People v. Mazurette

• Decision Date: 04 January 2001
• Docket Number: No. S081661.,S081661.
• Citation: 14 P.3d 227,24 Cal.4th 789,102 Cal.Rptr.2d 555
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mary Lucia MAZURETTE, Defendant and Appellant.

102 Cal.Rptr.2d 555

24 Cal.4th 789

14 P.3d 227

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Mary Lucia MAZURETTE, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S081661.

Supreme Court of California.

January 4, 2001.

Jonathan B. Steiner and Cheryl Lutz, under appointments by the Supreme Court, and Thomas F. Coleman, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, Los Angeles, for Defendant and Appellant.

Bill Lockyer, Attorney General, David P. Druliner, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Carol Wendelin Pollack, Assistant Attorney General, Mary Sanchez, Jennifer A. Leal and Joseph P. Lee, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

WERDEGAR, J.

Following denial of her motion to suppress incriminating evidence, defendant Mary Lucia Mazurette pleaded no contest to violating Health and Safety Code section 11377, possession of methamphetamine. Entry of judgment was deferred pursuant to Penal Code ¹ section 1000 et seq., and she entered a drug diversion program. We granted review to decide whether sections 1000-1000.4 preclude defendant from immediately appealing the trial court's decision denying her suppression motion. As explained below, we conclude the Court of Appeal correctly dismissed defendant's appeal.

Facts

Officer Eric Huisar was on patrol in the City of Claremont when he observed defendant Mazurette driving a car with an expired registration, an infraction under Vehicle Code section 4000, subdivision (a). The officer stopped defendant and arrested her on discovering she was also driving with a suspended license, a misdemeanor under Vehicle Code section 14601.1. At the police station, communications supervisor Yvonne Coffey and a records clerk trainee, Kathy Walls, searched defendant to determine whether she possessed any weapons or contraband. Officer Huisar and a male jailer were also present. While defendant remained fully clothed, Coffey and Walls patsearched her and reached under and through her clothes and pulled back portions of her brassiere. A small envelope of white powder fell out when Coffey pulled through defendant's sweater on the front part of her brassiere. Defendant was then booked on suspicion of possessing methamphetamine. At no time were defendant's breasts or genitals exposed, although Walls may have lifted the back of defendant's sweater, slightly exposing her skin.

Defendant was charged with the two Vehicle Code violations as well as violating Health and Safety Code section 11377, possession of methamphetamine, a felony. She moved before trial to suppress the packet of methamphetamine, claiming she had been improperly subjected to a strip search. The trial court denied the motion, whereupon defendant pleaded nolo contendere to possession of methamphetamine and the two Vehicle Code violations. With defendant's consent, the trial court deferred entry of judgment pursuant to Penal Code sections 1000.1 and 1000.2 and ordered defendant diverted from the criminal justice system to undergo drug rehabilitation.

Trial counsel filed a notice of appeal, and new counsel was appointed. Appointed counsel found no issue of potential merit and filed a Wende brief (People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 158 Cal.Rptr. 839, 600 P.2d 1071) with the Court of Appeal. That court requested briefing on whether the trial court's order denying the suppression motion was an appealable order, whether defendant's no contest² plea was an appealable judgment, and whether defendant could appeal following an order deferring entry of judgment. After receiving briefing, the appellate court dismissed the appeal, reasoning that "there is no right to appeal from an order denying a motion to suppress evidence if the defendant has pled guilty or no contest and been granted deferred entry of judgment."

Discussion

A. Appealability

"It is settled that the right of appeal is statutory and that a judgment or order is not appealable unless expressly made so by statute." (People v. Chi Ko Wong (1976) 18 Cal.3d 698, 709, 135 Cal. Rptr. 392, 557 P.2d 976, disapproved on another point in People v. Green (1980) 27 Cal.3d 1, 33-34, 164 Cal.Rptr. 1, 609 P.2d 468; see also Powers v. City of Richmond (1995) 10 Cal.4th 85, 109-110, 40 Cal. Rptr.2d 839, 893 P.2d 1160 and cases cited (plur. opn. of Kennard, J.).)

The question whether a criminal defendant granted a deferred entry of judgment can, immediately following his or her plea of guilty or nolo contendere, appeal an adverse pretrial decision on a motion to suppress evidence arises from the interplay among three sets of statutes. The first statute is section 1237, which sets forth the situations in which a criminal defendant may appeal: "An appeal may be taken by the defendant: [¶] (a) From a final judgment of conviction except as provided in Section 1237.1 and Section 1237.5. A sentence, an order granting probation, or the commitment of a defendant for insanity, the indeterminate commitment of a defendant as a mentally disordered sex offender, or the commitment of a defendant for controlled substance addiction shall be deemed to be a final judgment within the meaning of this section. Upon appeal from a final judgment the court may review any order denying a motion for a new trial. [¶] (b) From any order made after judgment, affecting the substantial rights of the party." Section 1237 thus establishes the general rule that a criminal defendant can appeal only from final judgments and those orders deemed by statute to be final judgments.

Because defendant pleaded no contest to the felony charge, a second set of statutes, those governing criminal appeals following pleas of guilty or no contest, comes into play. Section 1237.5 provides the general rule: "No appeal shall be taken by the defendant from a judgment of conviction upon a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, or a revocation of probation following an admission of violation, except where [certain conditions are met]." A special case, however, is presented when a defendant enters such a plea following an adverse decision on a motion to suppress evidence based on a claim of an illegal search and/or seizure. Section 1538.5, subdivision (m) (hereafter section 1538.5(m)) announces this exception, providing that "[a] defendant may seek further review of the validity of a search or seizure on appeal from a conviction in a criminal case notwithstanding the fact that the judgment of conviction is predicated upon a plea of guilty." This rule applies to pleas of nolo contendere as well as pleas of guilty. (People v. West (1970) 3 Cal.3d 595, 600-601, 91 Cal.Rptr. 385, 477 P.2d 409.)

A third set of statutes complicates the picture. Sections 1000.1 and 1000.2 provide that, in appropriate cases, the court can accept a guilty or no contest plea but defer entry of the judgment of conviction pending the defendant's attempt to successfully complete a drug rehabilitation program. (§ 1000.1, subd. (b) ["If the court determines that it is appropriate, the court shall grant deferred entry of judgment if the defendant pleads guilty to the charge or charges and waives time for the pronouncement of judgment"].) If the defendant successfully completes the assigned program, "the criminal charge or charges shall be dismissed" (§ 1000.3, 4th par.), in which case no judgment of conviction will be entered into the record and, with limited exceptions, the defendant need never reveal she was even arrested, let alone that she was charged with a felony, pleaded guilty, and was granted a deferred entry of judgment. (§ 1000.4.) Under these circumstances, of course, no need would arise to appeal the denial of a suppression motion. If the defendant's attempt at rehabilitation is unsuccessful, however, "the court shall render a finding of guilt to the charge or charges pled, enter judgment, and schedule a sentencing hearing as otherwise provided in this code." (§ 1000.3, 3d par.)

The intersection of these three sets of statutes creates the uncertainty in this case. Defendant here pleaded no contest, and the court accepted her plea. Normally, section 1237.5 would preclude her from appealing.³ But because she pleaded following denial of her suppression motion raising a claim of an illegal search, section 1538.5(m) would permit her to appeal from a final judgment of conviction. In defendant's case, however, the trial court, with her consent, deferred entry of judgment pursuant to section 1000.1. Accordingly, there is—as yet—no judgment from which defendant can appeal. If she successfully completes her rehabilitation, the charges will be dismissed and the slate wiped clean. If, instead, defendant fails to "perform[ ] satisfactorily" in her assigned program, "is not benefiting from education, treatment, or rehabilitation," or engages in additional criminal behavior, "the court shall render a finding of guilt to the charge or charges pled, enter judgment, and schedule a sentencing hearing as otherwise provided in this code." (§ 1000.3, 3d par., italics added.) Only following entry of judgment pursuant to section 1000.3 will a judgment exist from which defendant can appeal.

Our conclusion that defendant cannot appeal following a deferred entry of judgment is consistent with the plain meaning of sections 1237 and 1237.5. {People v. Valladoli (1996) 13 Cal.4th 590, 597, 54 Cal.Rptr.2d 695, 918 P.2d 999 [the "first step" in statutory construction "is to scrutinize the actual words of the statute, giving them a plain and commonsense meaning"].) Because a deferred entry of judgment is neither a final judgment nor listed in section 1237 as one of the types of orders deemed to be final judgments for purposes of appeal, we would diverge from that section's plain meaning were we nevertheless to conclude defendant was entitled to appeal. And, although section 1237.5 lists the special conditions that will permit an appeal from a "judgment of conviction" following a plea of nolo contendere, that section has no application when, as here, there is not, as yet, a judgment of conviction.

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