People v. Manragh

• Decision Date: 20 November 2018
• Docket Number: No. 119,119
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Rohan MANRAGH, Jr., Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

32 N.Y.3d 1101

114 N.E.3d 1076

90 N.Y.S.3d 623

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Rohan MANRAGH, Jr., Appellant.

No. 119

Court of Appeals of New York.

November 20, 2018

OPINION OF THE COURTMEMORANDUM.

The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed. Defendant, who pled guilty, claims his guilty plea was entered involuntarily and the indictment must be dismissed because the prosecutor failed to notify the Grand Jury of his request to call a particular witness, and failed to allow the grand jury to vote whether to hear that witness, in violation of Criminal Procedure Law § 190.50(6). Defendant does not contend that the evidence before the grand jury was insufficient to support the indictment. Instead, defendant claims that the prosecutor's conduct impaired the integrity of the grand jury proceeding and argues his motion to dismiss the indictment for defective grand jury proceedings on that ground is not forfeited by his guilty plea. The Appellate Division held that defendant's plea was entered voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently and that "by pleading guilty, the defendant forfeited his contention that his motion to dismiss the indictment should have been granted" ( 150 A.D.3d 762, 51 N.Y.S.3d 431 [2017] ). We granted leave to appeal ( 29 N.Y.3d 1130, 64 N.Y.S.3d 680, 86 N.E.3d 572 [2017] ), and now affirm.

On review of the record as a whole, we agree that defendant entered his guilty plea "understandingly and voluntarily" ( People v. Harris, 61 N.Y.2d 9, 19, 471 N.Y.S.2d 61, 459 N.E.2d 170 [1983] ) and that the County Court did not improvidently exercise its discretion in refusing to allow defendant to withdraw his plea ( Criminal Procedure Law § 220.60[3] ). Nonetheless, we have explained that even after entering a valid guilty plea, "a defendant may not forfeit a claim of a constitutional defect implicating the integrity of the process" ( People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227, 231, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773 [2000] ) and we have recognized that certain claimed defects in a grand jury proceeding rise to this level (see e.g. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d at 232, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773 [claims implicating "the constitutional function of the grand jury to indict" or "the prosecutor's duty of fair dealing" survive a guilty plea]; People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 108, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447 [1984] [claim that prosecutor knew, and concealed from the grand jury, his knowledge that there was no evidence to support the indictment survives a guilty plea] ).

Defendant's claim in this case rests on the purported exclusion of a witness, the substance of whose testimony was contained in an affidavit provided to the courts below. That proffered testimony was largely inadmissible and, in any event, would have inculpated him by establishing that he had a relationship with the complainant and had been in her presence in violation of an order of protection. The exclusion of such testimony before the grand jury does not present "a constitutional defect implicating the integrity of the process" ( Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d at 231, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773 ) and accordingly the claimed violation in this case did not survive defendant's guilty plea.

In light of defendant's forfeiture of this claim, his remaining contentions have been rendered academic.

RIVERA, J. (concurring).

Defendant Rohan Manragh, Jr. challenges his conviction upon his guilty plea. I agree with the majority that the Appellate Division should be affirmed because all of defendant's grounds for reversal are without merit. However, the majority has improperly merged the forfeiture and merits analysis of defendant's claim regarding the integrity of the grand jury process. While this doctrinal misstep does not affect the outcome here, the majority creates confusion as to the proper application of the law to future cases. I write to clarify that the question whether a defendant's guilty plea works a forfeiture of an appellate claim is a threshold matter as to the opportunity for judicial review of a type of claim, and not a merits-based determination or a ruling on the proper remedy for a proven error.

I.

Defendant argues, inter alia, that his conviction should be reversed because the integrity of the grand jury proceeding was impaired when the prosecutor did not ask the grand jury to vote on whether to call a witness whom defendant requested. The People concede that the prosecutor did not put the witness to a vote but contend that defendant's guilty plea works a forfeiture of the claim and, alternatively, that his claim is without merit because the prosecutor acted within her discretion to exclude from grand jury consideration what amounts to hearsay testimony.

The State Constitution expressly requires that "[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime ... unless on indictment of a grand jury" ( N.Y. Const. art. I, § 6 ; see People v. Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d 589, 593 n.3, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110, 384 N.E.2d 656 [1978] ). The Legislature imposed this requirement to protect "the people of this State from potentially oppressive excesses by the agents of the government in the exercise of the prosecutorial authority vested in the State" (Iannone, 45 N.Y.2d at 594, 412 N.Y.S.2d 110, 384 N.E.2d 656 [citation omitted] ). Indeed, such a check on the government is necessary given the onerous task of defending oneself against criminal charges (see id. ). "As the constitutional ‘check’ on the prosecutorial power of the State and in its accusatory role, the grand jury ‘remains the exclusive judge of the facts with respect to any matter before it’ " ( People v. Guerrero, 28 N.Y.3d 110, 119, 42 N.Y.S.3d 80, 65 N.E.3d 51 [2016] [Rivera, J., dissenting], quoting People v. Pelchat, 62 N.Y.2d 97, 105, 476 N.Y.S.2d 79, 464 N.E.2d 447 [1984] ).

Article 190 of the Criminal Procedure Law, titled "The Grand Jury and Its Proceedings," sets forth the process that ensures the proper and unobstructed exercise of the grand jury power. As relevant to defendant's claim, pursuant to CPL 190.50(6), a defendant may "request the grand jury, either orally or in writing, to cause a person designated by him to be called as a witness in such proceeding." After reviewing any such request, "[t]he grand jury may as a matter of discretion grant such request and cause such witness to be called pursuant to subdivision three" ( CPL 190.50[6] ). Subdivision three provides:

"The grand jury may cause to be called as a witness any person believed by it to possess relevant information or knowledge. If the grand jury desires to hear any such witness who was not called by the people, it may direct the district attorney to issue and serve a subpoena upon such witness, and the district attorney must comply with such direction. At any time after such a direction, however, or at any time after the service of a subpoena pursuant to such a direction and before the return date thereof, the people may apply to the court which impaneled the grand jury for an order vacating or modifying such direction or subpoena on the ground that such is in the public interest. Upon such application, the court may in its discretion vacate the direction or subpoena, attach reasonable conditions thereto, or make other appropriate qualification thereof" ( CPL 190.50[3] ).

In sum, the Legislature has provided defendant the right to request the grand jury call a named witness, and therefore implicitly imposed an obligation on the prosecutor to honor this right by ensuring the request is put before the grand jurors.¹ In accordance with CPL 190.50(6), the prosecutor has no discretion to deny defendant's request.²

The People are incorrect that defendant's guilty plea forfeited his claim that the prosecutor's conduct impaired the grand jury proceeding. Further, as the text of CPL 190.50(3) and (6) make clear, the prosecutor could not unilaterally decide to avoid a vote on defendant's request. As I discuss below, and contrary to the majority's approach, we resolve this threshold issue by following distinct analytic steps.

II.

A forfeiture is the loss of a right, privilege, or property due to a crime (Black's Law Dictionary, 14th ed. [2014], forfeiture). It automatically "occurs by operation of law as a consequence of the guilty plea, with respect to issues which as a matter of policy the law does not permit to survive such a plea" ( People v. Thomas, 53 N.Y.2d 338, 342 n.2, 441 N.Y.S.2d 650, 424 N.E.2d 537 [1981] ; see People v. Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d 227, 230 n.1, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773 [2000] ). This forfeiture of claims is consistent with the understanding that a guilty plea "marks the end of a criminal case, not a gateway to further litigation" ( People v. Taylor, 65 N.Y.2d 1, 5, 489 N.Y.S.2d 152, 478 N.E.2d 755 [1985] ), and reflects the fact that a guilty plea shifts the propriety of a conviction to the sufficiency of the plea ( People v. Di Raffaele, 55 N.Y.2d 234, 240, 448 N.Y.S.2d 448, 433 N.E.2d 513 [1982] ["(W)here defendant has by his plea admitted commission of the crime with which he was charged, his plea renders irrelevant his contention that the criminal proceedings preliminary to trial were infected with impropriety and error; his conviction rests directly on the sufficiency of his plea, not on the legal or constitutional sufficiency of any proceedings which might have led to his conviction after trial"] ). Notwithstanding this interest in "marking the end of a criminal case," and forfeiture's general application in furtherance of that goal, forfeiture is neither an absolute nor inevitable rule of claim foreclosure but a rule contingent on the nature of the claim. While a guilty plea "effect[s] a forfeiture of the right to revive certain claims made prior to the plea, [it] does not, however, extinguish every claim on appeal" ( Hansen, 95 N.Y.2d at 230, 715 N.Y.S.2d 369, 738 N.E.2d 773 ). Claims which are not forfeited by a guilty plea are preserved by legislative design or judicial...