People v. Naranjo

• Decision Date: 23 April 1973
• Docket Number: No. 24894,24894
• Citation: 181 Colo. 273,509 P.2d 1235
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ned NARANJO a/k/a Ned Robert Naranjo a/k/a Ned R. Naranjo, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

Page 1235

509 P.2d 1235

181 Colo. 273

The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ned NARANJO a/k/a Ned Robert Naranjo a/k/a Ned R. Naranjo Defendant-Appellant.

No. 24894.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

April 23, 1973.

Duke W. Dunbar, Atty. Gen., John P. Moore, Deputy Atty. Gen., Tennyson W Grebenar, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-appellee.

Seavy, Abbot & Jensen, V. G. Seavy, Pueblo, for defendant-appellant.

PRINGLE, Chief Justice.

Defendant, Ned R. Naranjo, appeals from his conviction for second-degree murder. He contends that reversal of the judgment of the trial court is required because, in his view: (1) the evidence in this case was insufficient as a matter of law to support the jury's verdict, and therefore, the trial judge erred in not granting defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; (2) the admission of defendant's statement, being a product of several interrogations of defendant, was a violation of constitutional requirements mandated by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694; and (3) the submission of Instruction 22, relating to the evidentiary value of statements or admissions made by defendant, was erroneous. We do not agree, and therefore affirm the judgment of the trial court.

I.

Defendant contends that the circumstantial evidence adduced at the trial was insufficient to permit the question of defendant's guilt to go to the jury and that the trial court should therefore have granted his motion for judgment of acquittal. The evidence in this case is entirely circumstantial. It appears from the record that several witnesses testified to defendant's presence and demeanor in the El Fandango Bar in Pueblo, Colorado on the evening of June 21, 1969, which was the date of the killing alleged in the information.

The deceased was the proprietor of the bar. As a result of the defendant's conduct in the bar, the deceased's son Aurelio Sisneros, asked the defendant to leave the bar. The testimony disclosed that the defendant left the interior of the bar and went to the front porch. Witnesses testified that thereupon the deceased Sisneros went to the porch and was talking to the defendant. Witnesses saw no one else in the area of the porch at the time the discussion between defendant and the deceased took place. Shortly thereafter, Aurelio heard a scuffling on the front porch. He opened the door to the porch and saw the defendant making 'motions' at his father who was slumped against the door. Aurelio could not say whether the defendant had a weapon when he was striking at his father. The deceased staggered inside and said to his son, 'Don't go out there, he's got a knife.' At this point, the defendant fled. Aurelio rushed his father to the hospital where the father died of stab wounds. Police officers came to the bar to investigate the incident and found a knife on the front porch of the bar. The knife was never identified as belonging to the defendant.

Shortly thereafter, on the basis of the identification by Aurelio, the defendant was arrested at a drive-in restaurant in the vicinity. When arrested he was wearing a shirt which was spotted with blood. This shirt was identified by witnesses at the trial as looking like the one worn by the defendant while at the El Fandango Bar.

Where the guilt of the defendant is proven by circumstantial evidence, as in this case, the test for denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal has been set out with clarity in previous decisions of this Court. In Mathis v. People, 167 Colo. 504, 511, 448 P.2d 633, 637, we stated:

'Where there is evidence in the record from which a jury can find beyond a reasonable doubt that the circumstances are such as to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence, we cannot say the trial court erred in refusing to enter a judgment of acquittal, nor will we sit as a thirteenth juror and set aside a jury verdict because we might have drawn a different conclusion from the same evidence.'

While examining the facts in a particular case, this Court must assume that the jury adopted that evidence, or any reasonable inferences therefrom, which supports the verdict. Wilson v. People, 143 Colo. 544, 354 P.2d 588. An examination of the evidence in this case, which we have outlined, establishes at least a prima facie case impregnable against a motion for acquittal. Ruark v. People, 164 Colo. 257, 434 P.2d 124. Short of a full eyewitness account of the killing, the testimony of Aurelio Sisneros, which we presume was believed by the jury, inferentially could serve to exclude any other reasonable hypotheses for the killing. The son saw defendant making 'motions' at his father, and the elder Sisneros, after the confrontation, stated, 'He's got a knife.' That Sisneros' death was the result of stab wounds is not in dispute. The evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the People, Bennett v. People, 155 Colo. 101, 392 P.2d 657, was clearly sufficient to go to the jury for the ultimate determination of defendant's guilt or innocence.

II.

Defendant's next contention goes to the method of the police interrogation of the defendant and the admission of a statement given as a result of this interrogation. When taken into custody defendant was given his Miranda warnings and asked if he had anything to say. Defendant stated that he did not...