People v. Guzman

• Decision Date: 09 April 2014
• Citation: 982 N.Y.S.2d 908,2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02453,116 A.D.3d 790
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. Harry GUZMAN, appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

116 A.D.3d 790

982 N.Y.S.2d 908

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 02453

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.Harry GUZMAN, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

April 9, 2014.

Harry Guzman, Napanoch, N.Y., appellant pro se.

Janet DiFiore, District Attorney, White Plains, N.Y. (Raffaelina Gianfrancesco, Steven A. Bender, and Richard Longworth Hecht of counsel), for respondent.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Westchester County (Holdman, J.), rendered July 9, 2010, convicting him of burglary in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Betancourt, 68 N.Y.2d 707, 506 N.Y.S.2d 310, 497 N.E.2d 677;People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish his guilt of burglary in the second degree beyond a reasonable doubt ( see Penal Law § 140.25[2]; People v. Hammon, 47 A.D.3d 644, 850 N.Y.S.2d 474;People v. Balaz, 43 A.D.3d 949, 841 N.Y.S.2d 367;People v. Moon, 11 A.D.3d 486, 782 N.Y.S.2d 369;People v. Brown, 288 A.D.2d 233, 732 N.Y.S.2d 361;People v. Hirsch, 280 A.D.2d 612, 720 N.Y.S.2d 535;People v. Murray, 168 A.D.2d 573, 562 N.Y.S.2d 788). Contrary to the defendant's contention, his intent to commit a crime within the subject residence was sufficiently established by circumstantial evidence ( see People v. Barnes, 50 N.Y.2d 375, 380, 429 N.Y.S.2d 178, 406 N.E.2d 1071;People v. Bergman, 70 A.D.3d 1494, 894 N.Y.S.2d 635;People v. Gilmore, 199 A.D.2d 410, 411, 605 N.Y.S.2d 109;People v. Lide, 192 A.D.2d 557, 558, 596 N.Y.S.2d 103;People v. Murray, 168 A.D.2d 573, 562 N.Y.S.2d 788;People v. Caraballo, 138 A.D.2d 725, 526 N.Y.S.2d 538), including DNA evidence linking the defendant to the crime ( see People v. Jones, 105 A.D.3d 1059, 1060, 963 N.Y.S.2d 399;People v. Dolan, 2 A.D.3d 745, 746, 768 N.Y.S.2d 654;People v. Rush, 242 A.D.2d 108, 672 N.Y.S.2d 362).

Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15[5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Mateo, 2 N.Y.3d 383, 410, 779 N.Y.S.2d 399, 811 N.E.2d 1053,cert. denied 542 U.S. 946, 124 S.Ct. 2929, 159 L.Ed.2d 828;People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt as to all of the convictions was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

Contrary to the defendant's contention, the Supreme Court conducted an extensive colloquy, following which the defendant executed a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver of his right to counsel ( see People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d 579, 583, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632;People v. Vivenzio, 62 N.Y.2d 775, 477 N.Y.S.2d 318, 465 N.E.2d 1254;People v. Anderson, 94 A.D.3d 1010, 1012, 942 N.Y.S.2d 561).

The defendant's remaining contention is without merit.

DILLON, J.P., CHAMBERS, AUSTIN and DUFFY, JJ., concur.