People v. Thompson, No. 284160 (Mich. App. 8/25/2009)
| Decision Date | 25 August 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 284160,284160 |
| Parties | PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. DANNY LEE THOMPSON, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
Appeal from Genesee Circuit Court, LC No. 07-020463-FC.
Before: Cavanagh, P.J., and Markey and Davis, JJ.
UNPUBLISHED
Defendant was convicted by a jury of first-degree premeditated murder, MCL 750.316(1)(a), and sentenced as a fourth habitual offender, MCL 769.12, to life imprisonment without parole. He appeals as of right. We affirm.
Defendant's conviction arises from the October 7, 1996, drowning death of William Beauchamp in Genesee County. Julie Vega, a bartender at the Viking Lounge bar, testified that defendant and codefendant Randy Snyder encountered Beauchamp, a homeless man, at the bar on the evening of October 6, 1996. According to Vega, defendant remarked that he wanted to harm Beauchamp for something he had done to defendant's grandmother. Beauchamp thereafter left the bar with defendant and Snyder, despite Vega's warning not to go with them.
Beauchamp's body was discovered in the Flint River near a fishing site the following morning. A forensic examination indicated that he had been struck in the head with a blunt object, dragged to the river, and immersed in the water while still alive. The examiner determined that the cause of Beauchamp's death was drowning. After seeing a news report of Beauchamp's death, Vega contacted the police and gave them defendant's name. She also identified defendant's photograph from a photographic array. Lieutenant Shanlian interviewed defendant, who admitted meeting Beauchamp at the bar, but claimed that he left the bar with his wife. Defendant's wife corroborated defendant's alibi.
The investigation stalled until Lieutenant Shanlian learned in 2006 that Snyder had made statements implicating himself and defendant in Beauchamp's death. After interviewing Snyder, Shanlian obtained a warrant for defendant's arrest and drove to Tennessee where defendant was then living. After defendant was arrested, he agreed to waive extradition and return to Michigan. Shanlian interviewed defendant after his arrest. Defendant admitted leaving the bar with Snyder and Beauchamp and going to the fishing site, but stated that he was too intoxicated to fully understand what was happening. He claimed that he and Beauchamp got into a fight, during which Beauchamp jumped on him and immobilized him, and then Snyder hit Beauchamp with a tire iron to get him off defendant. According to defendant, he and Snyder then drove away, leaving Beauchamp behind. Defendant subsequently recalled that he and Beauchamp fought in the water, but did not admit to drowning him.
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his confession on the ground that it was not voluntarily given. Defendant argued in part that his confession was induced by Shanlian's threats that his wife could be arrested for obstruction of justice and that his children could be placed in foster care. The trial court held a Walker1 hearing at which Shanlian denied threatening to arrest defendant's wife or to remove defendant's children. Shanlian testified that defendant raised these issues when Shanlian asked him whether he had asked his wife to lie for him in the 1996 interview. Shanlian claimed that he repeatedly told defendant that he did not intend to arrest his wife, although he acknowledged telling defendant that the prosecutor had the authority to initiate criminal charges against her. The trial court ultimately determined that, under the totality of the circumstances, defendant's confession was not involuntary.
Defendant first argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress his confession. Defendant contends that his confession was not voluntarily given because it was induced by Shanlian's threats that, if defendant did not cooperate and tell the truth, his wife could be arrested and prosecuted for obstruction of justice and his children placed in foster care.
A defendant's statement obtained during a custodial interrogation is admissible only if the defendant knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived his Fifth Amendment rights. Miranda v Arizona, 384 US 436, 444; 86 S Ct 1602; 16 L Ed 2d 694 (1966). When assessing a defendant's claim that a challenged statement was involuntary, an appellate court reviews the record de novo and makes an independent determination of voluntariness. People v Cheatham, 453 Mich 1, 29-30; 551 NW2d 355 (1996). However, deference is given to the trial court's assessment of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. People v Shipley, 256 Mich App 367, 372-373; 662 NW2d 856 (2003). The trial court's findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. People v Givans, 227 Mich App 113, 119; 575 NW2d 84 (1997).
The ultimate test of admissibility is whether the totality of the circumstances surrounding the making of a confession indicates that it was freely and voluntarily made. People v Cipriano, 431 Mich 315, 333-334; 429 NW2d 781 (1988). A non-exhaustive list of factors to consider in determining voluntariness include:
[t]he age of the accused; his lack of education or his intelligence level; the extent of his previous experience with the police; the repeated and prolonged nature of the questioning; the length of the detention of the accused before he gave the statement in question; the lack of any advice to the accused of his constitutional rights; whether there was an unnecessary delay in bringing him before a magistrate before he gave the confession; whether the accused was injured intoxicated or drugged, or in ill health when he gave the statement; whether the accused was deprived of food, sleep, or medical attention; whether the accused was physically abused; and whether the suspect was threatened with abuse. [Id. at 334.]
Threats and promises of leniency are also factors to consider. People v Sexton, 458 Mich 43, 66; 580 NW2d 404 (1998). In People v Conte, 421 Mich 704; 365 NW2d 648 (1984), a majority of our Supreme Court concluded that whether a promise of leniency may render a defendant's statement involuntary is also to be evaluated under the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 761-762. In this case, defendant and Shanlian presented conflicting testimony concerning the circumstances surrounding defendant's custodial interview. An evaluation of defendant's confession under the totality of the circumstances ultimately depends on which witness was more credible.
According to defendant, Shanlian made comments to the effect that he would contact the prosecutor about bringing charges against defendant's wife for obstruction of justice if defendant did not provide a statement. Defendant claimed that Shanlian also advised him that if defendant's wife were arrested, their children would be placed in foster care. Defendant also claimed that he was cold and uncomfortable in the interrogation room, and was not given an opportunity to take his pain medication.
Conversely, Shanlian testified that he affirmatively advised defendant that he did not intend to arrest defendant's wife, although he acknowledged advising defendant that the prosecutor could independently decide to charge her with obstruction of justice. A transcript of recorded portions of defendant's interview corroborates this account. Shanlian's acknowledgment that any decision to charge defendant's wife rested with the prosecutor, and not with him, negates an inference that Shanlian was attempting to induce a confession by offering leniency for defendant's wife as a quid-pro-quo for defendant's confession, or by threatening to bring criminal charges against defendant's wife as a consequence of defendant's refusal to cooperate and give a statement. Shanlian also testified that defendant was regularly offered food, water, and bathroom breaks. Moreover, according to Shanlian, it was defendant who first raised the issue of possible criminal charges against defendant's wife. Shanlian testified that he responded to defendant's question by positively stating that he had no intention of arresting defendant's wife, but acknowledging that he could not speak for the prosecutor, who had the authority to independently initiate charges for obstruction of justice. This account, if true, indicates that Shanlian did not seize upon defendant's concern for his wife's jeopardy as a means of extracting a confession from him.
It was the trial court's prerogative to assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Shipley, supra at 372-373. Considering the totality of the circumstances in accordance with Shanlian's version of events, which the trial court apparently found more credible, we conclude that defendant's confession was not involuntarily given. The trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress his confession.
Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress Vega's identification testimony. Defendant contends that Vega's identification of him resulted from an impermissibly suggestive photographic array.
A trial court's decision to admit identification evidence generally will not be reversed unless it is clearly erroneous, People v Kurylczyk, 443 Mich 289, 303 (Griffin, J.), 318 (Boyle, J.); 505 NW2d 528 (1993); People v Harris, 261 Mich App 44, 51; 680 NW2d 17 (2004). A photographic identification procedure violates a defendant's right to due process when it is so impermissibly suggestive under the totality of the circumstances that it gives rise to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. People v Gray, 457 Mich 107, 111; 577 NW2d 92 (1998); Kurylczyk, supra at 302.
Defendant contends that the photographic array is impermissibly suggestive because his appearance is markedly distinctive from that of the other men in the filler photographs, because he is the only man who is fully bald, the only man with a prominent...
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