVP statute. See§ 18–3–414.5(1)(a)(IV). Although the SVP statute only expressly directs the SOMB to address the recidivism criterion in the Screening Instrument, seeid. the SOMB developed the Screening Instrument in such a way that requires the evaluator to confirm that the offender has satisfied the first three criteria of the SVP statute before reaching the recidivism analysis. SeeSOMB Handbook: Sexually Violent Predator Assessment Screening Instrument for Felons, Background and Instruction 66–70 (June 2003), http:// dcj.state.co.us/ors/pdf/docs/FinalS¨VP.pdf. To assist the evaluator, the Screening Instrument provides definitions for the first three criteria, including defining when an offender “established a relationship” or “promoted a relationship” primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization. Id. at 22–26.

¶ 10 Section 18–3–414.5, however, does not grant the SOMB the authority to define these terms. SeeAllen, ¶ 9 (opining that “the SVP statute only expressly directs the SOMB to address the recidivism criterion in the Screening Instrument”). Accordingly, to guide the lower courts in their future SVP analyses, we review the relationship criterion de novo and, applying our tenants of statutory construction, we define the terms “established a relationship” and “promoted a relationship” as employed in that criterion.

B. Established A Relationship

¶ 11 We hold that an offender “established a relationship” under the relationship criterion of the SVP statute where he created, started, or began the relationship primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization.

¶ 12 The leading legal dictionary defines the verb “establish” as “[t]o make or form; to bring about or into existence.” Black's Law Dictionary 626 (9th ed. 2004). Similarly, Webster's New College Dictionary defines “establish,” as “to cause to be or happen; bring about.” Webster's New College Dictionary 486 (2005). Considering these definitions in the context of the SVP statute, we hold that an offender “established a relationship”—and therefore meets the relationship criterion of the SVP statute—if he created, started, or began a relationship with his victim primarily for the purpose of sexual victimization.

¶ 13 In this case, Gallegos lived in the same house as his victim for three years prior to the incident and interacted with her as he would interact with a stepchild. Nothing in the record suggests that Gallegos created, started, or began his relationship with the victim for the purpose of sexual victimization. Rather, Gallegos maintained a stepparent-like...