People v. Rivers

• Citation: 453 N.Y.S.2d 156,438 N.E.2d 862,56 N.Y.2d 476
• Parties: , 438 N.E.2d 862 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Keith RIVERS, Appellant.
• Decision Date: 23 June 1982
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 156

453 N.Y.S.2d 156

56 N.Y.2d 476, 438 N.E.2d 862

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Keith RIVERS, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 23, 1982.

Livingston L. Hatch, Keeseville, for appellant.

Joseph W. Kelley, Dist. Atty. (Steven Greenblatt and Michael A. Gross, New York City, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

WACHTLER, Judge.

The primary question on this appeal concerns the admissibility of a statement made by the defendant in the absence of counsel after his arrest on a warrant and after he had requested and obtained a brief response from the arresting officer as to why he was being charged with the same offense as his companions. The trial court and the Appellate Division held the defendant's statement admissible on the ground that it was spontaneous or volunteered. The defendant appeals claiming that the statement was the "product of subtle maneuvering on the part of the police".

In 1979 the defendant was employed as a taxicab driver in the Plattsburg area. In February and March of that year he passed a series of forged checks at local gas stations. The checks, approximately $100 each, were forged by two of the defendant's friends, King and Reilly, who generally accompanied him but remained in the cab while he presented the checks for payment. The proceeds were then divided among the three of them.

On March 16 the defendant was arrested on a warrant. He was transported to the police station where, after being advised of his rights, he declined to make any statement. However, as the arresting officer was entering information concerning the defendant's arrest in a police log, after entries relating to King and Reilly, the defendant asked why he was being charged with the same offense as his companions. According to the officer, at this time: "I told him that if he had any part in the crime that he was as guilty of the crime, just as everybody else who was involved in it." The defendant replied, in effect, that this was ridiculous and, according to the officer, also stated "that he knew the checks were forged after a couple had been passed. He knew that Bobby Riley was making them out but they were not his checks. He didn't fill them out and he didn't sign them and therefore he wasn't doing anything wrong."

The defendant's motion to suppress this statement was denied on the ground that it had been volunteered by the defendant. A jury subsequently found the defendant guilty of four counts of possession of a forged instrument and four counts of petit larceny.

The Appellate Division, 83 A.D.2d 978, 443 N.Y.S.2d 35, affirmed the conviction. The court found that this statement was properly admitted because the defendant had made it spontaneously. ^*

Under the State Constitution the defendant's right to counsel indelibly attached upon the filing of the accusatory instrument which provided the basis for the issuance of the arrest warrant (People v. Samuels, 49 N.Y.2d 218, 424 N.Y.S.2d 892, 400 N.E.2d 1344; CPL 120.10). Consequently, when the defendant was arrested on the warrant the police could not question him in the absence of counsel (People v. Samuels, supra). That means, of course, that they could not engage in interrogation or its functional equivalent (People v. Lanahan, 55 N.Y.2d 711, 447 N.Y.S.2d 139, 431 N.E.2d 624). The rule, however, does not require the police to take affirmative steps, by gag or otherwise, to prevent a talkative person in custody from making an incriminating statement. Volunteered statements are admissible provided the defendant spoke with genuine spontaneity "and not the result of inducement, provocation, encouragement or acquiescence, no matter how subtly employed" (People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 302-303, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 385 N.E.2d 1245; People v. Lanahan, supra).

The fact that the defendant may have initiated the exchange is not necessarily controlling. Statements made in response to police questioning or during a long informal discussion are not truly spontaneous, even though the defendant may have made the opening remarks (see, e.g., People v. Townes, 41 N.Y.2d 97, 390 N.Y.S.2d 893, 359 N.E.2d 402; People v. Roberson, 41 N.Y.2d 106, 390 N.Y.S.2d 900, 359 N.E.2d 408; People v. Tompkins, 45 N.Y.2d 748, 408 N.Y.S.2d 485, 380 N.E.2d 311; People v. Maerling, 46 N.Y.2d 289, 413 N.Y.S.2d 316, 385 N.E.2d 1245, supra; People v. Cunningham, 49 N.Y.2d 203, 424 N.Y.S.2d 421, 400 N.E.2d 360; People v. Bell, 50 N.Y.2d 869, 430 N.Y.S.2d 43, 407 N.E.2d 1340; People v. Lucas, 53 N.Y.2d 678, 439 N.Y.S.2d 99, 421 N.E.2d 494; People v. Lanahan, supra). On the other hand, not every comment made by a police officer in response to an inquiry by the defendant can be said to constitute interrogation, merely because it is followed by an incriminating statement from the defendant (People v. Lynes, 49 N.Y.2d 286, 294-295, 425 N.Y.S.2d 295, 401 N.E.2d 405).

The question in such cases is whether the police conduct should reasonably have been anticipated to evoke a statement from the defendant (People v. Lynes, supra, 49...