People v. Mingo

Decision Date14 May 1973
Docket NumberNo. 25626,25626
Citation181 Colo. 390,509 P.2d 800
PartiesThe PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. J. B. MINGO, Defendant-Appellant.
CourtColorado Supreme Court

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., E. Ronald Beeks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

William M. Cohen, Boulder, for defendant-appellant.

KELLEY, Justice.

The defendant was convicted in 1966 of grand larceny and of being an habitual criminal. An appeal to this court resulted in affirmance of that judgment, Mingo v. People, 171 Colo. 474, 468 P.2d 849 (1970).

A Motion to Vacate Sentence and Conviction filed pursuant to Crim.P. 35(b) was granted as to the habitual offender conviction and resulted in a re-sentencing. This appeal concerns those portions of defendant's 35(b) motion which the district court denied: namely, the setting aside of the larceny conviction, and the granting of a new trial. The attorney general confesses error. We agree.

I.

The primary argument put forth here by the defendant is based upon his constitutional right against self-incrimination, U.S.Const. Amends. V, XIV; Colo. Const. art. II, § 18. Defendant asserts that at trial, the prosecution introduced testimony showing that the defendant refused to answer certain questions while undergoing custodial interrogation by police officers. The inference most likely to be drawn from such testimony was that the defendant was guilty and that an honest answer would incriminate him.

The People have confessed error based on our holding in Hines v. People, Colo., 497 P.2d 1258 (1972). It is clear that such testimony was inadmissible under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), wherein the United States Supreme Court held:

'In accord with our decision today, it is impermissible to penalize an individual for exercising his Fifth Amendment privilege when he is under police custodial interrogation. The prosecution may not, therefore, use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in the face of accusation. . . .'

It should be noted that the prosecutor compounded this error during closing argument by calling attention to defendant's failure to testify. Meader v. People, Colo., 497 P.2d 1010 (1972); Montoya v. People, 169 Colo. 428, 457 P.2d 397 (1969); Martinez v. People, 162 Colo. 195, 425 P.2d 299 (1967).

II.

To avoid uncertainty in the event of a retrial of this case, we note a further issue raised by defendant in this proceeding, but which was not raised in the appeal on the merits. Mingo v. People, Supra.

Defendant contends that larceny is a specific intent crime and that the trial court should have given instructions to the jury on the element of specific intent to steal. We agree.

It is generally accepted in Colorado and elsewhere that larceny requires the specific intent to permanently deprive an owner or possessor of the property taken. People v. Gallegos, 130 Colo. 232, 274 P.2d 608 (1954); 2...

To continue reading

Request your trial
14 cases
  • State v. Wright
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • November 5, 1975
    ...court.' 416 F.2d at 594 (footnote omitted). The state courts of Colorado and Kansas have reached similar decisions. People v. Mingo, 509 P.2d 800, 181 Colo. 390 (1973); State v. Ritson, 210 Kan. 760, 504 P.2d 605 (1972). I believe these to be the better reasoned cases and would hold that th......
  • People v. Freeman
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • September 6, 1983
    ...they permitted a verdict of guilty to be returned upon a lesser degree of culpability than is required by the statute. People v. Mingo, 181 Colo. 390, 509 P.2d 800 (1973). We also agree that the trial court erroneously removed the culpable mental state of "intentionally" from its instructio......
  • Starr v. Industrial Claim Appeals Office
    • United States
    • Colorado Court of Appeals
    • December 10, 2009
    ...Theft or larceny requires a showing that the alleged perpetrator acted knowingly and with specific intent. See People v. Mingo, 181 Colo. 390, 392, 509 P.2d 800, 801 (1973) ("It is generally accepted in Colorado and elsewhere that larceny requires the specific intent to permanently deprive ......
  • People v. Atencio
    • United States
    • Colorado Supreme Court
    • May 16, 1977
    ...183 Colo. 146, 515 P.2d 460; People v. Robles, 183 Colo. 4, 514 P.2d 630; People v. Wright, 182 Colo. 87, 511 P.2d 460; People v. Mingo, 181 Colo. 390, 509 P.2d 800; Hines v. People, 179 Colo. 4, 497 P.2d On the other hand, not every reference to the exercise of this right mandates automati......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
2 books & journal articles
  • Section 18 CRIMES - EVIDENCE AGAINST ONE'S SELF-JEOPARDY.
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Rules and C.R.S. of Evidence Annotated (CBA)
    • Invalid date
    ...interrogation by police officers was inadmissible and violated privilege against self-incrimination. People v. Mingo, 180 Colo. 390, 509 P.2d 800 (1973). Court may properly allow testimony concerning defendant's pre-advisement silence concerning failure to contact authorities to correct dis......
  • Avoiding Error in Closing Argument
    • United States
    • Colorado Bar Association Colorado Lawyer No. 24-1, January 1995
    • Invalid date
    ...(Colo. 1973). 43. The court cited a number of cases with similar results: Hines v. People, 497 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1972); People v. Mingo, 509 P.2d 800 (Colo. 1973); Montoya v. People, 457 P.2d 397 (Colo. 1969); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965). 44. People v. Graham, 590 P.2d 511 (Co......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT