People v. Anderson

• Citation: 94 A.D.3d 1010,942 N.Y.S.2d 561,2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 02888
• Parties: The PEOPLE, etc., respondent, v. James ANDERSON, appellant.
• Decision Date: 17 April 2012
• Court: New York Supreme Court Appellate Division

2012 N.Y. Slip Op. 02888

94 A.D.3d 1010

942 N.Y.S.2d 561

The PEOPLE, etc., respondent,

v.James ANDERSON, appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Second Department, New York.

April 17, 2012.

Salvatore C. Adamo, New York, N.Y., for appellant.

Thomas J. Spota, District Attorney, Riverhead, N.Y. (Karla Lato and Sandra Corbois of counsel), for respondent.

MARK C. DILLON, J.P., DANIEL D. ANGIOLILLO, THOMAS A. DICKERSON, and L. PRISCILLA HALL, JJ.

Appeal by the defendant from a judgment of the County Court, Suffolk County (Weber, J.), rendered October 7, 2009, convicting him of robbery in the second degree and unlawful imprisonment in the second degree, upon a jury verdict, and imposing sentence. The appeal brings up for review the denial, after a hearing, of those branches of the defendant's omnibus motion which were to suppress physical and identification evidence and his statements to law enforcement officers.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed.

The hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress physical evidence on the grounds that the police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop and detain him and that he did not abandon his property. The evidence at the suppression hearing established that the officers had reasonable suspicion based upon information they received regarding an attempted burglary and their observations of the defendant in close spatial and temporal proximity to the crime scene, his furtive conduct in tossing a knapsack he was carrying as the officers' patrol car approached, and his response, “What bag?” when the officers pulled alongside and asked why he had tossed the knapsack. Under the totality of the circumstances, the officers acted reasonably in alighting from their vehicle and detaining the defendant ( see People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d 444, 446–447, 591 N.Y.S.2d 823, 606 N.E.2d 951; People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d 181, 184, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204; People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210, 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562; People v. Martinez, 17 A.D.3d 606, 606–607, 794 N.Y.S.2d 397; People v. Warren, 276 A.D.2d 505, 505–506, 714 N.Y.S.2d 107). Contrary to the defendant's contention, his act of tossing the knapsack was not precipitated by unlawful police conduct. Rather, the evidence established that he voluntarily and intentionally abandoned the property and thereby waived his expectation of privacy in it ( see People v. Ramirez–Portoreal, 88 N.Y.2d 99, 110, 643 N.Y.S.2d 502, 666 N.E.2d 207; People v. Caba, 78 A.D.3d 857, 858, 910 N.Y.S.2d 373; People v. Jenkins, 66 A.D.3d 800, 886 N.Y.S.2d 348; People v. Amuso, 44 A.D.3d 781, 783, 843 N.Y.S.2d 395; cf. People v. Howard, 50 N.Y.2d 583, 593, 430 N.Y.S.2d 578, 408 N.E.2d 908, cert. denied 449 U.S. 1023, 101 S.Ct. 590, 66 L.Ed.2d 484). Upon recovery and search of the knapsack by one of the officers, it was found to contain a crack pipe, and the defendant spontaneously remarked that he had smoked crack cocaine from the pipe the day before. At that point, the officers had probable cause to arrest him ( see People v. Martinez, 80 N.Y.2d at 448–449, 591 N.Y.S.2d 823, 606 N.E.2d 951; People v. Hollman, 79 N.Y.2d at 185, 581 N.Y.S.2d 619, 590 N.E.2d 204; People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375, 352 N.E.2d 562).

The hearing court properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress the complainant's in-court identification testimony as allegedly tainted by unduly suggestive pretrial identification procedures. During a lineup, the defendant held his head down to prevent the complainant from seeing his face. At that point, the police properly conducted a photo array identification procedure, which was necessitated by the defendant's misconduct ( cf. People v. Perkins, 15 N.Y.3d 200, 205, 906 N.Y.S.2d 523, 932 N.E.2d 879). Nothing in the record supports the defendant's contention that the complainant's identification of his picture in the photo array was tainted by the aborted lineup. The People satisfied their initial burden of establishing that the lineup and photo array identification procedures were properly conducted, and the defendant failed to meet his ultimate burden of establishing that either procedure was unduly suggestive ( see People v. Chipp, 75 N.Y.2d 327, 335–336, 553 N.Y.S.2d 72, 552 N.E.2d 608, cert. denied 498 U.S. 833, 111 S.Ct. 99, 112 L.Ed.2d 70; People v. Seymour, 77 A.D.3d 976, 978, 910 N.Y.S.2d 487).

The hearing court also properly denied that branch of the defendant's omnibus motion which was to suppress his statements to law enforcement officers. Two of the defendant's statements were made in response to the officers' questions during their performance of “routine police functions” ( People v. Igneri, 152 A.D.2d 638, 639, 543 N.Y.S.2d 169), and the rest of the statements were made “with genuine spontaneity and not [as] the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence” ( People v. Rivers, 56 N.Y.2d 476, 479, 453 N.Y.S.2d 156, 438 N.E.2d 862 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Tyrell, 67 A.D.3d 827, 828, 888 N.Y.S.2d 610). Since the police conduct could not “reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a declaration from the defendant” ( People v. Sobolof, 109 A.D.2d 903, 905, 487 N.Y.S.2d 341 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286, 295, 425 N.Y.S.2d 295, 401 N.E.2d 405), the defendant's statements to the police were not the result of custodial interrogation.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution ( see People v. Contes, 60 N.Y.2d 620, 621, 467 N.Y.S.2d 349, 454 N.E.2d 932), we find that it was legally sufficient to establish the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in fulfilling our responsibility to conduct an independent review of the weight of the evidence ( see CPL 470.15 [5]; People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1), we nevertheless accord great deference to the jury's opportunity to view the witnesses, hear the testimony, and observe demeanor ( see People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672). Upon reviewing the record here, we are satisfied that the verdict of guilt was not against the weight of the evidence ( see People v. Romero, 7 N.Y.3d 633, 826 N.Y.S.2d 163, 859 N.E.2d 902).

The defendant's contention that the trial court erred in permitting him to represent himself is without merit. To ensure that the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel in favor of self-representation is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent, the trial court must undertake a “ ‘searching inquiry’ ... aimed at insuring that the defendant ‘was aware of the dangers and disadvantages of proceeding without counsel’ ” ( People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d 579, 582, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632, quoting People v. Slaughter, 78 N.Y.2d 485, 492, 577 N.Y.S.2d 206, 583 N.E.2d 919; see People v. Vivenzio, 62 N.Y.2d 775, 776, 477 N.Y.S.2d 318, 465 N.E.2d 1254). Contrary to the defendant's contention, his waiver was not ineffective for lack of inquiry into specific factors such as his education or experience in the law ( see People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d at 583, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632; cf. People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d 101, 104, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154). The Court of Appeals has “eschewed application of any rigid formula and endorsed the use of a nonformalistic, flexible inquiry”; “the whole record, not simply ... the waiver colloquy” must provide a “reliable basis for appellate review” ( People v. Providence, 2 N.Y.3d at 583, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632 [internal quotation marks omitted] ). Here, the trial court noted the defendant's significant personal experience with the criminal justice system and had numerous opportunities to see and hear the defendant firsthand, and, thus, “had general knowledge of defendant's age, literacy and familiarity with the criminal justice system” ( id. at 583–584, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632). Further, “nothing in the lengthy colloquies in this record calls into question [the] defendant's ability to understand the trial judge's detailed warnings regarding self-representation” ( id. at 584, 780 N.Y.S.2d 552, 813 N.E.2d 632; see People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d at 104, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154; People v. Vivenzio, 62 N.Y.2d at 776, 477 N.Y.S.2d 318, 465 N.E.2d 1254). Accordingly, the record, as a whole, demonstrates that the defendant made a knowing, voluntary, and intelligent decision to waive his right to counsel and to proceed pro se.

At the persistent felony offender hearing, the defendant walked out of the courtroom when the court denied his request for an adjournment, leaving the court no choice but to appoint an attorney so that the hearing could proceed. By refusing to abide by the court's ruling and engaging “in conduct which would prevent the fair and orderly exposition of the issues” ( People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 17, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 324 N.E.2d 322), the defendant forfeited his right to proceed pro se. Accordingly, the court properly denied his request, in effect, to represent himself at the persistent felony offender hearing and at sentencing ( see People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d at 103, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d...