People v. Lucus

• Decision Date: 22 November 1968
• Docket Number: No. 41159,41159
• Citation: 41 Ill.2d 370,243 N.E.2d 228
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Roger B. LUCUS, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 228

243 N.E.2d 228

41 Ill.2d 370

The PEOPLE of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Roger B. LUCUS, Appellant.

No. 41159.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Nov. 22, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 28, 1969.

Niven & Clay, Pontiac, for appellant.

William G. Clark, Atty. Gen., Springfield, and Chester Crabtree, State's Atty., Pontiac (Fred G. Leach, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Ronald K. Fellheimer, Asst. State's Atty., of counsel), for appellee.

WARD, Justice.

The appellant, Roger B. Lucus, was found guilty, by a jury in the circuit court of Livingston County, of leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a vehicle, and fined $50 plus the costs of the proceeding. He has appealed directly to this court alleging (1) that the statute under which he was convicted is violative of the privilege against self-incrimination; (2) that his arrest was unlawful; and (3) that the trial court erred in refusing to give certain instructions be requested.

On December 8, 1965, at about 7:00 P.M., Lucus, who was then 17 years of age, and a young girl friend were driving from Long Point, Illinois, toward Dwight along Route 23 in a white 1960 Chevrolet. East of Cornell, the defendant's car was passed by a Volkswagen bus occupied by six men. A little later, the defendant's auto passed the Volkswagen and the bus again passed the Chevrolet. Then, as the defendant was in the act of passing the Volkswagen once more the vehicles collided causing damage to the left front side of the Volkswagen, which was occupied by railroad employees, and the right rear side of the defendant's Chevrolet. It does not appear that anyone was injured. The defendant completed his passing of the bus and did not stop. The Volkswagen, too, continued along the highway for about one-half a mile where the driver, Robert Waggoner, stopped at a farmhouse. There he phoned the State police and reported the incident, giving a description of the defendant's automobile and its license number. A State trooper, who had been informed of the occurrence by radio, stopped the Chevrolet on route 66 near Dwight, about 17 miles from the scene of the impact. The defendant was taken to State police headquarters, where his auto was identified by the occupants of the Volkswagen, and the damage to both vehicles was examined by the police. The defendant was then charged with leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a vehicle.

The statute concerned provides in part: 'The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting only in damage to a vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop such vehicle at the scene of such accident or as close thereto as possible but shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of such accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of Section 38 of this Act.' (Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 95 1/2, par. 134.) Section 38 of the Act, incorporated by reference into section 37 as well as into section 36 (entitled 'Accidents involving death or personal injuries'), provides that: 'The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person or damage to any vehicle which is driven or attended by any person shall give his name, address, and the registration number of the vehicle he is driving and shall upon request and if available exhibit his operator's or chauffeur's license to the person struck or the driver or occupant of or person attending any vehicle collided with and shall render to any person injured in such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying or making of arrangements for the carrying of such person to a physician, surgeon or hospital for medical or surgical treatment, if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary, or if such carrying is requested by the injured person.' Ill.Rev.Stat.1965, chap. 95 1/2, par. 135.

The defendant asserts that the requirement that a motorist involved in a traffic accident, in effect, identify himself unconstitutionally compels an individual to incriminate himself by supplying evidence of his identity which can be used in any criminal charge arising out of the collision. No other challenge to the validity of the statute is presented.

An important purpose of a statute such as this is to inform immediately one whose vehicle has been damaged of the identity of the person in control of the motor vehicle causing the damage. (See Commonwealth v. Joyce, 326 Mass. 751, 97 N.E.2d 192, 194.) The gist of the offense created by the statute is not the fact of causing damage to a motor vehicle, but the concealing or attempting to conceal the identity of a driver who has been involved in an accident which caused damage to another vehicle. (Cf. People v. Nails, 10 Ill.2d 279, 286, 139 N.E.2d 744, 62 A.L.R.2d 1124.) The statute is a regulatory one directed at all who operate motor vehicles and not at 'a highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities' as in a case such as Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70, 79, 86 S.Ct. 194, 199, 15 L.Ed.2d 165, 172. The legislature in view of the problems and damages occasioned by motor vehicles may impose reasonable conditions on the operation of such vehicles. (See Haswell v. Powell, 38 Ill.2d 161, 163, 230 N.E.2d 178.) Statutes enacted pursuant to this authority must represent a reasonable exercise of the police power and cannot, of course, be violative of constitutionally assured rights.

Many jurisdictions have considered the constitutionality of essentially like 'hit and run' statutes and have rejected arguments that the provisions violated the guaranty against self-incrimination: e.g. Commonwealth v. Joyce, 326 Mass. 751, 97 N.E.2d 192; In re Jones, 130 Fla. 667, 178 So. 424; Ule v. State, 208 Ind. 255, 194 N.E. 140, 101 A.L.R. 903; People v. Rosenheimer, 209 N.Y. 115, 102 N.E. 530, 46 L.R.A.,N.S., 977; People v. Thompson, 259 Mich. 109, 242 N.W. 857, Ex parte Kneedler, 243 Mo. 632, 147 S.W. 983, 40 L.R.A.,N.S., 622; State v. Sterrin, 78 N.H. 220, 98 A. 482. We deem that our statute, too, can withstand such a constitutional challenge.

The privilege under the fifth amendment is not without qualification. It 'is confined to real danger, and does not extend to remote possibilities out of the ordinary course of law.' (Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144, 33 S.Ct. 226, 228, 57 L.Ed. 450, 455.) 'The central standard for the privilege's application has been whether the claimant is confronted by substantial and 'real,' and not merely trifling or imaginary, hazards of incrimination. (Citations.)' Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 53, 88 S.Ct. 697, 705, 19 L.Ed.2d 889, 901.

The statute here requires the driver to disclose only his name and address, the registration number of his vehicle and, upon proper request, his driver's license. The fact that a motor vehicle has been damaged does not, of course, of itself mean that a crime is involved. However, we note that the statute does not require the driver to relate the circumstances of the accident and it in no way requires him to discuss the event beyond, in effect, identifying himself. In Commonwealth v. Joyce, 326 Mass. 751, 97 N.E.2d 192, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts considered a contention that a statute which required a motorist...