People v. Michael D. (In re Michael D.)

• Decision Date: 17 December 2015
• Docket Number: No. 119178.,119178.
• Citation: 2015 IL 119178,69 N.E.3d 822
• Parties: In re MICHAEL D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Michael D., Appellant).
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

2015 IL 119178

69 N.E.3d 822

In re MICHAEL D., a Minor (The People of the State of Illinois, Appellee, v. Michael D., Appellant).

No. 119178.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 17, 2015.

Michael J. Pelletier, State Appellate Defender, Alan D. Goldberg and Patricia Mysza, Deputy Defenders, and Christopher M. Kopacz, Assistant Appellate Defender, of the Office of the State Appellate Defender, of Chicago, for appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield, and Anita Alvarez, State's Attorney, of Chicago (Alan J. Spellberg, Annette Collins and Veronica Calderon Malavia, Assistant State's Attorneys, of counsel), for the People.

OPINION

Justice THOMAS delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 At issue is whether, in a juvenile delinquency case, this court's rules allow a minor to appeal an order continuing the case under supervision, when the order is entered after a finding of guilty. We hold that no supreme court rule provides for appeal of such orders.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The State filed a petition for adjudication of wardship against respondent, Michael D., charging him with two counts of misdemeanor theft. Count I alleged that he obtained control over property of another under circumstances that would have reasonably induced him to believe that it was stolen (720 ILCS 5/16–1(a)(4) (West 2014)). Count 2 alleged that he committed theft by deception (720 ILCS 5/16–1(a)(2) (West 2014)). Following a bench trial, the circuit court of Cook County found him guilty of both counts. Respondent filed a motion to reconsider, and the circuit court acquitted him of count I.

¶ 4 At a hearing, the probation officer recommended that respondent be placed on supervision for one year. The State recommended a sentence of one year's probation and asked that the minor be required to make restitution of $160 to the victim. The trial court entered an order continuing the case under supervision for one year. The order also referred respondent for a TASC evaluation and ordered him to pay $160 in restitution to the victim. The continuance of the case under supervision with conditions was memorialized in both a "Supervision Order" and a "Sentencing Order." On the sentencing order, the judge checked the box next to "No finding or judgment of guilty entered." The court did not adjudge respondent a ward of the court. The court advised respondent of his appeal rights and appointed the State Appellate Defender to represent him.

¶ 5 Respondent appealed, and the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. In re Michael D., 2015 IL App (1st) 143181, 390 Ill.Dec. 870, 29 N.E.3d 1140.¹ The court explained that, until recently, supervision could be ordered in a juvenile case only prior to a determination of guilt (see 705 ILCS 405/5–615(1) (West 2012)), and the appellate court had already determined that such orders were not appealable (see In re A.M., 94 Ill.App.3d 86, 90, 49 Ill.Dec. 630, 418 N.E.2d 484 (1981) ). The court noted that a recent statutory change allowed supervision orders to be entered in juvenile cases after a finding of guilt (see 705 ILCS 405/5–615(1)(b) (West 2014)), but held that this change did not make such orders appealable under any supreme court rule. 2015 IL App (1st) 143181, ¶¶ 53–55, 390 Ill.Dec. 870, 29 N.E.3d 1140. The court stated that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 660(a) (eff. Oct. 1, 2001) gives the appellate court jurisdiction to review final judgments in juvenile cases,² but that a supervision order is not a final judgment. 2015 IL App (1st) 143181, ¶ 54, 390 Ill.Dec. 870, 29 N.E.3d 1140. Illinois Supreme Court Rule 662 (eff. Oct. 1, 1975) gives the appellate court jurisdiction to review certain interlocutory orders in juvenile cases, but not supervision orders. 2015 IL App (1st) 143181, ¶ 55, 390 Ill.Dec. 870, 29 N.E.3d 1140. The court noted that Illinois Supreme Court Rule 604(b) (eff. Dec. 11, 2014) gives the appellate court jurisdiction over adult supervision orders, but found that rule inapplicable to juvenile cases. 2015 IL App (1st) 143181, ¶ 53, 390 Ill.Dec. 870, 29 N.E.3d 1140. The court therefore dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 6 We allowed respondent's petition for leave to appeal. Ill. S.Ct. R. 315 (eff. Jan. 1, 2015).

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 On appeal, respondent argues that postdelinquency supervision orders are final, appealable orders under this court's rules. Respondent further argues that, if such a reading is not clear from the plain language of the rules, then the rules should be interpreted in a way to avoid an unconstitutional reading that would bar a juvenile's right to appeal. Alternatively, respondent asks that we amend our rules to make postdelinquency supervision orders appealable.

¶ 9 This case involves interpretation of both a statute and supreme court rules. The same rules of construction apply to both. People v. Roberts, 214 Ill.2d 106, 116, 291 Ill.Dec. 674, 824 N.E.2d 250 (2005). Our primary goal is to ascertain and give effect to the intent of the drafters. People v. Perkins, 229 Ill.2d 34, 41, 321 Ill.Dec. 676, 890 N.E.2d 398 (2007). The most reliable indicator of the drafters' intent is the language used, given its plain and ordinary meaning. Id. When the statutory language is clear, it must be given effect without resort to other tools of interpretation. It is never proper to depart from plain language by reading into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions which conflict with the clearly expressed legislative intent. People v. Rissley, 206 Ill.2d 403, 414, 276 Ill.Dec. 821, 795 N.E.2d 174 (2003). Our review is de novo. People v. Suarez, 224 Ill.2d 37, 41–42, 308 Ill.Dec. 774, 862 N.E.2d 977 (2007).

¶ 10 The Illinois Constitution gives the appellate court jurisdiction to review final judgments. Ill. Const. 1970, art. VI, § 6. That same section provides that this court may provide, by rules, for appeals from other than final judgments. Id. Thus, postguilt supervision orders in juvenile delinquency cases are appealable either if they are final judgments, or if this court has provided for their appealability by rule.

¶ 11 Section 5–615(1) of the Juvenile Court Act (Act) (705 ILCS 405/5–615(1) (West 2014)) provides as follows:

" § 5–615. Continuance under supervision.

(1) The court may enter an order of continuance under supervision for an offense other than first degree murder, a Class X felony or a forcible felony:

(a) upon an admission or stipulation by the appropriate respondent or minor respondent of the facts supporting the petition and before the court makes a finding of delinquency, and in the absence of objection made in open court by the minor, his or her parent, guardian, or legal custodian, the minor's attorney or the State's Attorney; or

(b) upon a finding of delinquency and after considering the circumstances of the offense and the history, character, and condition of the minor, if the court is of the opinion that:

(i) the minor is not likely to commit further crimes;

(ii) the minor and the public would be best served if the minor were not to receive a criminal record; and

(iii) in the best interests of justice an order of continuance under supervision is more appropriate than a sentence otherwise permitted under this Act."

¶ 12 Subsection (b), which allows the court to place a minor on supervision after a finding of delinquency has been made, became effective on January 1, 2014. Prior to that, supervision was an option in a delinquency case only before a delinquency finding was made. See In re Veronica C., 239 Ill.2d 134, 146–47, 346 Ill.Dec. 1, 940 N.E.2d 1 (2010). In A.M., 94 Ill.App.3d 86, 49 Ill.Dec. 630, 418 N.E.2d 484, the appellate court determined that supervision orders entered under the previous version of the statute were not appealable.³ The A.M. court reasoned that supervision orders entered in a juvenile proceeding are not final orders. iD. at 88, 49 ILl.dEc. 630, 418 n.E.2D 484. sEe also iN iNterest of M.W.W., 125 Ill.App.3d at 835, 81 Ill.Dec. 2, 466 N.E.2d 588 ("if in fact the order here is an order for continuance under supervision * * * then the State's assertion of unappealability is correct"). Respondent does not contest the correctness of these decisions and concedes that a supervision order entered prior to a finding of delinquency is not an appealable order.

¶ 13 The question, then, is whether a supervision order entered after a finding of delinquency is a final, appealable order. A final judgment is one that finally determines the litigation on the merits " ‘so that, if affirmed, the only thing remaining is to proceed with the execution of the judgment.’ " (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Commitment of Hernandez, 239 Ill.2d 195, 202, 346 Ill.Dec. 478, 940 N.E.2d 1082 (2010) (quoting In re M.M., 337 Ill.App.3d 764, 771, 272 Ill.Dec. 115, 786 N.E.2d 654 (2003) ). In In re Samantha V., 234 Ill.2d 359, 365, 334 Ill.Dec. 661, 917 N.E.2d 487 (2009), this court explained that there are three phases to a juvenile delinquency proceeding: the findings phase, the adjudicatory phase, and the dispositional phase. At the findings phase, the trial court conducts a trial and determines whether the minor is guilty. If the court finds the minor guilty, a delinquency finding is made and the court proceeds to the adjudicatory phase. At the adjudicatory phase, the court determines if the minor should be made a ward of the court. If the minor is made a ward of the court, the case then proceeds to the dispositional phase, at which the court fashions an appropriate sentence. Id. at 365–66, 334 Ill.Dec. 661, 917 N.E.2d 487. The final judgment in a juvenile delinquency case is the dispositional order. In re J.N., 91 Ill.2d 122, 127, 61 Ill.Dec. 776, 435 N.E.2d 473 (1982).

¶ 14 It is difficult to see how anything referred to as a "continuance" could be a final judgment. And, indeed, the plain language of section 5–615 shows that, whether entered preguilt or postguilt, a continuance under supervision is not a final order. The...