People v. Tarver, 11597
| Decision Date | 11 April 2002 |
| Docket Number | 3,11597 |
| Parties | THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Respondent, v FELICIA TARVER, Appellant. 11597 SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK APPELLATE DIVISION: THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT Calendar Date: |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Eugene P. Devine, Public Defender, Albany (Gloria Herron Arthur of counsel), for appellant.
Paul A. Clyne, District Attorney, Albany (Christopher D. Horn of counsel), for respondent.
Before: Cardona, P.J., Peters, Spain, Rose and Lahtinen, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Albany County (Breslin, J.), rendered March 18, 1998, upon a verdict convicting defendant of two counts of the crime of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged of two counts of criminal possession of a controlled substance in the third degree for knowingly and unlawfully possessing one-half ounce or more of cocaine, with intent to sell it (Penal Law § 220.16 [1], [12]). During an investigation by the City of Albany Police Department and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter FBI), three controlled buys of crack cocaine were made from defendant in June 1997, two at her first floor apartment on First Street in Albany and one elsewhere. Thereafter, an Albany Police Department Detective obtained a no-knock warrant from Albany City Court to search defendant's First Street apartment. After a combined Mapp/Franks/Huntley hearing, County Court denied defendant's motion to suppress her postarrest statement to police finding that it was voluntary and denied suppression of all of the items seized from the apartment concluding, inter alia, that probable cause existed for City Court to issue the search warrant.
At trial, members of the Albany Police Department testified that when the warrant was executed at approximately 7:30 A.M. on June 27, 1997, they recovered bags containing powdered cocaine and rocks of crack cocaine from beneath a cutout in the floor boards of the closet in the rear bedroom in which defendant was found alone sleeping. The police also seized from the closet and the nightstand in that same bedroom, inter alia, in excess of five ounces of marihuana, razor blades and unused small plastic bags, as well as a variety of personal papers, identification documents and financial records. Defendant's daughter and a male companion, who were present in the other bedroom, did not testify at trial. After being arrested and advised of her rights, defendant told police that she did not know about the cocaine. A State Police forensic scientist testified that the substance seized from defendant's closet tested positive for cocaine and had an aggregate weight of 35.12 grams, i.e., more than one ounce. Notably, evidence regarding defendant's sale of cocaine to confidential informants was not introduced at her trial.
Defendant was sentenced as an admitted second felony offender to concurrent terms of 11 to 22 years on each count. Defendant appeals, challenging, inter alia, the validity of the search warrant, the legal sufficiency and weight of the evidence, the admission of expert testimony concerning the packaging of drugs and drug paraphernalia and the sentence. We affirm.
With regard to the jury's verdict, defendant argues that the People offered insufficient evidence that she constructively possessed the cocaine or that she intended to sell it. Our review of the record demonstrates that the evidence was more than sufficient for the jury to conclude that defendant exercised dominion and control over the bedroom in which the drugs were secreted and, thus, constructively possessed the drugs (see, People v Manini, 79 N.Y.2d 561, 573-575; see also, Penal Law § 10.00 [8]). When the search warrant was executed, defendant was alone, sleeping in the bedroom. Significantly, among other property, her Social Security card, driver's license, a completed application for public assistance, an identification card and letters regarding food stamps and disability benefits were on her nightstand showing this apartment to be her address. Also present were a utility bill in defendant's name at that address, money orders identifying defendant as the sender and personal letters to defendant mailed to that address bearing postmarks from the prior month. Only female clothing and shoes were observed in the bedroom and closet. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the People and affording them every favorable inference (see, People v Acosta, 80 N.Y.2d 665, 672; People v Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 495-496), we find that the evidence was sufficient to establish defendant's constructive possession of the cocaine in the closet (see, People v Powell, 209 A.D.2d 879, 880-881, lv denied 84 N.Y.2d 1037; see also, People v Johnson, 257 A.D.2d 439, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 900; People v Diaz, 220 A.D.2d 260; People v Tirado, 47 A.D.2d 193, affd 38 N.Y.2d 955; cf., People v Swain, 241 A.D.2d 695, 696).
On the issue of defendant's intent to sell, we conclude that the evidence amply justified the inference that she possessed the cocaine for resale, thereby establishing this element. Defendant possessed in her bedroom over 35 grams of powder and rocks of crack cocaine (more than one ounce) contained in several baggies -- a quantity the experts testified exceeded the amount a user would typically possess -- as well as heavy gauge razor blades with apparent cocaine residue, which the experts testified are used to cut crack cocaine rocks into smaller quantities for distribution. She also possessed plastic bags with the corners cut in which, according to the expert testimony, cocaine is ordinarily packaged for sale. We find this evidence sufficient to establish defendant's intent to sell (see, People v Fallen, 249 A.D.2d 771, 771-772, lv denied 92 N.Y.2d 879; People v Belo, 240 A.D.2d 964, 966, lv denied 91 N.Y.2d 869; see also, People v Wright, 283 A.D.2d 712, 714, lv denied 96 N.Y.2d 926; cf., People v Garcia, 86 N.Y.2d 27, 35; People v Lamont, 227 A.D.2d 873, 875).
Further, "'weigh[ing] the relative probative force of [the] conflicting testimony and the conflicting inferences that may be drawn from the testimony'" (People v Bleakley, supra, at 495, quoting People ex rel. MacCracken v Miller, 291 NY 55, 62), we do not find that the verdict was contrary to the weight of the evidence. The discrepancies in the law enforcement officers' testimony on which defendant relies regarding, for example, the number of nightstands in the bedroom, whether the various pieces of evidence were located inside or on top of the nightstand, whether there was a rug in the closet and the number of closets, were inconsequential and did not undermine the consistent testimony establishing defendant's guilt of the crimes charged.
Next, defendant never objected to the expert testimony concerning drug paraphernalia and the packaging of drugs for resale and, thus, the issue is unpreserved for appellate review (see, CPL 470.05 [2]). In any event, we note that defendant did not challenge at trial, nor does she do so on appeal, the qualifications of the law enforcement officers -- each of whom had participated in hundreds of arrests for controlled substances -- to testify as experts. To the extent that they offered opinions based upon their experiences as narcotics officers that the razor blades, cut baggies and collection of unused baggies found in defendant's bedroom were consistent with the paraphernalia and packaging used in the drug trade, we find no error (see, People v Wright, supra, at 713; People v Gaynor, 257 A.D.2d 494, lv denied 93 N.Y.2d 970; People v Davis, 235 A.D.2d 941, 943, lv denied 89 N.Y.2d 1010, 1013; People v Corbitt, 221 A.D.2d 809, 811). While it was error for the People to have been permitted to elicit from one of the officers that the cocaine was intended for sale -- the ultimate question regarding defendant's intent, a conclusion the officer based upon the facts that it was "a larger quantity than one might expect for personal use" and it was "broken down into rocks" -- we find that the error was harmless in view of the overwhelming evidence of defendant's possession with intent to sell (see, People v Wright, supra, at 714; People v Goodwine, 177 A.D.2d 708, 709, lv denied 79 N.Y.2d 920; see also, People v Crimmins, 36 N.Y.2d 230, 241-242).
Next, defendant challenges County Court's denial, following the Mapp/Franks hearing, of her motion to suppress all items seized from the apartment. The court credited the testimony of the testifying law enforcement officers and found, inter alia, that the People had submitted sufficient evidence to establish probable cause for City Court to issue the search warrant, which was properly executed. A review of the contents of the search warrant application prepared by the Albany Police Department reflects that after receiving information from FBI informants, three controlled buys of crack cocaine were made by informants who reported that defendant kept the cocaine in the rear room on the first floor of that address. Certain telephone calls were recorded between the informants and defendant, and agents and officers visually monitored all of the controlled purchases, the second of which involved an informant wearing a body wire. The informant who made the first two controlled buys had proven to be reliable, having worked with the FBI for several years and contributed to convictions, and two of the controlled buys here occurred at defendant's apartment in the days and weeks prior to the issuance of the...
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