People v. Grant

• Citation: 174 P.3d 798
• Decision Date: 25 January 2007
• Docket Number: No. 03CA1034.,03CA1034.
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dale Sample GRANT, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

174 P.3d 798

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Dale Sample GRANT, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 03CA1034.

Colorado Court of Appeals, Div. V.

January 25, 2007.

Rehearing Denied April 12, 2007.

John W. Suthers, Attorney General, Paul Koehler, Assistant Attorney General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.

Douglas K. Wilson, Colorado State Public Defender, Mark G. Walta, Deputy State Public

Defender, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.

Opinion by Judge DAILEY.

Defendant, Dale Sample Grant, appeals the judgments of conviction entered upon jury verdicts finding him guilty of first degree murder, attempted first degree murder, first degree assault, second degree assault, and resisting arrest. He also appeals the sentences imposed. We affirm.

The charges in this case arose out of an incident in which the eighteen-year-old defendant attacked three others with a hunting knife.

For a month prior to the incident, defendant had been living in an apartment with a friend and his friend's mother. He smoked marijuana on a daily basis and began experimenting with lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD). During that period, defendant had a bad experience with LSD, which resulted in his becoming very scared and claiming that "the devil was after [him]." Thereafter, he acted abnormally and complained on numerous occasions about "seeing the devil and reflections and other stuff."

On the day in question, defendant told his friend that he had not slept well the night before because "[Satan was] messing with [his] head," and he told his employer that he "was seeing the devil." Before coming back to the apartment that evening, he smoked a substantial amount of marijuana, some of which he later claimed was laced with methamphetamine. Defendant later also admitted that he had used LSD on either the night, or a few days, before the incident.

In the apartment that evening were defendant, the friend, the friend's mother, and a fifteen-year-old neighbor girl. Defendant picked up a hunting knife from a dresser after claiming to have heard something. When his friend indicated he had not heard anything, defendant threatened to kill him. When the friend sought to have his mother intervene, defendant rushed up from behind, saying, "[T]he devil is on [the friend]. I've got to get the devil off him." Although the mother initially talked defendant into giving up the knife, defendant changed his mind, struggled with the mother, somehow regained possession of the knife, and stabbed her in the shoulder. The friend tried to intervene, and his hand was cut while scuffling with defendant.

The friend and the mother escaped, leaving only defendant and the neighbor girl in the apartment. The neighbor girl was overheard saying, "Dale, it's me, your neighbor, it's okay." Thereafter, loud noises and screams were heard coming from the apartment. When the police arrived, they found defendant standing inside the apartment, covered in blood, mumbling and yelling incoherently. The neighbor was lying nearby: she had been stabbed and slashed eighteen times, and she subsequently died from excessive loss of blood.

Following the incident, defendant told law enforcement authorities that he knew he was stabbing bodies and that he repeatedly, intentionally stabbed the neighbor. According to him, the neighbor was changing into a devil or a dragon, of which he was afraid. Psychiatrists who talked to him described him as believing that the neighbor was "under the influence of," "infested by," "inhabited by," or "turning into" the devil or a dragon.

At trial, defense and prosecution psychiatrists alike opined that defendant was psychotic at the time of the incident. Defendant's psychiatrists attributed his psychosis to schizophrenia that either predated or was unrelated to his use of drugs; thus, they posited that he was legally insane during the incident. The prosecution's psychiatrists, however, attributed defendant's psychosis to his use of LSD, marijuana, and amphetamines; thus, they posited that he was legally sane at the time.

Defendant asserted that, even if he were legally sane, his mental condition was such that he lacked the requisite culpable mental state for the more serious charges.

The jury found defendant guilty as charged, and the trial court sentenced him to (1) life imprisonment without possibility of parole for first degree murder of the neighbor; (2) twenty years imprisonment for attempted first degree murder and ten years imprisonment for first degree assault on the mother; (3) eight years imprisonment for second degree assault on the friend; and (4) twelve months imprisonment for resisting arrest. The court ordered that the sentences be served consecutively, except those for attempted murder and first degree assault, which were to be served concurrently with one another.

I. Suppression of Statements

Defendant contends that reversal is required because the trial court did not suppress statements that law enforcement authorities obtained from him in violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 1612, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). We disagree.

Under Miranda v. Arizona, supra, 384 U.S. at 478-79, 86 S.Ct. at 1630, the prosecution may not use in its case-in-chief a statement obtained by police during custodial interrogation unless the suspect was advised of and validly waived certain Fifth Amendment rights. See People v. Wood, 135 P.3d 744, 749 (Colo.2006).

Here, the statements defendant challenges were not introduced by the prosecution as part of its case-in-chief. Rather, defendant introduced these statements as part of his case-in-chief to show his mental state at or around the time of the incident. For this reason, defendant cannot now claim that his statements (or those unfavorable portions thereof upon which the prosecution relied in rebuttal) were admitted in violation of Miranda. See People v. Wood, supra, 135 P.3d at 749 (Miranda prohibits use of statements in prosecution's case-in-chief); People v. Stewart, 55 P.3d 107, 119 (Colo.2002)(under invited error doctrine, a party is precluded from urging on appeal error based on matters that he or she strategically injected into the case); People v. Melillo, 25 P.3d 769, 775 (Colo.2001) (ordinarily, under the rule of completeness, if part of a defendant's statement is introduced by one party as an admission or declaration, the other party may have the remainder of the statement admitted as well).

We note that in his reply brief defendant asserts that, in addition to being obtained in violation of Miranda, his statements were involuntary. Because this argument is raised for the first time in his reply brief, we decline to consider it. See People v. Czemerynski, 786 P.2d 1100, 1107 (Colo. 1990); People v. Harrison, 58 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Colo.App.2002).

II. Additional Psychiatric Evaluation

Defendant next contends that the trial court erred by ordering him to submit to an additional examination on the issue of sanity. We disagree.

When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, the trial court must order him committed for a sanity examination by one or more doctors specializing in nervous and mental diseases. Sections 16-8-105.5(1), 16-8-106(1), C.R.S.2006. "For good cause shown, upon motion of the prosecution or defendant, or upon the court's own motion, the court may order such further or other examination, including services of psychologists, as is advisable under the circumstances." Section 16-8-106(1).

"Although the [good cause] standard is not an onerous one, there must be some basis, other than counsel's opinion, for showing that the first examination was inadequate or unfair." People v. Garcia, 87 P.3d 159, 163 (Colo.App.2003), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 113 P.3d 775 (Colo. 2005). The determination of whether good cause has been shown is a matter committed to the discretion of the trial court. People v. Galimanis, 765 P.2d 644, 646 (Colo.App. 1988).

Here, a little more than a month before trial, the prosecution moved for an order requiring defendant to submit to a further mental examination. The prosecution asserted that, although the parties had long been aware of defendant's drug use, none of the examining experts had, until recently, considered whether defendant's hallucinations could have been caused by his use of LSD even though it was not detected in his blood following the incident. This possibility, the prosecution asserted, had been raised only after the doctor who conducted the most recent examination, for which there had been no objection, recommended further examination by an expert in a condition known as hallucinogen persisting perception disorder.

Defendant objected to any further examination based on the timing of the examination in relation to the scheduled trial date. He asserted that he would be prejudiced because of his inability to assess the results of the new examination and, if necessary, prepare a surrebuttal case for trial. He did not object, as he does here on appeal, on the ground that he would be prejudiced by being required to supply yet more statements that could be used to assess his mental condition.

The trial court determined that the prosecution established good cause for a further examination. Cognizant of defendant's concern about preparing for trial, however, the court set a time by which the examination was to be completed and a report submitted.

A party is not entitled to have another examination by a different doctor simply because the original examination did not yield favorable results. Cf. Massey v. Dist. Court, 180 Colo. 359, 365, 506 P.2d 128, 131 (1973) ("A court-appointed medical expert who expresses his professional opinion in a trial is not a partisan, but is, in effect, the court's witness."). Here, however, the prosecution did not request that defendant be examined by another expert simply because the prior experts' opinions were not...