People v. Leonard, 82SA122

• Decision Date: 29 November 1983
• Docket Number: No. 82SA122,82SA122
• Citation: 673 P.2d 37
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles Thomas LEONARD, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 37

673 P.2d 37

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Charles Thomas LEONARD, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 82SA122.

Supreme Court of Colorado,

En Banc.

Nov. 29, 1983.

Dennis E. Faulk, Dist. Atty., Canon City, Steven B. Rich, Deputy Dist. Atty., Fairplay, for plaintiff-appellant.

David F. Vela, Colorado State Public Defender, Barbara S. Blackman, Deputy State Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-appellee.

QUINN, Justice.

In this appeal the People challenge the dismissal of two counts of habitual criminality based on convictions resulting from guilty pleas which the district court found were entered without the defendant having understood the elements of the crimes to which he pled. Because we find that the pleas complied with the requirements of due process of law and Crim.P. 11, we disapprove the judgment of dismissal.

I.

On March 13, 1981, a multi-count information was filed charging the defendant, Charles Thomas Leonard, with the following offenses allegedly committed on February 14, 1981: second degree burglary, ¹ misdemeanor theft, ² conspiracy to commit burglary and theft, ³ criminal mischief, ⁴ and possession of burglary tools. ⁵ The information was amended on April 16, 1981, by adding three counts, each alleging a prior felony conviction in 1973, 1975, and 1978 respectively. ⁶ The defendant thereafter filed a motion to dismiss the habitual criminal counts alleging, inter alia, that he had not been properly advised of the elements of the crimes to which he pled and, therefore, the guilty pleas were not knowingly and voluntarily entered in accordance with due process of law. U.S. Const. Amend. XIV; Colo. Const. Art. II, Sec. 25.

The defendant's motion to dismiss was heard on January 7, 1982, while the trial on the five substantive counts was in progress. The defendant offered and the court received into evidence transcripts of the 1973, 1975, and 1978 providency hearings at which the guilty pleas were entered. The People offered no evidence in opposition to the defendant's motion. At the conclusion of the hearing the court dismissed the counts alleging the 1973 and 1975 convictions because, in its view, the People had not met their burden "of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the pleas involved were valid in the sense that the defendant at the time knew and understood the nature and elements of the offenses in each case." Trial on the five substantive counts then continued to a conclusion, with the jury returning guilty verdicts on each count.

The People seek appellate review of the trial court's dismissal order on two grounds. ⁷ Initially, the People argue that the defendant's challenge to his prior convictions was barred by section 16-5-402, C.R.S.1973 (1982 Supp.), which establishes a three-year limitation period for collateral attacks upon prior felony convictions. This claim, however, has been resolved adversely to the People by our recent decision in People v. Germany, 674 P.2d 345 (Colo.1983), in which we held that section 16-5-402 violated due process of law under the federal and state constitutions "because it precludes collateral challenges to the constitutional admissibility of prior convictions in pending prosecutions solely on the basis of a time bar, without providing the defendant an opportunity to show that the failure to assert a timely constitutional challenge was the result of circumstances amounting to justifiable excuse or excusable neglect." 674 P.2d at 354. ⁸ The remaining issue, which we address in this opinion, is whether the district court erred in concluding that the 1973 and 1975 convictions could not be used as the predicate for habitual criminality because the constitutional validity of the guilty pleas underlying the convictions was not adequately established.

II.

Due process of law requires a conviction based on a guilty plea be voluntarily and understandingly made. E.g., Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 96 S.Ct. 2253, 49 L.Ed.2d 108 (1976); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969); Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834 (Colo.1983); People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121 (Colo.1980). A plea cannot be either a voluntary or a knowing and intelligent admission of guilt unless the defendant receives " 'real notice of the true nature of the charge against him, the first and most universally recognized requirement of due process.' " Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. at 645, 96 S.Ct. at 2257, 49 L.Ed.2d at 114, quoting Smith v. O'Grady, 312 U.S. 329, 334, 61 S.Ct. 572, 574, 85 L.Ed. 859, 862 (1941). To ensure that constitutional standards are satisfied the record should affirmatively show "the defendant's understanding of the critical elements of the crime to which the plea is tendered." Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d at 837. See also, e.g., People v. Meyers, 617 P.2d 808 (Colo.1980); People v. Gleason, 180 Colo. 71, 502 P.2d 69 (1972); People v. Colosacco, 177 Colo. 219, 493 P.2d 650 (1972).

Our cases have demonstrated that the degree of explanation required of a court depends on the nature and complexity of the crime. Where, for example, the crime is "readily understandable to a person of ordinary intelligence from a mere reading of the information without further explanation by the court," a mere reading of the charge may be sufficient. People v. Muniz, 667 P.2d 1377, 1383 (Colo.1983); see, e.g., People v. Gorniak, 197 Colo. 289, 593 P.2d 349 (1979) (plea of guilty to second degree murder); People v. Edwards, 186 Colo. 129, 526 P.2d 144 (1974) (plea of guilty to aggravated robbery). Crimes of greater complexity, on the other hand, require the court to explain in easily understandable terms the critical elements of the crime to which the plea is entered. See, e.g., People v. Muniz, supra (conspiracy to commit burglary); Watkins v. People, supra (conspiracy to commit escape); People v. Sanders, 185 Colo. 356, 524 P.2d 299 (1974) (assault to rob).

Rule 11 of the Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure is designed to facilitate a more accurate determination of the constitutional validity of guilty pleas. The rule prohibits a judge from accepting a guilty plea without first determining that the plea is voluntarily and understandingly made. See, e.g., People v. Muniz, supra; People v. Colosacco, supra. Compliance with the rule also creates an adequate record to support a determination by both the arraigning court and a reviewing court of the defendant's understanding of the crime to which the plea is tendered. See, e.g., People v. Muniz, supra; People v. Mason, Jr., 176 Colo. 544, 491 P.2d 1383 (1971); People v. Randolph, 175 Colo. 454, 488 P.2d 203 (1971).

III.

In assessing the validity of the defendant's 1973 and 1975 convictions, we are guided by the provisions of Rule 11 in effect at the time the pleas were entered. See, e.g., People v. Muniz, supra; People v. Moore, 636 P.2d 1290 (Colo.App.1981). In 1973, Crim.P. 11(a) provided in pertinent part that the court shall not accept a guilty plea without first determining that "the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the charge." ⁹ Although no prescribed ritual was required for acceptance of a guilty plea in 1973, it was essential that the record adequately establish the defendant's understanding of the crime to which the plea was entered. People v. Muniz, supra; People v. Mason, Jr., supra; People v. Randolph, supra.

The present version of Crim.P. 11, which became effective on April 1, 1974, governs the defendant's 1975 plea. This rule provides, in pertinent part, that the court shall not accept a guilty plea "without first determining that the defendant has been advised of all the rights set forth in Rule 5(a)(2)" ¹⁰ and that he "understands the nature of the charge and the elements of the offense to which he is pleading and the effect of his plea." ¹¹ This terminology is designed to make more specific those matters which the court should communicate to the defendant before a guilty plea is accepted.

A.

Turning first to the defendant's 1973 guilty plea to conspiracy to commit burglary, the transcript of the providency hearing discloses that the plea was the result of a plea agreement involving the dismissal of a more serious charge of second degree burglary of a building. At the arraignment the defendant was represented by counsel. Initially, the court read the charge to the defendant, and also explained that the alleged conspiracy was directed to the burglary of a certain building. The defendant stated that he understood the charge and acknowledged that by pleading guilty he was thereby admitting that he did in fact conspire to commit the burglary. The court thereafter engaged in the following colloquy with the defendant:

"THE COURT: May I inquire, Mr. Leonard, ... whether, in fact, there was some agreement, conspiracy or cooperation between you and another person to commit this burglary?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: And that occurred between May 13 and May 15; is that correct?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, I think so.

"THE COURT: The burglary we're talking about is the one involving Walt Flanagan and Company at 401 West Warren?

"MR. BUCKLEY [Deputy District Attorney]: I think it might be better [to explain] Your Honor, that this case involves the theft of 22 station phones, master phones, from the company.

"THE COURT: Wasn't there a chain, also?

"MR. BUCKLEY: And a log chain that was found in the Defendant's apartment two days after the burglary.

"THE COURT: All right, Mr. Leonard, I want to again make very clear that you know what we're talking about.

"The charge of conspiracy relates to the charge of taking 22 phones and a log chain from Walt Flanagan and Company.

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: And you do understand that?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: And you are, in fact, stating that there was some basis for the Court accepting this plea to conspiracy in that you did agree and conspire and cooperate with someone else...