People v. Myers

• Decision Date: 05 April 2018
• Docket Number: 109164,108136,108168,106436
• Citation: 74 N.Y.S.3d 394,160 A.D.3d 1029
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Scott MYERS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

160 A.D.3d 1029

74 N.Y.S.3d 394

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Scott MYERS, Appellant.

106436

108136

108168

109164

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: February 21, 2018

Decided and Entered: April 5, 2018

Bruce Evans Knoll, Albany, for appellant, and appellant pro se.

John R. Sandleitner, Special Prosecutor, Tannersville, for respondent.

Before: McCarthy, J.P., Lynch, Devine, Clark and Pritzker, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Clark, J.

Appeals (1) from a judgment of the County Court of Greene County (Koweek, J.), rendered April 11, 2014, upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of criminal contempt in the first degree (two counts) and criminal contempt in the second degree (four counts), (2) by permission, from an order of said court, entered November 24, 2015, which denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction, without a hearing, (3) by permission, from an order of said court, entered November 24, 2015, which denied defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.20 to set aside the sentence, without a hearing, (4) by permission, from an order of said court, entered February 22, 2017, which, among other things, partially granted defendant's motion pursuant to CPL 440.10 and 440.20 to vacate the judgment of conviction and set aside the sentence, and (5) from a judgment of said court, rendered April 13, 2017, which resentenced defendant.

In September 2013, defendant was charged by indictment with two counts of criminal contempt in the first degree (counts 1 and 2) and six counts of criminal contempt in the second degree, all arising out of his alleged violations of a 2006 order of protection issued in favor of his children and former spouse (hereinafter collectively referred to as the victims). Following a jury trial, at which defendant proceeded pro se with the assistance of standby counsel, defendant was convicted of both counts of criminal contempt in the first degree and four counts of criminal contempt in the second degree.¹ County Court sentenced defendant to an aggregate prison term of 1? to 4 years, imposed a $5,000 fine and issued an order of protection in favor of the victims. Defendant appeals from the judgment of conviction.²

Thereafter, defendant moved pursuant to CPL 440.10 to vacate the judgment of conviction and separately moved pursuant to CPL 440.20 to set aside the resulting sentence. Without conducting a hearing, County Court denied both motions in separate orders. Defendant, by permission, appeals from both of those orders. Meanwhile, defendant successfully moved to vacate earlier convictions that served as predicate offenses for his felony convictions under counts 1 and 2 of the indictment. Defendant then moved, pursuant to CPL 440.10 and 440.20, for an order vacating and/or reducing those felony convictions or vacating the entire judgment of conviction and setting aside the sentence. County Court granted defendant's motion to the extent of reducing his convictions for criminal contempt in the first degree to convictions for criminal contempt in the second degree and ordered that defendant be resentenced on all counts, but otherwise denied the motion. Defendant, by permission, appeals from this order. County Court subsequently resentenced defendant—on his six misdemeanor convictions for criminal contempt in the second degree—to time served. County Court also issued an amended order charging defendant with applicable surcharges, as well as an order of protection in favor of the victims. Defendant appeals from this judgment.

Defendant argues that his convictions for criminal contempt in the second degree under counts 3, 7 and 8 of the indictment are not supported by legally sufficient evidence. Defendant, however, failed to preserve this argument by moving for a trial order of dismissal (see People v. Hawkins, 11 N.Y.3d 484, 492, 872 N.Y.S.2d 395, 900 N.E.2d 946 [2008] ; People v. Jones, 101 A.D.3d 1241, 1241, 955 N.Y.S.2d 694 [2012], lv denied 21 N.Y.3d 944, 968 N.Y.S.2d 6, 990 N.E.2d 140 [2013] ). As defendant also asserts that these convictions are against the weight of the evidence, we necessarily evaluate whether the elements of each charged crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Danielson, 9 N.Y.3d 342, 348–349, 849 N.Y.S.2d 480, 880 N.E.2d 1 [2007] ; People v. Young, 152 A.D.3d 981, 981, 59 N.Y.S.3d 535 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 955, 67 N.Y.S.3d 138, 89 N.E.3d 528 [2017] ). "To secure a conviction of criminal contempt in the second degree, the People were required to prove that defendant intentionally disobeyed or resisted the lawful process or other mandate of a court in a case other than one involving or growing out of a labor dispute" ( People v. Richardson, 155 A.D.3d 1099, 1101, 64 N.Y.S.3d 353 [2017] ; see Penal Law § 215.50[3] ).

Because, upon review of the evidence, a different result would not have been unreasonable, we must "weigh the relative probative force of conflicting testimony and the relative strength of conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony" ( People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761, 508 N.E.2d 672 [1987]

[internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see People v. Rosario, 157 A.D.3d 988, 989, 69 N.Y.S.3d 149 [2018] ; People v. LaBarge, 80 A.D.3d 892, 893, 914 N.Y.S.2d 424 [2011], lv denied 17 N.Y.3d 797, 929 N.Y.S.2d 105, 952 N.E.2d 1100 [2011] ). The evidence at trial established that, by virtue of a 2006 order of protection that expires in 2019,³ defendant was required to stay away from, and refrain from contacting, the victims. Defendant's testimony at trial demonstrated that he had knowledge of this order of protection and its terms at the time of the alleged violations. With respect to count 3 of the indictment, which charged defendant with violating the order of protection by visiting the residence of his ex-wife on a particular rainy evening in July 2013, the People presented the testimony of a neighbor, who stated that he had observed defendant outside the residence at the time in question. As to count 7, which alleged that defendant left letters for his son on the front porch of his ex-wife's home in August 2013, the ex-wife testified that she discovered the letters and recognized the handwriting as belonging to defendant. Additionally, a law enforcement officer testified that the ex-wife reported the incident to him and that he photographed and collected the letters, which were admitted into evidence without objection. Finally, count 8 of the indictment charged defendant with violating the order of protection by sending his ex-wife an email in August 2013. The email in question, which was copied to the ex-wife, was admitted into evidence on consent, and the ex-wife testified to receiving this email from defendant. Viewing the foregoing evidence in a neutral light, and according deference to the credibility determinations made by the jury, we find that defendant's convictions under counts 3, 7 and 8 of the indictment are amply supported by the weight of the credible evidence (see People v. Richardson, 155 A.D.3d at 1101–1103, 64 N.Y.S.3d 353; People v. Worthy, 109 A.D.3d 1140, 1141, 972 N.Y.S.2d 122 [2013], lv denied 23 N.Y.3d 970, 988 N.Y.S.2d 577, 11 N.E.3d 727 [2014] ).

We find merit, however, in defendant's contention that County Court failed to ensure that he knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his constitutional right to counsel (see U.S. Const 6th Amend; NY Const, art I, § 6 ). The fundamental right to counsel carries with it the implicit, but antagonistic, "right to forego the advantages of counsel and represent oneself" ( People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d 101, 103, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154 [2002] ; see People v. Henriquez, 3 N.Y.3d 210, 215, 785 N.Y.S.2d 384, 818 N.E.2d 1125 [2004] ). However, "to best promote the orderly administration of justice and insulate convictions from claims of deprivation of fundamental fairness, the right to self-representation is necessarily a qualified right" ( People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d at 103, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154 ; see People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 16–17, 364 N.Y.S.2d 837, 324 N.E.2d 322 [1974] ). A defendant must knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently waive the right to counsel before being permitted to proceed pro se (see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d 469, 481, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255 [2011], cert denied 565 U.S. 1261, 132 S.Ct. 1746, 182 L.Ed.2d 531 [2012] ; People v. Slaughter, 78 N.Y.2d 485, 491, 577 N.Y.S.2d 206, 583 N.E.2d 919 [1991] ; People v. Sawyer, 57 N.Y.2d 12, 21, 453 N.Y.S.2d 418, 438 N.E.2d 1133 [1982], cert denied 459 U.S. 1178, 103 S.Ct. 830, 74 L.Ed.2d 1024 [1983] ).

To ascertain whether a defendant's waiver of the right to counsel is knowing, voluntary and intelligent, a trial court must engage in a sufficient "searching inquiry," aimed at determining whether the defendant understands and "appreciate[s] the ‘dangers and disadvantages' " of self-representation ( People v. White, 56 N.Y.2d 110, 117, 451 N.Y.S.2d 57, 436 N.E.2d 507 [1982], quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 [1975] ; see People v. Slaughter, 78 N.Y.2d at 491, 577 N.Y.S.2d 206, 583 N.E.2d 919 ; People v. Kaltenbach, 60 N.Y.2d 797, 798–799, 469 N.Y.S.2d 685, 457 N.E.2d 791 [1983] ). Although the trial court need not conduct the required inquiry in a strict, formulaic manner, "it must accomplish the goals of adequately warning a defendant of the risks inherent in proceeding pro se, and apprising a defendant of the singular importance of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication" ( People v. Smith, 92 N.Y.2d 516, 520, 683 N.Y.S.2d 164, 705 N.E.2d 1205 [1998] ; see People v. Crampe, 17 N.Y.3d at 481–482, 932 N.Y.S.2d 765, 957 N.E.2d 255 ; People v. Arroyo, 98 N.Y.2d at 103–104, 745 N.Y.S.2d 796, 772 N.E.2d 1154 ). The trial court must also elicit on the record any information that may bear on ...