People v. Ruiz

• Decision Date: 25 January 1990
• Citation: 217 Cal.App.3d 574,265 Cal.Rptr. 886
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Richard Michael RUIZ et al., Defendants and Respondents. Crim. C005629.

Page 886

265 Cal.Rptr. 886

217 Cal.App.3d 574

The PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Richard Michael RUIZ et al., Defendants and Respondents.

Crim. C005629.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Jan. 25, 1990.

Review Denied May 17, 1990.

John K. Van de Kamp, Atty. Gen., Steve White, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Arnold O. Overoye, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael J. Weinberger, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., Ruth M. Saavedra, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and appellant.

Blackmon & Drozd, Dale A. Drozd, Clyde M. Blackmon and Steven Meinrath, Law Offices of Jon D. Smock, Sacramento, for defendants and respondents.

SPARKS, Associate Justice.

The question in this appeal is whether the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule set forth in United States v. Leon (1984) 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677, applies to a search warrant issued in violation of the rule in People v. Fleming (1981) 29 Cal.3d 698, 175 Cal.Rptr. 604, 631 P.2d 38, dealing with out-of- This is a People's appeal (Pen.Code, § 1238, subd. (a)(7)), from an order of dismissal (Pen.Code, § 1385), entered after the trial court granted the defendants' motion to suppress evidence seized pursuant to a search warrant (Pen.Code, § 1538.5). The trial court granted the motion to suppress because the search warrant was issued by a Placer County magistrate for a Sacramento County address, but the affidavit in support of the warrant failed to state specifically that the search related to a crime committed in Placer County. (People v. Fleming, supra, 29 Cal.3d 698, 707, 175 Cal.Rptr. 604, 631 P.2d 38.) On appeal, the People contend that the motion to suppress evidence should have been denied pursuant to the good faith exception of Leon. We agree and shall reverse the order of dismissal.

                county search warrants.  In Fleming, the court held that California law permits "an out-of-county warrant whenever the magistrate finds probable cause to believe that defendant has committed a crime within the issuing county and consequently will probably face trial in that county."  (Id. at p. 706, 175 Cal.Rptr. 604, 631 P.2d 38.)   In this case when the police officers sought an out-of-county search warrant they failed to advise the magistrate that they were investigating crimes which had occurred in the issuing county.  Despite that omission, we follow the decision in People v. Dantzler (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 289, 253 Cal.Rptr. 526 and hold that the good faith exception applies to such a warrant
                

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 1988, Officer Dennis O'Connor of the Lincoln Police Department was involved in an ongoing investigation for the Placer County narcotics task force. During that month O'Connor and other officers used a confidential informant to make controlled drug purchases in Placer County. On March 21, 1988, the informant successfully purchased drugs from an unknown third party in Roseville, Placer County. After the transaction Officer O'Connor surreptitiously followed the third party to a residence on Summerplace Drive in Citrus Heights, Sacramento County.

About 50 minutes after the first meeting, the informant again met with the third party in Roseville. During the meeting the informant attempted to purchase an "eight ball" of cocaine. The third party told him that he had gone to the home of a person named Rick to obtain the cocaine, but that Rick was holding a kilogram that he could not break up due to a previous arrangement. He asserted, however, that he could provide an eight ball the following day because more cocaine was coming to Rick's house.

After the second meeting between the informant and the third party, Officer O'Connor went to the Placer County District Attorney's office to prepare an affidavit for a search warrant. O'Connor sought a warrant to search residence of defendants Richard Ruiz and Mary Robles in Sacramento County. The affidavit in support of the search warrant essentially sets forth the above information together with other information about defendant Ruiz and his residence on Summerplace Drive, Citrus Heights. The affidavit did not, however, specifically state that the transactions involving the confidential informant had taken place in Placer County.

Officer O'Connor took his affidavit to the home of Placer County Superior Court Judge Richard Gilbert. Judge Gilbert considered the affidavit, questioned O'Connor, and had him add certain information to the affidavit by interlineation. He then approved the affidavit and issued a search warrant for defendants' Sacramento County home. The subsequent search of the residence disclosed evidence which led to various drug possession charges being filed against defendants in Sacramento County.

Defendants moved to suppress the evidence against them asserting, among other things, that the search warrant was invalid because it was issued by a Placer County magistrate for a Sacramento County residence. In opposition to the motion the People submitted a declaration from Judge Gilbert. He stated that he was aware of the requirements for the issuance of out-of- At the hearing of the motion to suppress evidence Officer O'Connor testified that when he took the affidavit for a search warrant to the jurist's residence Judge Gilbert asked him about the location of the transactions involving the confidential informant. According to O'Connor, he disclosed to the judge the location in Roseville where the transactions occurred. In response defendants submitted another declaration from Judge Gilbert. In this declaration the judge stated that he had no specific recollection whether he discussed the location of the transactions with Officer O'Connor. But he did state that it was his custom and practice not to accept oral briefing in connection with the issuance of a search warrant. In the event he elicits information from an officer it is his custom and practice to have the officer add the information to the affidavit by interlineation. He believed that if he had been orally told the events occurred in Placer County he would have had O'Connor add this information to the affidavit. The People submitted a declaration from Officer Jones, who accompanied O'Connor to request the warrant. This officer stated that he recalled O'Connor orally advising Judge Gilbert that the transactions occurred in Placer County.

county search warrants. Although the affidavit for the search warrant did not specifically state that the events leading up to the request for a warrant occurred in Placer County, Judge Gilbert either assumed or inferred that they had occurred there, based upon his knowledge of Officer O'Connor's employment in that County and past practices.

In ruling on the motion to suppress the trial court stated that it found Judge Gilbert to be the more credible witness with respect to the issuance of the warrant. With that finding the court found that the affidavit was facially deficient within the meaning of People v. Fleming, supra, 29 Cal.3d 698, 175 Cal.Rptr. 604, 631 P.2d 38. The court ordered the evidence suppressed. It later dismissed the charges pursuant to Penal Code section 1385 when the People were unable to continue without the suppressed evidence.

DISCUSSION

The resolution of a motion to suppress evidence requires a two-step process. (People v. Leyba (1981) 29 Cal.3d 591, 596, 174 Cal.Rptr. 867, 629 P.2d 961.) First, the court must determine what the facts are with respect to the challenged search. This involves the trial court's traditional fact-finding role: the court must weigh the evidence, judge the credibility of the witnesses, resolve conflicts in the evidence, and determine what inferences should be drawn. (Ibid.) Second, the facts so found must then be measured against constitutional requirements. (Id. at p. 597, 174 Cal.Rptr. 867, 629 P.2d 961.) On appeal from an order granting or denying a motion to suppress, the appellate court must uphold the trial court's factual findings if they are supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.) The determination whether the search and seizure was legal, based upon the facts found by the trial court, is the ultimate responsibility of the appellate court which must exercise its independent judgment on the legal question. (Ibid.)

There was only one evidentiary conflict in this case. That was whether Officer O'Connor orally advised Judge Gilbert that the drug transactions identified in the affidavit occurred in Placer County. The trial court, based upon Judge Gilbert's declaration, found that he did not. Since that finding was based upon substantial evidence, we must accept the trial court's resolution of the factual conflict. With that determination made, the factual circumstances presented are relatively straightforward. It appears that Placer County police officers were investigating drug transactions which occurred in Placer County. The investigation led them across the county line to defendants' residence in Sacramento County. They applied to a Placer County magistrate for a search warrant for defendants' Sacramento County residence. In doing so they failed to advise the magistrate that they were investigating drug transactions which had occurred in Placer County. The question is whether, under these circumstances, the evidence On appeal the People rely solely upon the so-called good faith rule set out in United States v. Leon, supra, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677. In Leon, the court considered "whether the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecution's case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause." (Id. at p. 900, 104 S.Ct. at p. 3409, 82 L.Ed.2d at p. 684.) The Court concluded that the exclusionary rule should be so modified. The Fourth Amendment does not require suppression of evidence obtained...