People v. Miller

• Decision Date: 31 March 1998
• Citation: 694 N.E.2d 61,91 N.Y.2d 372,670 N.Y.S.2d 978
• Parties: , 694 N.E.2d 61, 1998 N.Y. Slip Op. 2860 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Wayne S. MILLER, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 978

670 N.Y.S.2d 978

91 N.Y.2d 372, 694 N.E.2d 61, 1998

N.Y. Slip Op. 2860

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Wayne S. MILLER, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

March 31, 1998.

John T. Casey, Albany, for appellant.

Kenneth R. Bruno, District Attorney of Rensselaer County (Bruce E. Knoll, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

SMITH, Judge.

The primary issue before us concerns the admissibility of a prior conviction for impeachment purposes when that conviction arose from entry of an Alford plea (see, North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162). Defendant also claims that certain expert testimony as to the victim's time of death was erroneously admitted at trial. We conclude that County Court properly exercised its discretion in making the above-noted evidentiary rulings and the order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Defendant was indicted on three counts of murder in the second degree and one count of rape in the first degree arising from the death of a woman on July 21, 1993. The victim's body was unclothed and badly bruised, with her belongings strewn about the area where it was found. During the trial, the prosecution presented evidence that some articles of clothing found at the murder scene belonged to defendant including a patterned T-shirt that was covered with the victim's blood.

The prosecution also offered expert testimony as to the victim's estimated time of death. The People's first expert, who personally performed the autopsy, testified that the victim was "most likely" killed some time before 2:50 A.M. The People offered a second expert who reviewed the autopsy reports and concluded "to a reasonable degree of medical certainty" that the victim died at 1:50 A.M. "plus or minus fifteen minutes." Both experts were cross-examined by defense counsel. Defendant called his own expert witness who testified generally that time of death "would be very difficult to pinpoint exactly" but here, he thought it would be "later" than 2:00 A.M. based upon his review of the autopsy records.

The precise time of death was crucial as defendant's witnesses testified that they had seen the victim long after she had allegedly been murdered. The People were permitted to cross-examine some of these witnesses about prior arrests and convictions. One witness was cross-examined about a pending arrest warrant of which she claimed to have no knowledge. Upon leaving the stand, the witness was arrested in view of the court as noted by defense counsel on the record.

The court also permitted the admission of testimony that defendant had a prior felony conviction entered in Virginia. This conviction arose from defendant's Alford plea to the charge of attempted rape in Virginia. However, the court precluded all evidence concerning the charge or the facts underlying the conviction as overly prejudicial. At trial, defendant admitted only that he had been convicted of a prior felony for which he received a suspended sentence and was placed on probation.

The People also introduced defendant's statement taken by the Police. That statement, signed by the defendant upon waiving his Miranda rights, contained the following admission: "I put my arms around her chin, my hands around her neck and we were fighting, and then she gasped and went limp." There was also evidence given from others who testified that they had been told by defendant that he had killed the victim.

At the conclusion of the jury trial, defendant was found guilty of one count of murder in the second degree. The Appellate Division affirmed his conviction and a Judge of this Court granted leave to appeal. On appeal, defendant contends that County Court erroneously permitted the introduction of certain evidence for impeachment purposes including defendant's prior conviction in Virginia based on an Alford plea and a pending arrest warrant against another witness. Defendant also argues that the expert testimony proffered by the People regarding the victim's time of death was erroneously admitted.

I

While a guilty plea ordinarily constitutes an admission of criminal conduct, "an express admission of guilt * * * is not a constitutional requisite to the imposition of criminal penalty" (North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 167, supra). The desire to enter a plea of guilty accompanied by protestations of innocence may necessitate further inquiry by a trial court to ensure that the guilty plea truly "represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant" (North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S., supra, at 31, 38 n. 10, 91 S.Ct. at 164, 167 n. 10; cf., People v. Lopez, 71 N.Y.2d 662, 666, 529 N.Y.S.2d 465, 525 N.E.2d 5; People v. Friedman, 39 N.Y.2d 463, 384 N.Y.S.2d 408, 348 N.E.2d 883). But such a plea may still be upheld as consistent with constitutional requirements.

In North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 91 S.Ct. 160, supra, the Supreme Court noted that:

"An individual accused of crime may voluntarily, knowingly, and understandingly consent to the imposition of a prison sentence even if he is unwilling or unable to admit his participation in the acts constituting the crime * * * when * * * a defendant intelligently concludes that his interests require entry of a guilty plea and the record before the judge contains strong evidence of actual guilt" (id., at 37, 91 S.Ct. 160, 27 L.Ed.2d 162).

In People v. Francabandera, 33 N.Y.2d 429, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609, 310 N.E.2d 292, this Court explicitly recognized that the reasoning applied in Alford was "no different" than the rule in New York. In that case, defendant was injured during a shootout with the police which left him unable to recall the entire criminal incident. Represented by counsel, defendant decided to plead guilty to reckless endangerment in the first degree. Following an inquiry, the court accepted the plea.

We concluded that the plea at issue was voluntarily made notwithstanding the fact that defendant "could not honestly confess his guilt because of his amnesia" (id., at 434, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609, 310 N.E.2d 292). As we noted, defendant had "found himself in a position, considering the overwhelming evidence against him, where a plea to a lesser charge seemed quite the prudent course" (id., at 434, 354 N.Y.S.2d 609, 310 N.E.2d 292). Similar reasoning was employed in People v. Friedman, 39 N.Y.2d 463, 384 N.Y.S.2d 408, 348 N.E.2d 883, supra, a case in which this Court upheld defendant's plea although defendant failed to "actually or specifically admit[ ] that he had committed the criminal act" as charged (id., at 465, 384 N.Y.S.2d 408, 348 N.E.2d 883).

A plea in which a defendant admits guilt shares an identity with an Alford plea in that both result in convictions (see, Matter of Hopfl, 48 N.Y.2d 859, 860, 424 N.Y.S.2d 350, 400 N.E.2d 292 [although defendant "did not admit his guilt * * * he stood convicted of a felony"] ). As such, we conclude that a conviction premised upon an Alford plea may generally be used for the same purposes as any other conviction. For example, in Matter of Hopfl, 48 N.Y.2d 859, 424 N.Y.S.2d 350, 400 N.E.2d 292, supra we held that a felony conviction pursuant to an Alford plea could properly serve as the basis for an attorney's disbarment. Courts have also held that a conviction under an Alford plea may be considered in a determination of predicate felon status for sentencing purposes (see, People v. Geier, 144 A.D.2d 1015, 534 N.Y.S.2d 626).

Thus, within the limits applicable to the admission of evidence concerning any other conviction (see, e.g., People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413), a defendant may be properly cross-examined for impeachment purposes about a previous conviction regardless of the fact that it arose from an Alford plea (see, State v. Simms, 211 Conn. 1, 557 A.2d 914, 916 ["transcript of * * * Alford plea was * * * admissible for the jury's consideration as to the issue of the witness's credibility"], cert. denied 493 U.S. 843, 110 S.Ct. 133, 107 L.Ed.2d 93).

Although County Court ruled that defendant could be cross-examined about a conviction in Virginia based upon an Alford plea, it precluded questioning into the underlying facts of the conviction if defendant took the stand. Furthermore, the court ruled that defendant could testify about why he entered the Alford plea. At trial, the court gave appropriate limiting instructions to the jury that defendant's prior conviction was only to be considered for evaluating credibility and not as proof that he committed any of the crimes with which he was charged. Other than the fact that his prior conviction was based upon an Alford plea, defendant makes no further challenge to the court's Sandoval ruling. Defendant's prior conviction is, most importantly, still a conviction and may be treated as such. Accordingly, defendant's challenge to the court's Sandoval ruling must fail.

II

Defendant also challenges the...