People v. Martinez

• Decision Date: 22 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. 99SA206.,99SA206.
• Citation: 22 P.3d 915
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Danny Nieto MARTINEZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

22 P.3d 915

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Danny Nieto MARTINEZ, Jr., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 99SA206.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

January 22, 2001.

David J. Thomas, District Attorney, Donna Skinner Reed, Chief Appellate Deputy District Attorney, Mary Malatesta, Assistant Attorney General and Special Prosecutor, Golden, CO, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Susan L. Foreman, Boulder, CO, Haddon, Morgan & Foreman, P.C., Ty Gee, Denver, CO, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellee.

Justice KOURLIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

This case comes before the court on the People's appeal of a dissenting judge's opinion in a death penalty case. A jury convicted Defendant Danny Martinez as a complicitor to a number of offenses¹ arising out of the assault, rape, kidnapping, and murder of fourteen-year-old Brandaline Duvall. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions in People v. Martinez, 24 P.3d 629 (Colo.App. 2000), cert. denied (Colo.2001).

The People sought the death penalty in this case. At the outset, Defendant made a motion to strike the death penalty arguing that a person convicted as complicitor to first degree murder could never receive a death sentence. The trial judge denied this motion. He noted that Colorado's death penalty statute specifically allows the sentencing panel to consider a defendant's "minor participation" in a murder as a mitigating factor. § 16-11-103(4)(d), 6 C.R.S. (2000). Accordingly, he found that "[t]his provision is an implicit recognition of the fact that a complicitor may participate in a minimal matter in the acts resulting in death but still face the death penalty." The trial judge also determined that nothing in the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution specifically prohibited the imposition of the death penalty on a complicitor to murder. Because of that ruling, the case was tried as a death penalty case. Following the jury's return of a guilty verdict, a three-judge panel conducted the sentencing phase of the case pursuant to section 16-11-103.

At the conclusion of that sentencing phase, the panel issued an order sentencing Defendant to life without possibility of parole under section 16-11-103(2)(d). Two of the judges, including the presiding judge, found the death penalty appropriate and one judge disagreed. Because the panel was not unanimous, under the statute, Defendant received a life sentence. The dissenting judge declined to impose the death penalty essentially for two reasons, which he set out in a written opinion as provided by statute. First, he viewed the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution as prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty on a person convicted not as a principal, but rather as a complicitor. Second, even if the law were to permit imposition of the death penalty, he concluded that the death penalty was improper when applied to Martinez because he was not the individual who intentionally caused the death of Brandy Duvall.

The People challenge that dissenting opinion by appeal to this court. The People claim that the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution does not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on a person found guilty of intentional murder in the first degree on a complicity theory, and that therefore the dissenting judge erred in his application of aggravating factors set forth in section 16-11-103(5). The People bring the appeal under XX-XX-XXX(1), 6 C.R.S. (2000), which allows certain appeals to this court by the prosecution on issues of law.

This is the first case in which we have before us an appeal in a case involving a three-judge sentencing panel in a death penalty case. The role of the panel in the criminal process is something to which this court has not spoken, and we have only the statute to which to look for guidance. The specific questions posed by this appeal implicate broad questions involving the role of the sentencing panel judges in the sentencing process: specifically, are the panel judges acting as jurors who find facts and reach a verdict, or are they acting as judicial officers who reach independent decisions on matters of law and fact.

Because of the importance of those issues to the way in which the process unfolds, both procedurally and substantively, we do not approach them lightly. Rather, we will resolve them on a case-by-case basis, as dictated by our jurisprudence and limited function.

In this case, the dissenting sentencing judge announced two alternate bases for his decision not to impose the death penalty: one that was factual and one that was legal. Because of the factual basis, we do not view this appeal as turning on a question of law as is required for appeals filed under section 16-12-102(1). Even if the judge had reached a different conclusion of law, he would still have made the same decision regarding the death penalty. We therefore conclude that we do not have proper jurisdiction to hear the appeal under section 16-12-102(1).

We also decline to treat the case as an original proceeding under C.A.R. 21, because there is no trial court ruling that somehow interfered with the parties' rights to litigate the case. Indeed, the ruling that set the course of the case was the trial judge's ruling that the death penalty was available in a complicity case. Further, there is no remedy that could result from the People's appeal. Martinez received a life sentence, which could never be converted to a death penalty, whether the dissenting judge was correct as a matter of law or not.

The broader questions of when we have jurisdiction to review sentencing judges' rulings remain unanswered. What we do announce by this opinion is that we will not review the resolution of questions of fact by members of a sentencing panel. We dismiss this appeal.

I.

The People rely on section 16-12-102(1), for the proposition that this court does have jurisdiction to consider a direct appeal in this case.² The pertinent portion of section 16-12-102(1) states:

However, if a statute providing for the imposition of the death penalty is adjudged inoperative or inapplicable for any reason, such adjudication shall constitute a final order that shall be immediately appealable to the supreme court of Colorado, notwithstanding any statute or court rule to the contrary.

(Emphasis added.)

The General Assembly enacted this portion of section 16-12-102(1) in response to this court's decision in People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834 (Colo.1991). In Young, the People appealed the trial court's order finding the death penalty statute unconstitutional. Id. at 836. We held that section 16-12-102(1)³ did not provide jurisdiction, because the trial court's order did not constitute a final judgment. Id. at 838. We similarly refused to apply section 16-12-102(2) as a proper basis for jurisdiction because that section applied only to interlocutory appeals by the government concerning pretrial suppression orders. Instead, we exercised original jurisdiction under C.A.R. 21 and found the Colorado death penalty statute, section 16-11-103, as amended in 1988, invalid on its face as it failed to assure a constitutionally certain and reliable verdict of death under the Colorado Constitution. Id. at 847.

In response to Young, with the express intent that "there be no hiatus in the imposition of the death penalty" the Colorado General Assembly amended the statutory scheme imposing the death penalty.⁴ The General Assembly amended section 16-12-102(1) to ensure that a lower court order finding a death penalty statute inoperative or inapplicable constitutes a "final order which shall be immediately appealable to the Supreme Court of Colorado." Ch. 5, sec. 1, § 16-12-102(1), 1991 Colo. Sess. Laws 15, 15 (2d Extraordinary Sess.).

Here, the People argue that the dissenting judge's decision refusing to impose a sentence of death on Defendant constituted a legal conclusion that made the death penalty statute inoperative and inapplicable to a large class of persons. We reject this argument for a number of reasons.

A.

First, as a general matter, appeals taken by the prosecution "are strictly limited by law." People v. Tharp, 746 P.2d 1337, 1339 (Colo.1987). In Tharp, we dismissed an appeal for three fundamental flaws. First, the appeal in Tharp failed because it involved an evidentiary issue that implicated factual as well as legal issues. Id. at 1339. Any prosecutorial appeal under section 16-12-102(1) is necessarily limited to questions of law only. People v. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d 689, 693 (Colo.1989); Tharp, 746 P.2d at 1339. This section does not give the People a basis upon which to challenge the trial court's assessment of the evidence. Fagerholm, 768 P.2d at 693. Second, the appeal of an evidentiary issue in Tharp provided little precedential value for later analysis of broader legal issues. Tharp, 746 P.2d at 1339. Finally, we noted in Tharp that the very nature of an appeal corrects errors at the trial court that injuriously affect the rights of a party to the litigation. Id. Like in Tharp, the People's appeal in this case implicates factual, not purely legal, questions. The resolution of those questions falls within the discretion of the sentencing judge.

The three-judge sentencing panel is a creature of statute that replaces the sentencing jury in a capital case. Specifically, effective July 1, 1995, the Colorado legislature amended the statute governing the imposition of the death penalty for those convicted of class one felonies. § 16-11-103(1)(a). The new law provided for judicial sentencing by a three-judge panel in capital cases instead of sentencing by a jury. Id.; see A Bill for an Act Concerning Imposition of the Death Penalty, Hearings on S.B. 54, (Colo. Mar. 2, 1995) (statement of Bob Grant, District Attorney for Adams County and Chairman of District Attorney's Council Capital Litigation Subcommittee); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 92 S.Ct....