People v. Martinez
| Decision Date | 31 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | 2d Crim. No. B303086 |
| Citation | 54 Cal.App.5th 885,268 Cal.Rptr.3d 411 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Baltazar DIAZ MARTINEZ, Defendant and Appellant. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Todd W. Howeth, Public Defender, William Quest, Deputy Public Defender, for Defendant and Appellant.
Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr., and Stephanie A. Miyoshi, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This case involves the intersection of the Criminal Justice Realignment Act and the retroactive application of ameliorative statutes pursuant to In re Estrada (1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948 ( Estrada ). Under the Realignment Act, a trial court has discretion to impose a "split sentence" consisting of a term in county jail followed by a period of mandatory supervision. The court fashions a split sentence by suspending execution of the latter portion of the defendant's sentence and releasing them subject to the probation department's supervision. If the defendant violates the terms of supervision, the court may revoke it and order execution of the suspended portion of the sentence.
The issue presented in this case is whether a defendant is entitled to seek the retroactive benefit of an ameliorative statute on appeal from an order revoking supervision.1 We hold that a split sentence consisting of a county jail term followed by a period of mandatory supervision does not automatically become a final judgment of conviction for purposes of Estrada retroactivity when the time to appeal from the imposition of that sentence expires. Where, as here, the trial court subsequently revokes supervision and the Legislature enacts an ameliorative statute prior to or during the pendency of an appeal from the revocation order, the defendant is entitled to seek relief under the new law.
Baltazar Diaz Martinez pled guilty to unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle ( Veh. Code, § 10851, subd. (a) ), identity theft ( Pen. Code,2 § 530.5, subd. (a) ), grand theft (§ 487, subd. (a)), and providing a police officer with false information (§ 148.9, subd. (a)), and admitted allegations that he had served three prior prison terms (§ 667.5, subd. (b)). The trial court struck one of the prison priors and imposed a split sentence of four years eight months, two years of which was based on the two remaining prison priors. Martinez was to serve the first two years of his sentence in county jail, and the remaining two years eight months on mandatory supervision.
Martinez violated the terms of supervision. After his second violation, the trial court revoked supervision and ordered him to serve the remainder of his sentence in county jail. On appeal from the order revoking supervision, he contends he is entitled to have the two one-year prison priors stricken from his sentence due to a change in the law that occurred after sentencing. We agree, and remand.
In February 2018, Martinez pled guilty to unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, identity theft, grand theft, and giving a police officer false information, and admitted allegations that he had served three prior prison terms. In exchange for his guilty plea, the trial court agreed to impose a split sentence of four years eight months: two years in county jail, followed by two years eight months of mandatory supervision. The plea agreement did not state which convictions and enhancements would make up the total sentence.
At the March sentencing hearing, the trial court struck one of the prison priors and sentenced Martinez to the agreed-upon term of four years eight months: two years for unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle, eight months on the identity theft, and two years on the two remaining prison priors. Sentences on Martinez's additional convictions were run concurrently. He did not appeal from the judgment.
In January 2019, the trial court revoked and reinstated mandatory supervision after Martinez admitted that he had violated its terms by getting arrested and failing to report for drug testing. The court ordered him to serve 120 days in county jail for his violations.
Seven months later, Martinez admitted that he again violated the terms of supervision. This violation was tied, in part, to a new case in which Martinez pled guilty to another count of unlawfully driving or taking a vehicle and two more counts of identity theft. The trial court revoked supervision and ordered Martinez to serve the remaining 514 days of his original sentence in county jail. It sentenced him to a consecutive two years four months in jail on his new convictions.
When the trial court sentenced Martinez in 2018, section 667.5, subdivision (b), required it to add two years to his sentence because of his two prior prison terms. ( People v. Jennings (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 664, 681, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 713 ( Jennings ) [].) The Legislature subsequently enacted Senate Bill No. 136 (S.B. 136), which, effective January 1, 2020, limits the applicability of prior prison term sentence enhancements to terms served for sexually violent offenses. ( Ibid. ) The provisions of S.B. 136 apply retroactively to cases that are not yet final on appeal. ( Id. at pp. 681-682, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 713.)
Martinez argues he is entitled to have the enhancements stricken from the sentence imposed in his 2018 case because neither of his prior terms in prison involved a sexually violent offense. The Attorney General argues Martinez is not entitled to relief because the judgment in his case was final prior to S.B. 136's effective date. Martinez has the better argument.
In Estrada , the Supreme Court held that an ameliorative statute will generally apply to all cases that are not final as of its effective date. ( Estrada , supra , 63 Cal.2d at pp. 744-745, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948.) Estrada ’s retroactivity principles apply in a variety of contexts, including to statutory amendments that restrict the applicability of sentence enhancements.
( Jennings , supra , 42 Cal.App.5th at pp. 681-682, 255 Cal.Rptr.3d 713.) "The key date is the date of final judgment." ( Estrada , at p. 744, 48 Cal.Rptr. 172, 408 P.2d 948.) "If the amend[ed] statute ... becomes effective prior to the date the judgment of conviction becomes final[,] then ... it, and not the old statute in effect when the prohibited act was committed, applies." ( Ibid . )
"In criminal actions, the terms ‘judgment’ and " ‘sentence’ " are generally considered ‘synonymous’ [citation]." ( People v. McKenzie (2020) 9 Cal.5th 40, 46, 259 Cal.Rptr.3d 224, 459 P.3d 25 ( McKenzie ).) There can be "no ‘judgment of conviction’ without a sentence." ( Ibid . ) Thus, for purposes of Estrada retroactivity, the focus is not on when a conviction becomes final but rather when the sentence imposed on that conviction becomes final. ( Ibid . ) A sentence becomes final "when all available means to avoid its effect have been exhausted." ( Stephens v. Toomey (1959) 51 Cal.2d 864, 869, 338 P.2d 182 ( Stephens ).) It has not become final "if there still remains some legal means of setting it aside" on direct appeal. ( Ibid . ) Determining whether such means remain here presents an issue of law for our independent review. ( In re Marriage of Fellows (2006) 39 Cal.4th 179, 183, 46 Cal.Rptr.3d 49, 138 P.3d 200.)
Split sentences
In 2011, the Legislature enacted the Realignment Act, which grants a trial court the discretion to either sentence a low-level felony offender to county jail or impose a ( People v. Camp (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 461, 467, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 628 ; see also People v. Scott (2014) 58 Cal.4th 1415, 1418-1419, 171 Cal.Rptr.3d 638, 324 P.3d 827 ( Scott ).) In the latter scenario, the court suspends execution of the concluding portion of the offender's sentence and releases them into the community under the supervision of the probation department. ( People v. Avignone (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1233, 1240, 225 Cal.Rptr.3d 61.) The period of supervision "is mandatory [and] may not be ... terminated [early] except by court order." (§ 1170, subd. (h)(5)(B).) If the offender is rearrested during that period, any proceeding to revoke or modify the terms of supervision must be conducted pursuant to section 1203.2. ( Ibid. ; see Camp , at p. 469, fn. 9, 182 Cal.Rptr.3d 628.) That section permits the court to either release the offender under the same or modified terms, or revoke and terminate supervision. (§ 1203.2, subd. (a).) If the court opts for the latter, it must lift the suspension on the execution of the previously pronounced sentence and order it into "full force and effect." (§ 1203.2, subd. (c).)
Given the discretion granted to a trial court by section 1203.2 and related statutes, the Supreme Court has explained that, in the context of probation, a judgment is not "final" when the trial court imposes a sentence but suspends its execution. ( People v. Chavez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 771, 781, 231 Cal.Rptr.3d 634, 415 P.3d 707 ( Chavez ).) Criminal proceedings remain outstanding against the defendant, and the judgment "may or may not become final" depending on what happens during the probationary period. ( Stephens , supra , 51 Cal.2d at p. 875, 338 P.2d 182.) If the defendant complies with the terms of probation throughout that period, the case may be dismissed and expunged from the record, resulting in no final judgment. ( Ibid . ; see § 1203.4.) In contrast, if the defendant violates the terms of probation, probation may "be revoked [and] the judgment may be ordered in full force and effect." ( Stephens , at p. 875, 338 P.2d 182.) This range of outcomes...
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