People v. Kittrell, 87CA1095

• Decision Date: 17 August 1989
• Docket Number: No. 87CA1095,87CA1095
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald Lee KITTRELL, Defendant-Appellant. . V
• Court: Colorado Court of Appeals

Page 467

786 P.2d 467

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Donald Lee KITTRELL, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 87CA1095.

Colorado Court of Appeals,

Div. V.

Aug. 17, 1989.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 21, 1989.

Certiorari Denied Jan. 29, 1990.

Duane Woodard, Atty. Gen., Charles B. Howe, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Richard H. Forman, Sol. Gen., and John Milton Hutchins, First Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

David F. Vela, State Public Defender, and Thomas R. Williamson and Katherine Campbell, Deputy State Public Defenders, Denver, for defendant-appellant.

Opinion by Judge MARQUEZ.

Defendant, Donald Lee Kittrell, appeals a judgment entered upon a jury verdict finding him guilty of murder in the first degree (felony murder) and murder in the second degree. We affirm in part, and remand with directions.

Defendant was charged by information with first degree murder (after deliberation) pursuant to § 18-3-102(1)(a), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B) and first degree murder (felony murder) pursuant to § 18-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B) for the 1986 multiple stabbing death of a man. This murder occurred after the victim allegedly had solicited defendant for sex. The record reflects that defendant, who admitted stabbing the victim, stole the victim's wallet and keys and was later seen driving the victim's car.

I.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury adequately about the law of felony murder. We disagree.

The jury was instructed on both first degree murder after deliberation and first degree felony murder, as well as robbery, the offense underlying the felony murder charge. The instruction setting out the elements of felony murder included among those elements that the defendant:

"(4) committed robbery, and

(5) in the course of or in the furtherance of robbery, or in the immediate flight therefrom,

(6) the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by anyone."

Prior to deliberations, the defendant tendered two jury instructions to the trial court. The first of these read, in pertinent part:

"Donald Kittrell contends that the homicidal act against [the victim] was committed before anything was taken from him."

The second stated:

"In order to find the Defendant guilty of Murder in the First Degree as defined in [the felony murder instruction], you must find that the Defendant was committing or attempting to commit the crime of Robbery at the time he caused the death of [the victim]."

The trial court refused the second of these instructions, but accepted and gave to the jury a modified version of defendant's first instruction which, as modified, read:

"Donald Kittrell contends that the homicidal act against [the victim] was committed before the intent to take anything was formed."

Defendant asserts that a conviction for felony murder required proof of an intent to commit the underlying felony either prior to, or concomitant with, the killing of the victim. The People do not take issue with this proposition. We conclude that there was no error in the court's instructions.

Defendant's tendered instructions did not contain the language which defendant now asserts was erroneously omitted. Further, the court gave a modified version of his first tendered instruction and, as is discussed below, the second was an incorrect statement of the law.

The court correctly instructed the jury on the elements of robbery. See COLJI-Crim. No. 15:01. The court's felony murder instruction essentially follows COLJI-Crim. No. 9:02 (1983) and the language of § 18-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B). See People v. Scheer, 184 Colo. 15, 518 P.2d 833 (1974). In our view, the instructions as a whole clearly informed the jury of the applicable law. See People v. Freeman, 739 P.2d 856 (Colo.App.1987).

The purpose of the felony murder statute is to hold a participating robber accountable for a nonparticipant's death, even though unintended, as long as death is caused by an act committed in the course of or in furtherance of the robbery or in the course of immediate flight therefrom. People v. Raymer, 662 P.2d 1066 (Colo.1983). The prosecution still has to prove the homicide and all elements of the underlying felony beyond a reasonable doubt. People v. Morgan, 637 P.2d 338 (Colo.1981). Hence, we conclude that the court did not commit error in its instructions.

II.

We reject defendant's contention that the court erred in failing to accept the second tendered instruction quoted above, since the instruction did not completely and correctly reflect the law of felony murder.

A person commits felony murder if:

"Acting either alone or with one or more persons, he commits or attempts to ... commit ... robbery ... and, in the course of or in furtherance of the crime that he is committing or attempting to commit, or of immediate flight therefrom, the death of a person, other than one of the participants, is caused by anyone."

Section 18-3-102(1)(b), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8B).

Hence, by its plain language, § 18-3-102(1)(b) is not so limited as to allow conviction only if there is a finding that the defendant was committing or attempting to commit the crime at the time he caused the death. A death caused in the furtherance of a robbery or a death caused in the immediate flight from a robbery falls squarely within the edict of § 18-3-102(1)(b). See People v. Morgan, supra; Whitman v. People, 161 Colo. 110, 420 P.2d 416 (1966) (felony murder occurred when the defendant's get-away car collided with that of the victim).

III.

Defendant contends that the trial court erred in failing to respond adequately to an inquiry from the jury. We disagree.

During its deliberations, the jury sent the following inquiry to the court:

"We would like clarification on the felony murder charge. One dissenting member needs to know if murder must be committed in response to or because of robbery--rather than before."

In response to this inquiry, defense counsel requested only that the court submit to the jury one of defendant's tendered instructions, noted above. The trial court denied defendant's request and instructed the bailiff to "tell the jurors to read the instructions carefully because all the information they're requesting is in the instructions."

Defendant argues that the jury was never informed that he could not be found guilty of felony murder if his decision and intent to rob the victim had been formed after the killing and that, although he tendered an instruction relating to this principle, it was refused by the trial court. Defendant also asserts that although the jurors were informed that he contended that the homicidal act was committed before the intent to take anything was formed, they were never instructed that this fact would constitute a defense. We reject these arguments.

We recognize that when a deliberating jury affirmatively indicates to the trial court that it does not understand an element of the offense charged or some other matter of law central to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the court is obligated to clarify the matter for the jury in a concrete and unambiguous manner. Leonardo v. People, 728 P.2d 1252 (Colo.1986). Moreover, a jury should be referred back to instructions only when it is apparent that the jury has overlooked some portion of the instructions or when the instructions clearly answer the inquiry. See Leonardo v. People, supra (referring jury to same instruction that caused it difficulty served no useful purpose).

We distinguish Leonardo because there, the trial court had offered no definition of a term relating to the elements of the offense. Here, however, the court's instruction defining the elements of felony murder and robbery adequately answered the jury's question and the jury had been instructed previously to read the instructions as a whole.

Further, unlike Leonardo, counsel was consulted and defendant's only proposed clarification was to request the trial court to submit a previously tendered and refused instruction. The court had already submitted a modified version of defendant's first instruction. Thus, a useful purpose was served by the court's response since the instructions clearly answered the jury's inquiry.

We conclude the court responded adequately to the jury's inquiry.

IV.

During voir dire, the trial court made a statement to the effect that the death penalty would not be sought against defendant. Defendant contends that such statement mandates reversal. We disagree.

Be...