People v. Hadfield

• Decision Date: 24 July 2014
• Citation: 2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05461,119 A.D.3d 1217,990 N.Y.S.2d 683
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Adam M. HADFIELD, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

119 A.D.3d 1217

990 N.Y.S.2d 683

2014 N.Y. Slip Op. 05461

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Adam M. HADFIELD, Appellant.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

July 24, 2014.

John A. Cirando, Syracuse, for appellant.

Alexander Lesyk, Special Prosecutor, Norwood, for respondent.

Before: STEIN, J.P., McCARTHY, EGAN JR., LYNCH and CLARK, JJ.

EGAN JR., J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of St. Lawrence County (Richards, J.), rendered October 7, 2011, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal sexual act in the first degree (five counts), unlawful imprisonment in the first degree, menacing in the second degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree, kidnapping in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in the first degree and driving while intoxicated.

Defendant was charged in a 13–count indictment with criminal sexual act in the first degree (five counts), unlawful imprisonmentin the first degree, menacing in the second degree, reckless endangerment in the first degree, criminal mischief in the fourth degree, kidnapping in the second degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, rape in the first degree and driving while intoxicated. Count 1 of the indictment—charging criminal sexual act in the first degree—pertained to defendant's sexual contact with victim A in March 2008; the remaining counts of the indictment related to defendant's conduct with respect to victim B in July 2009. The matter proceeded to trial in July 2011 and, during the course thereof, defendant tendered proof in support of his affirmative defense of not guilty by reason of mental disease or defect. Upon defense counsel's motion at the close of the People's case, County Court dismissed the reckless endangerment count and, at the close of all proof, the jury returned a verdict finding defendant guilty of the remaining charges. Defendant thereafter was sentenced to an aggregate prison term of 53 years to be followed by a lengthy period of postrelease supervision.¹ This appeal ensued.²

We affirm. Initially, we reject defendant's assertion that County Court erred in finding that he was competent to stand trial. “The key inquiry in determining whether a criminal defendant is fit for trial is ‘whether he [or she] has sufficient present ability to consult with his [or her] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he [or she] has a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him [or her]’ ” ( People v. Phillips, 16 N.Y.3d 510, 516, 924 N.Y.S.2d 4, 948 N.E.2d 428 [2011], quoting Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402, 80 S.Ct. 788, 4 L.Ed.2d 824 [1960];seeCPL 730.10[1] ). The People bear the burden of proving a defendant's competency by a preponderance of the evidence ( see People v. Surdis, 77 A.D.3d 1018, 1018, 909 N.Y.S.2d 170 [2010],lv. denied16 N.Y.3d 800, 919 N.Y.S.2d 517, 944 N.E.2d 1157 [2011] ), and the trial court's determination in this regard “is accorded considerable deference” ( People v. Kendall, 91 A.D.3d 1191, 1192, 937 N.Y.S.2d 439 [2012];see People v. Phillips, 16 N.Y.3d at 517, 924 N.Y.S.2d 4, 948 N.E.2d 428;People v. Brown, 110 A.D.3d 481, 482, 973 N.Y.S.2d 118 [2013],lv. denied22 N.Y.3d 1039, 981 N.Y.S.2d 373, 4 N.E.3d 385 [2013] ). Notably, the mere fact that a defendant may suffer a memory loss does not automatically trigger a finding of incompetency ( see People v. Bates, 83 A.D.3d 1110, 1112, 920 N.Y.S.2d 795 [2011],lv. denied21 N.Y.3d 1072, 974 N.Y.S.2d 321, 997 N.E.2d 146 [2013];People v. Surdis, 77 A.D.3d at 1018 n. 1, 909 N.Y.S.2d 170).

Here, defendant was evaluated by two psychiatrists (testifying on behalf of the People) and one psychologist (testifying on behalf of defendant). All three evaluators found that defendant appreciated the nature and severity of the charges against him and understood the roles of the trial judge, the jury, the prosecutor and defense counsel. As for defendant's ability to consult with his attorney, one of the People's experts acknowledged that defendant's claimed memory lapses “would make [assisting in his own defense] more difficult,” and the psychologist who testified on behalf of defendant opined that defendant's asserted “lack of recollection [might] compromise his ability to testify relevantly or realistically challenge prosecution witnesses.” ³ Despite these concerns, two of the three experts found defendant to be competent to stand trial, and having reviewed the evaluators' respective reports and conflicting testimony, we discern no basis upon which to disturb County Court's finding that defendant indeed was fit for trial.

Defendant next contends that his convictions are not supported by legally sufficient evidence and, further, are against the weight of the evidence. Again, we disagree. Insofar as is relevant here, count 1 of the indictment required the People to establish that defendant engaged in anal sexual conduct with victim A by forcible compulsion ( seePenal Law § 130.50 [1] ). Victim A, who had been dating defendant for three or four months at the time the incident occurred in March 2008, testified that she awoke on the morning in question to find defendant attempting to have sex with her. When victim A refused his advances, defendant pinned her arms above her head, removed her underwear and, despite her continued protests, engaged in anal sex with her. Victim A further testified that, during this encounter, defendant's hand or body pushed her head into her pillow, making it difficult for her to breathe. Such testimony, in our view, was sufficient to establish the element of forcible compulsion ( seePenal Law § 130.00[8][a], [b] ), as well as the remaining elements of the crime. To the extent that defendant now deems victim A's account of this incident to be dubious—citing, among other things, her delay in reporting the crime—these issues were fully explored at trial, and we defer to the jury's resolution of the underlying credibility issues ( see People v. Littebrant, 55 A.D.3d 1151, 1154–1155, 867 N.Y.S.2d 550 [2008],lv. denied12 N.Y.3d 818, 881 N.Y.S.2d 26, 908 N.E.2d 934 [2009] ).

With respect to the counts pertaining to victim B (counts 2–3 and 5–13), victim B testified that she and defendant began dating in May 2009. On the evening of July 14, 2009, she and defendant went to a local bar—known as the Trackside—around 10:00 p.m., where they remained for approximately 90 minutes. During this time period, defendant consumed “quite a few” beers and/or mixed drinks and “a lot of shots” of alcohol. Defendant and victim B then left the Trackside, purchased a quantity of beer and went to a birthday party for her ex-boyfriend. During the early morning hours of July 15, 2009, defendant and victim B, both of whom had continued to drink at the birthday party, returned to the Trackside, where they remained until closing.

Although defendant and victim B apparently had enjoyed a cordial evening up until this point, the two began to argue upon returning to victim B's residence in the Town of Pitcairn, St. Lawrence County. When victim B indicated that she was going to sleep on the couch, defendant became upset, prompting victim B to decide to leave the premises. Defendant, however, would not allow victim B to leave; after blocking her exit, taking her cell phone and shoving her, defendant pinned victim B to the ground with his knees against her shoulders, took out a pocket knife and dragged the blade across her face—all before pressing the blade to her throat and informing her that she “[had] to die” and that “he was going to kill [her].” Eventually, victim B persuaded defendant to release her so that she could let her animals outside to relieve themselves. After expressing concern over the welfare of one of her dogs, victim B convinced defendant to allow her to venture outside as well, whereupon she managed to get to her vehicle and flee. Defendant gave chase, however, and—once he caught up with victim B—rammed her vehicle with his truck and forced her off the road. Defendant then punched out the driver's side window of victim B's vehicle, pulled her out of the car and “[t]ossed” her into the front passenger seat of his truck.

After reentering the truck, defendant reclined the front seat and pinned victim B down by placing his elbow to her collarbone. Following a brief struggle over the knife, which victim B succeeded in tossing out of the window of the truck, defendant began driving. Approximately 10 minutes later, victim B was allowed to sit up, at which point she recognized landmarks that placed her whereabouts in St. Lawrence County. As defendant continued to drive, they passed another motorist, who victim B recognized as a friend, prompting her to launch her hands and face out of the driver's side window and yell for help; defendant responded, “Great, now the cops are going to be called.” Although victim B's friend turned around and began to follow defendant's truck, defendant “started driving faster” and the other vehicle faded from sight. As victim B pleaded for defendant to take her home, they approached an intersection with a stop sign, and victim B used this opportunity to “kick the shifter [lever] out of gear,” exit the vehicle and begin running. After only “two or three steps,” however, defendant caught up with victim B, informing her that “now [she was] really going to have to die.” Defendant then dragged victim B back the truck and again began driving.

Eventually, defendant pulled over and announced that he wanted to get some sleep. Despite his stated intention, defendant thereafter grabbed victim B's breast before straddling her, pinning her down to the passenger seat and attempting to persuade her to perform oral sex. When victim B refused, defendant—on three separate occasions—placed his hands around victim B's throat and choked her; each time that victim B would gasp for air, defendant would force his penis...