People v. Johnson, Docket No. 71296
| Decision Date | 01 June 1984 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 71296 |
| Citation | 421 Mich. 494,364 N.W.2d 654 |
| Parties | PEOPLE of the State of Michigan, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Michael Jeffrey JOHNSON, Defendant-Appellant. , |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Paul L. Maloney, Pros. Atty. by John T. Burhans, Asst. Pros. Atty., St. Joseph, for plaintiff-appellee.
Andrew J. Burch, Bleich, Burch, Dettman & Grumbine, Benton, Harbor, for defendant-appellant.
Defendant pleaded guilty to second-degree murder. M.C.L. Sec. 750.317; M.S.A. Sec. 28.549. Pursuant to a plea bargain, a charge of first-degree murder was dismissed. M.C.L. Sec. 750.316; M.S.A. Sec. 28.548. He was sentenced to life imprisonment.
The Court of Appeals considered and rejected asserted errors touching the plea-taking procedure and that court's ruling thereon is not challenged here. Rather defendant here argues the effect of "Proposal B" on the "lifer law" and claims that failure of the trial court to make certain that defendant was correctly informed thereon prevented an understanding plea as required by GCR 1963, 785.7.
We do not usually treat errors not asserted in the Court of Appeals. We address this question, however, because we are concerned with its implication in this and many other cases and confusion about it has such impact on our plea-taking procedure as to warrant our speaking to it at this time.
M.C.L. Sec. 791.234(4); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304(4), popularly known as the "lifer law," provides in pertinent part:
"A prisoner under sentence for life or for a term of years, other than prisoners sentenced for life for murder in the first degree and prisoners sentenced to life or for a minimum term of imprisonment for a major controlled substance offense, who has served 10 calendar years of the sentence, is subject to the jurisdiction of the parole board and may be released on parole by the parole board...."
Proposal B, an initiatory provision adopted by the voters in 1978 became M.C.L. Sec. 791.233b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2303(3) and provided in relevant part:
"A person convicted and sentenced for the commission of any of the following crimes shall not be eligible for parole until the person has served the minimum term imposed by the court which minimum term shall not be diminished by allowances for good time, special good time, or special parole."
Among the crimes listed requiring service of minimum term before parole is second-degree murder.
The prosecutor argues that Proposal B, despite its express provision that the legislation has application to "the minimum term imposed by the court," must be read as applying to a life sentence. This is so, he maintains, because the minimum term of a life sentence is the natural life of the defendant. He relies on the authority of the opinion of the Attorney General, OAG 1979-1980, No 5583, pp 438, 441-442 (October 16, 1979), for this view, and its acceptance by the Court of Appeals in People v. Cohens, 111 Mich.App. 788, 795, 314 N.W.2d 756 (1981).
We disagree.
The difference between a life sentence and an indeterminate sentence having a minimum and maximum term has been recognized by this Court since our decision in People v. Vitali, 156 Mich. 370, 120 N.W. 1003 (1909). We observed in Vitali that if a life sentence is imposed there can be no minimum term.
Accordingly, when a statute authorizes the imposition of a sentence of "life or any term of years" it allows the imposition of a fixed sentence--life--or an indeterminate sentence--any number of years. We observed in People v. Blythe, 417 Mich. 430, 434-435, 339 N.W.2d 399 (1983), that the Legislature viewed the phrase "life or any term of years" as descriptive of the maximum sentence only. The sentence concepts "life" and "any term of years" are mutually exclusive and a sentencing judge may (in the appropriate case) opt for either but not both.
We hold that Proposal B applies only to indeterminate sentences. Its express provisions are binding on the parole board, and the board may not release on parole, before the expiration of the minimum term fixed by the sentencing judge, any person given an indeterminate sentence for the crimes specified after the proposal's effective date. It has no application to a fixed or life sentence.
The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
We dissent because we conclude that the purpose of Proposal B was to preclude persons sentenced to life in prison from eligibility for parole under M.C.L. Sec. 791.234; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304. We would however remand for resentencing because on the facts of this case, we are uncertain of the trial court's intent in sentencing the defendant.
1978 P.A. 81 initiated measure, Proposal B, was an initiative law, the clear intent of which was to change the sentencing structure, good time provision, and parole policies of this state.
The official ballot wording for Proposal B read as follows:
"Proposal to Prohibit the Granting of a Parole to a Prisoner Convicted of Certain Crimes Involving Violence or Injury to Person or Property Until at Least the Minimum Sentence Has Been Served. The Proposed Law would:
1) List the crimes to which this law applies, which are crimes of violence or crimes resulting in injury to persons or damage to property.
2) Prohibit the Parole Board from granting a parole to a prisoner serving a sentence for conviction of one of these crimes until after the completion of the minimum sentence imposed on the prisoner.
3) Provide that in cases involving conviction for one of these crimes that the minimum sentence cannot be diminished by granting of good time, special good time, or special parole." OAG, 1981-1982, No. 5875, p 120 (April 16, 1981).
As passed by the Legislature, M.C.L. Sec. 791.233b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2303(3), the amendment required by Proposal B contained over 80 statutes involving crimes of violence or injury to person or property. Of these, 25 carry a maximum penalty of life in prison.
Prior to adoption of M.C.L. Sec. 791.233b; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2303(3), M.C.L. Sec. 791.233(b); M.S.A. Sec. 28.2303(b) provided that prisoners were eligible for special parole "prior to expiration of their minimum terms of imprisonment whenever the sentencing judge or the judge's successor in office gives written approval...."
M.C.L. Sec. 791.234; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2304, "the lifer law", provided that persons who had served ten calendar years "under a sentence for life or for a term of years" other than those sentenced for "murder in the first degree" may be released on parole.
By 1978 P.A. 81, the Legislature amended M.C.L. Sec. 791.233; M.S.A. Sec. 28.2303 to preclude special paroles for "prisoners sentenced for life for murder in the first degree and prisoners sentenced for life or for a minimum term of imprisonment...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
People v. Arnold
...option that existed alongside other options, such as a life sentence or a term of years"); see generally People v. Johnson , 421 Mich. 494, 498, 364 N.W.2d 654 (1984) ("The sentence concepts ‘life’ and ‘any term of years’ are mutually exclusive ....").32 The concurrence points out that the ......
-
People v. Adams
...of less than ten years. Persons sentenced to parolable life sentences may be considered for parole after ten years. People v. Johnson, 421 Mich. 494, 364 N.W.2d 654 (1984). A consecutive sentence for perjury would be a meaningful deterrent to all such persons.The deterrent effect of a conse......
-
People v. Wiley
...prisoner may be entitled under statute before that prisoner has even begun serving the term of imprisonment.")And in People v. Johnson , 421 Mich. 494, 364 N.W.2d 654 (1984), our Supreme Court considered the effects of Proposal B on life sentences. Id . at 497-498, 364 N.W.2d 654. Although ......
-
People v. Arnold
...years’ are mutually exclusive and a sentencing judge may (in the appropriate case) opt for either but not both," People v. Johnson , 421 Mich. 494, 498, 364 N.W.2d 654 (1984), so "1 day to life" was a mutually exclusive concept that a sentencing judge was free to opt for to the exclusion of......