People v. Thomas
Decision Date | 25 July 1984 |
Docket Number | Cr. A,No. 21434,21434 |
Citation | 206 Cal.Rptr. 84,159 Cal.App.3d Supp. 18 |
Court | California Superior Court |
Parties | 159 Cal.App.3d Supp. 18 THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. Terri Lynn THOMAS, Defendant and Appellant. Appellate Department, Superior Court, Los Angeles County, California |
Marla L. Sutker, Los Angeles, for defendant and appellant.
Robert H. Philibosian, Dist. Atty., Donald J. Kaplan and Richard W. Gerry, Deputy Dist. Attys., for plaintiff and respondent.
Defendant Terri Lynn Thomas appeals from the judgment of conviction for violation of Vehicle Code section 27360, subdivision (a) ( ).
The settled statement sets out the trial proceedings as follows: 1
Defendant's sole contention on appeal is that Vehicle Code section 27360, subdivision (a) is an "unconstitutional interference with the fundamental right of family privacy and parental autonomy." Defendant argues that there is no compelling state interest for the statute and even if there is such an interest, a more narrowly drawn statute would have satisfied that interest. We reject defendant's contention.
Article 3.3 of the Vehicle Code sets out various child passenger restraint requirements. Vehicle Code section 27360, subdivision (a) comes under this article. This statute states: "(a) It is unlawful for the parent or legal guardian, when present in a passenger vehicle or motor truck of less than 6,001 pounds unladen weight which is owned by him or her and registered in this state, to permit his or her child or ward under the age of four years or weighing less than 40 pounds to be transported upon a highway in the motor vehicle without providing and properly using, for each such child or ward, a child passenger seat restraint system meeting applicable federal motor vehicle safety standards." The legislative intent in enacting article 3.3 is set out in Vehicle Code section 27364 as follows:
The first issue to be resolved in determining whether the statute is constitutional is whether the statute impinges on a fundamental right of defendant. If it does, then under the "strict scrutiny" standard the state would have to have a compelling interest to enact the statute. The court in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton (1973) 413 U.S. 49, 65, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2639, 37 L.Ed.2d 446, stated: "Our prior decisions recognizing a right to privacy guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment included 'only personal rights that can be deemed "fundamental" or "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.' Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 [58 S.Ct. 149, 152, 82 L.Ed. 288] (1937), Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152, 93 S.Ct. 705 , 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973). This privacy right encompasses and protects the personal intimacies of the home, the family, marriage, motherhood, procreation, and child rearing." The court in In re Marriage of Mentry (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 260, 265, 190] Cal.Rptr. 843, stated:
The statute in question does not infringe on defendant's fundamental right to family privacy. This right is directed to the "integrity of the family unit" (id., at p. 267, fn. 6, 190 Cal.Rptr. 843) which is at stake when the state attempts to regulate the custody, care and nurturing of a child. " 7 As we noted in In re Marriage of Wellman (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 992 , 'the state has no general authority to dictate to parents the manner in which they should rear their children. (Ginsberg v. New York (1968) 390 U.S. 629, 639 [88 S.Ct. 1274, 1280, 20 L.Ed.2d 195, 203-204].' (Id., at p. 996 . See also Stanley v. Illinois, supra, where the Supreme Court made it plain 'that the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children "come[s] to this Court with a momentum for respect lacking when appeal is made to liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrangements." ' (405 U.S. at p. 651 [92 S.Ct. 1208, at p. 1212, 31 L.Ed.2d 551, at p. 558], quoting from Kovacs v. Cooper (1949) 336 U.S. 77, 95 [69 S.Ct. 448, 458, 93 L.Ed. 513, 526, 10 A.L.R.2d 608] (conc. opn. of Frankfurter, J.). The California Supreme Court has been equally deferential to the fundamental rights of parents. (See, e.g., In re Carmaleta B., supra, at p. 489 [146 Cal.Rptr. 623, 579 P.2d 514], and In re B.G. (1974) 11 Cal.3d 679, 698-699 [114 Cal.Rptr. 444, 523 P.2d 244].)" (Id., at p. 268, fn. 7, 190 Cal.Rptr. 843, emphasis added.)
The right to family privacy is "concerned ... with a protected intimate relationship." (Paris Adult Theatre I, supra, 413 U.S. at p. 66, fn. 13, 93 S.Ct. at p. 2640, fn. 13.) If a state regulates an area where there is "no necessary or legitimate expectation of [family] privacy," then the right is not violated. (Ibid.)
Requiring defendant to ensure that her children use seat restraints does relate to the "care" of the children in the sense that it ensures safe transportation of the children. However, it cannot be said that the ensuring of the children's safe transportation is the type of "care" encompassed by the fundamental right to family privacy, as this regulation does not affect the integrity of defendant's family unit. Furthermore, considering the extensive regulation over motor vehicles (Hernandez v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 30 Cal.3d 70, 79, fn. 8, 177 Cal.Rptr. 566, 634 P.2d 917) it cannot be said that defendant had a necessary or legitimate expectation of family privacy in determining whether to provide safe transportation for her children.
8 In Watson, our court stated: (212 Cal. at p. 283 .)"
Having determined that a fundamental right to family privacy is not violated by Vehicle Code section 27360, subdivision (a), the second issue which needs to be resolved is whether the statute is reasonably related to its purpose. The court in Hernandez, supra, 30 Cal.3d 70, 117 Cal.Rptr. 566, 634 P.2d 917 stated as follows:
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