People v. Konkowski

• Decision Date: 15 January 1942
• Docket Number: No. 26310.,26310.
• Citation: 378 Ill. 616,39 N.E.2d 13
• Parties: PEOPLE v. KONKOWSKI et al.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

378 Ill. 616

39 N.E.2d 13

PEOPLE

v.KONKOWSKI et al.

No. 26310.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 18, 1941.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 15, 1942.

Error to Second Division, Appellate Court, First District, on Error to Criminal Court, Cook County; William J. Lindsay, Judge.

Frank E. Konkowski and Stephen Idzikowski were convicted of conspiracy to cheat and defraud. The conviction was affirmed by the Appellate Court, 308 Ill.App. 470, 32 N.E.2d 352, and defendants bring error.

Affirmed.Walker Butler and Donald E. Blodgett, both of Chicago, for plaintiffs in error.

George F. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and Thomas J. Courtney, State's Atty., of Chicago (Edward E. Wilson, John T. Gallagher, Melvin S. Rembe, and William B. Crawford, all of Chicago, of counsel), for defendant in error.

GUNN, Justice.

Plaintiffs in error, Frank E. Konkowski and Stephen Idzikowski, were convicted by a jury in the criminal court of Cook county of conspiracy to cheat and defraud one Edward Rozek of certain money. They were each sentenced to the penitentiary, and the judgment of the criminal court was affirmed by the Appellate Court for the First District. The cause comes to this court on writ of error to the Appellate Court.

The evidence produced by the People tended to show that the defendants induced the complaining witness to believe that for the sum of $600 they could have him placed on the eligible police list qualifying him for appointment on the police force of the city of Chicago. The defendant Konkowski, an attorney, was an alderman and ward committeeman. Idzikowski was a precinct captain. Application was made by Charles Rozek to Idzikowski, who was a friend of the family, to take the civil service examination for policeman. The testimony shows that Rozek was told that he would have no chance to pass the examination unless money was paid. On May 7, 1936, Idzikowski took Charles Rozek to Konkowski's office, talked to him out of the presence of Rozek and the next day came to the Rozek home where he was handed a wallet containing $600. Idzikowski then took Rozek to Konkowski's office, entered the private office, came out a few moments later with Konkowski and introduced him to Charles Rozek. Konkowski told him he would be a policeman. After this had occurred it was decided by the family that Edward Rozek was the one who should be a policeman instead of Charles, and this fact was communicated to Konkowski and agreed to by him. Evidence was also offered that at least six other persons paid one or the other of the defendants from $500 to $600, each, to be placed upon the elibile police list. This evidence was for the purpose of showing motive and course of conduct upon the part of the defendants.

In July, 1938, Edward Rozek testified he went to the office of Konkowski and asked him what was holding up the list, and he was told it would be up shortly. Konkowski was then asked ‘What donation did Steve Idzikowski give you?’ and his reply was ‘How much was he supposed to?’ and when told $600 he sent the complaining witness to Idzikowski requesting him to come immediately to the office. Konkowski and Idzikowski went into the inner office, and in about five minutes called the complaining witness and told him he had nothing to worry about, and that everything was taken care of, and that his name was on the list, and later Idzikowski told him he would be one of the first 300.

In September, 1938, the list was published and Edward Rozek's name was not on it. He claims he made demand of Konkowski for a return of the money, and was told he would get it at the end of the week. On April 16, 1939, an emissary of Idzikowski by the name of Weidebusch, called upon the Rozek family and offered to return $500 if they would come down to court and cause the complaint to be dismissed. While at the Rozek home Weidebusch was arrested. He had in his possession $400 in currency which he turned over to one of the officers.

Both of the defendants took the witness stand and denied the truth of the facts set forth above. They admitted knowledge and acquaintance with the complaining witness and the several other persons who claimed they had paid money to get their names placed upon the eligible list. Evidence was also introduced by the defendants showing the reputation of both defendants for honesty and integrity was good. A fuller and more detailed statement of the facts may be found in the opinion of the Appellate Court. People v. Konkowski, 308 Ill.App. 470, 32 N.E.2d 352.

The first point made by the plaintiffs in error is that since the Statute of Limitations, Ill.Rev.Stats.1939, c. 38, § 631, for conspiracy is eighteen months, and the $600 was received by plaintiffs in error on May 8, 1936, and the indictment returned on May 19, 1939, it was the duty of the court to discharge plaintiffs in error. The point was not raised at the time of the trial, but the question was raised for the first time on a motion for a new trial. Plaintiffs in error claim the unlawful object of the conspiracy was to obtain money by false pretenses. The indictment charged a ‘conspiracy to cheat and defraud.’ The question raised by this assignment of error is whether a conspiracy to cheat and defraud is the same as a conspiracy to obtain money by false pretenses. It is claimed the offense of conspiring to obtain money by false pretenses is complete when the money of the victim is obtained, and the Statute of Limitations then begins to run, because thereafter nothing can be done in furtherance of the object which had already been accomplished.

Cheating is a different offense from that of false pretenses. Cheating is an offense at common law. 4 Blackstone, 157; 2 Hawkins Pleas of the Crown, chap. 23, sec. 1; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence, chap. 9. Every conspiracy to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act for an illegal, fraudulent, or malicious purpose, or for a purpose which has a tendency to prejudice the public in general is, at common law, an indictable offense. People v. Amore, 369 Ill. 245, 16 N.E.2d 720;Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17, 76 Am.Dec. 780;People v. Curran, 286 Ill. 302, 121 N.E. 637;Chicago, Wilmington & Vermilion Coal Co. v. People, 214 Ill. 421, 73 N.E. 770. Under the law, in a conspiracy case every over act is a renewal of the conspiracy, and the offense is continuous so long as overt acts in furtherance of its purpose are committed. People v. Drury, 335 Ill. 539, 167 N.E. 823;People v. Blumenberg, 271 Ill. 180, 110 N.E. 788. Where the charge is conspiracy the Statute of Limitations runs from the date of the commission of the last overt act in furtherance of the common design. People v. Throop, 359 Ill. 354, 194 N.E. 553; People v. Drury, supra; People v. Walsh, 322 Ill. 195, 153 N.E. 357.

Under the evidence in this case, in July, 1938, and within eighteen months of the return of the indictment, plaintiffs in error assured complaining witness he had nothing to worry about, and everything was taken care of, and his name was on the list. One of the means by which the complaining witness testified he was cheated out of his money was by the repeated assurances that his name would be upon the eligible police list, and there was evidence that this assurance was made within the eighteen-months' limitation, and substantially a repetition of the representation made in May, 1936. As was said in People v. Drury, supra, the conspiracy is renewed as to all conspirators by each and every overt act. The claim of plaintiffs in error that the Statute of Limitations had run is not tenable.

It is also claimed that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to keep the jury together during the trial upon the motion of the defendants and the concurrence therein of the State's attorney. It is only in capital cases that the trial court is without discretion as to keeping the jury together during the trial. In other cases there must be a showing that some injury would result from a refusal to keep the jury together. People v. Schneider, 362 Ill. 478, 200 N.E. 321;People v. Foster, 288 Ill. 371, 123 N.E. 534. In the present case there was no sufficient showing to deprive the court of its discretion in this matter. The only support to the motion of the defendants was the unsworn statement of their attorneys that there had been considerable publicity of...