People v. Garcia

• Decision Date: 11 March 2004
• Citation: 777 N.Y.S.2d 846,3 Misc.3d 699
• Parties: THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff,<BR>v.<BR>MICHAEL GARCIA, Defendant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

3 Misc.3d 699

777 N.Y.S.2d 846

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Plaintiff,

v.MICHAEL GARCIA, Defendant.

March 11, 2004.

Hornstein, Palumbo & Keith, New York City (James Palumbo of counsel), for defendant.

Robert M. Morgenthau, District Attorney, New York City (Jon Veiga of counsel), for plaintiff.

OPINION OF THE COURT

MARCY L. KAHN, J.

On January 30, 2004, following a bench trial defendant was convicted of attempted assault in the second degree (Penal Law §§ 110.00, 120.05 [1]), assault in the third degree (Penal Law § 120.00 [1]) (three counts), criminal possession of a weapon in the third degree (Penal Law § 265.02 [1]), criminal mischief in the third degree (Penal Law § 145.05), endangering the welfare of a child (Penal Law § 260.10 [1]) (three counts), and aggravated cruelty to animals (Agriculture and Markets Law § 353-a). Prior to the court's verdict, defendant moved to dismiss the charge of aggravated cruelty to animals on due process grounds, contending that the statute's definition of "companion animal" was unconstitutionally vague, both facially and as applied to him. This written decision explains the court's oral decision of January 30, 2004, which denied defendant's motion in its entirety.

I. Background

The evidence at trial established that on August 2, 2003, defendant Michael Garcia, wielding a gravity knife, assaulted Emalie Martinez in her home, and also committed various other crimes against Jesus Rabassa, who was her roommate at the time, and Ms. Martinez's three children, Juan Torres, age 9, Crystal Torres, age 8, and Emalie Ann Torres, age 4. Earlier on that day, defendant had picked up a 10-gallon fish tank containing three pet goldfish belonging to Ms. Martinez's three children and hurled it into a 47-inch television screen, smashing the television screen and the fish tank, and damaging other property items in the process. Defendant then called nine-year-old Juan into the room and, said, "Hey, Juan, want to see something cool?" Defendant then proceeded to crush under the heel of his shoe one of the three goldfish then writhing on the floor.

II. Discussion

A. Applicable Law

1. The Vagueness Doctrine

It is well established that due process under both the Federal and State Constitutions requires a criminal statute to define an offense with sufficient clarity that a person of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited. (Connally v General Constr. Co., 269 US 385, 391 [1926]; International Harvester Co. v Kentucky, 234 US 216, 221 [1914]; People v Grogan, 260 NY 138, 145-146 [1932].) A statute must also be written in a manner which precludes arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement by the police. (Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108-109 [1972]; People v Nelson, 69 NY2d 302, 306 [1987].) Accordingly, a statute is unconstitutionally vague if a potential offender or a police officer cannot determine the conduct proscribed by the statute. (People v Stuart, 100 NY2d 412 [2003].) Where a question is raised as to the constitutionality of a statute, the party raising the challenge bears the burden of establishing that the provision is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v Scalza, 76 NY2d 604 [1990].)

A party may challenge a statute as being unconstitutionally vague on its face or in its particular application. (People v Stuart, supra, 100 NY2d at 421.) Upon raising a facial vagueness argument, the challenger has the burden of demonstrating that the statute is impermissibly vague in all of its applications. (United States v Salerno, 481 US 739 [1987].) That is, for a facial challenge to succeed, the moving party must show that the statute is permeated by vagueness to the point where "no standard of conduct is specified at all" (Coates v City of Cincinnati, 402 US 611, 614 [1971]), or that the statute is so vague that it permits a police officer to exercise unfettered discretion in every single case (People v Bright, 71 NY2d 376, 383-384 [1988]). An "as-applied" challenge, by contrast, requires a court only to consider whether the statute can be constitutionally applied to the defendant under the particular facts of the case. (Chapman v United States, 500 US 453, 467-468 [1991]; People v Parker, 41 NY2d 21, 24 [1976].)

Every statute is presumed to be constitutional. (Brady v State of New York, 80 NY2d 596, 602 [1992].) Accordingly, with the exception (not relevant here) of a First Amendment context, when a statute is challenged as being vague both facially and as applied, a court must first consider whether the statute is vague as applied to the party making the challenge. (People v Stuart, supra, 100 NY2d at 423; Ulster Home Care v Vacco, 96 NY2d 505, 510 [2001].) If the statute provides the defendant with adequate notice and the police with clear criteria, that will be the end of the inquiry, as a court "will not strain to imagine marginal situations in which the application of the statute is not so clear." (People v Nelson, supra, 69 NY2d at 308.) Accordingly, should a defendant's as-applied challenge fail, the court will have found that there is at least one person, the defendant, to whom the statute may be applied constitutionally, and, therefore, the statute would necessarily be valid on its face and not unconstitutionally vague. (Village of Hoffman Estates v Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 US 489, 495 [1982]; People v Stuart, supra, 100 NY2d at 423.)

2. Agriculture and Markets Law § 353-a

Popularly known as "Buster's Law," Agriculture and Markets Law § 353-a was enacted by the Legislature in 1999 after a Schenectady cat named "Buster" was doused with kerosene and set on fire. The law was enacted to "increase the penalty for intentionally and without just cause seriously injuring or killing... dogs, cats and other domesticated animals." (NY Assembly Mem in Support of L 1999, ch 118, 1999 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 1584-1585 [NY Assembly Mem].) Governor Pataki, when signing the legislation, stated that making such conduct a felony will send a "clear message that such cowardly and despicable acts of violence will not be tolerated." (Governor's Mem approving L 1999, ch 118, 1999 McKinney's Session Laws of NY, at 1469.) Finally, the Legislature acknowledged that "[t]he connection between animal abusers and violence towards humans shows that virtually every serial killer had a history of abusing animals before turning their attention to people." (NY Assembly Mem at 1585.)

Specifically, Agriculture and Markets Law § 353-a (1) provides:

"A person is guilty of aggravated cruelty to animals when, with no justifiable purpose, he or she intentionally kills or intentionally causes serious physical injury to a companion animal with aggravated cruelty. For purposes of this section, `aggravated cruelty' shall mean conduct which: (i) is intended to cause extreme physical pain; or (ii) is done or carried out in an especially depraved or sadistic manner."

The statute further states, in pertinent part: "A `companion animal' or `pet' means any dog or cat, and shall also mean any other domesticated animal normally maintained in or near the household of the owner or person who cares for such other domesticated animal." (Agriculture and Markets Law § 350 [5].)

"Animal," in turn, is defined in the statute as "every living creature except a human being." (Agriculture and Markets Law § 350 [1].)

B. Parties' Contentions

Defendant contends that the definition of "companion animal" fails to provide adequate warning as to which animals Agriculture and Markets Law § 353-a protects, rendering the statute vague on its face and violative of due process. In addition, defendant contends, the statute is vague as applied to him in this case, as a goldfish cannot be considered a companion animal, and, therefore, is not within the terms of the statute. A goldfish, defendant argues, is not a companion animal because: (1) a "domesticated animal" must be a mammal; (2) a "domesticated animal" must breathe air in order to live among humans; (3) a fish does not feel pain; (4) people eat fish; (5) a fish cannot be trained; (6) an owner cannot interact with a fish; and (7) a fish cannot provide company to an owner. Defendant concludes by arguing that a fish maintained in a household is, at best, an "ornament."

The People contend that the statute is neither vague on its face nor vague as applied to defendant, as it provides adequate notice of the proscribed conduct. The People argue that by expanding the definition of companion animal beyond cats and dogs to include other domesticated animals, the Legislature intended the statute to be read broadly and to include animals other than mammals. Finally, the People contend, the statute's requirement that the unlawful conduct be for "no justifiable purpose" eliminates any concern that the killing and eating of fish at home would be prohibited under the statute.

C. Analysis

Only one reported decision has addressed the constitutionality of the aggravated cruelty to animals statute. In People v Knowles (184 Misc 2d 474 [Rensselaer County Ct 2000]), the court upheld the constitutionality of the statute against several challenges,^[*] but did not address whether or not the definition of "companion animal" rendered the statute void for vagueness.

1. Principles of Statutory Construction

If a statute is framed in language which is clear and unambiguous, any attempt to construe its language is superfluous. (McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 75, at 168 [1971].) Only where a statute's language leaves its purpose and the legislative intent uncertain should a court make any attempt at statutory construction. (Id. at 168-169.) Accordingly, a court's first duty is to examine the natural and obvious meaning of the words and language employed in a statute to determine the intent of the Legislature. (Id. at 170-171; Mc-Kinney's Cons Laws of NY, Book 1, Statutes § 91, at 174; § 94, at 188-191 [1971].)

A statute may utilize...