People v. Vespucci
| Decision Date | 30 December 1988 |
| Parties | The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Anthony VESPUCCI, James J. Corrigan, Jr., Charles Cannizzaro, MCM, d/b/a Island Carting Co., Enviro, d/b/a Island Carting, Nicholas Ferrante, Unique Sanitation, John Haynes, Robert Schuman; Standard Commercial Cartage, Inc., Vincent Montesano, Vinnie Monte's Waste Systems, Inc., Frank Rotundo, Wayside Carting Inc., a/k/a Wayside Sanitation, Sail Sanitation, Inc., and Sanicare, Appellants. The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Salvatore AVELLINO, Jr., Salem Sanitary Carting Corp., Thomas Ronga, Detail Carting Company, Jamaica Ash and Rubbish Removal Company, Inc., Appellants. The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. James J. CORRIGAN, Jr., Anthony Vespucci and Salvatore Avellino, Jr., Appellants. The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Arthur ROMERSA and Vito Biondo, Appellants. The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. James J. CORRIGAN, Jr., Appellant. The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Arthur ROMERSA, Appellant. The PEOPLE, etc., Respondent, v. Peter Francis FINNERTY, Appellant. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
Meyer, Suozzi, English & Klein, Mineola (Bernard S. Meyer and Andrew J. Turro, of counsel), for all appellants other than Jamaica Ash and Rubbish Removal.
Stephen P. Scaring, P.C., Mineola (Laurie S. Hershey, of counsel), for appellant Jamaica Ash and Rubbish Removal.
Ronald Goldstock, Deputy Atty. Gen., White Plains (Martin Marcus, Steven Chananie and Vija Kemanis, of counsel), for respondent.
Before WEINSTEIN, J.P., and BRACKEN, KUNZEMAN and KOOPER, JJ.
The principal issue to be resolved on appeal is whether the Director of the New York State Organized Crime Task Force has been permissibly empowered, in light of controlling Federal law, to apply for eavesdropping warrants pursuant to CPL 700.05(5). For the reasons that follow, we conclude that he is empowered to do so, and affirm the judgments of conviction appealed from.
The convictions from which the defendants appeal represent the culmination of a lengthy investigation by the New York State Organized Crime Task Force (hereinafter the Task Force) into organized crime and corruption in the refuse collection industry in Nassau and Suffolk Counties. The principal investigative tools employed by the Task Force in securing evidence against the defendants, were eavesdropping warrants obtained upon applications executed by the Task Force Director, Ronald Goldstock, pursuant to authorization issued by Attorney-General Robert Abrams. After the completion of the investigation, the defendants were charged with a variety of crimes in several indictments. The County Court denied suppression of the conversations intercepted pursuant to the court authorized eavesdropping warrants.
On appeal, the defendants contend, inter alia, that CPL 700.05(5) 1, which confers wiretap applicant status upon the Director of the Task Force, is fatally inconsistent with the definitional provisions of, and underlying policy objectives sought to be achieved by, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520). They argue that the Federal statutory scheme, pursuant to which the "principal prosecuting attorney" of a state or a political subdivision thereof may apply for a wiretap warrant (see, 18 U.S.C. § 2516), was intended to limit the class of eavesdropping applicants to officials who are "politically accountable", and that the Director of the Task Force is neither a "principal prosecuting attorney" nor a politically accountable official within the meaning of the Federal statute. We disagree.
Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, which constitutes the first comprehensive Federal legislation regulating electronic surveillance, prohibits--with limited exceptions--wiretapping and electronic surveillance unless accomplished pursuant to a court order requested by an authorized Federal or state law enforcement officer in connection with specified offenses (see, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 507, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 1823, 40 L.Ed.2d 341; United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562, 94 S.Ct. 1849, 40 L.Ed.2d 380; see generally, Note, Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance--Title III of the Crime Control Act of 1968, 23 Rutgers L Rev 319). In enacting Title III, Congress "relied upon the broadest reach of its commerce clause powers, in large part to impose upon the states the minimum constitutional criteria for electronic surveillance legislation mandated by Berger v New York (388 US 41 ) and Katz v United States (389 US 347 )" (see, People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747, 762-763, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 409 N.E.2d 897). Although Title III "recognizes that a State is free to either adopt procedures and standards more restrictive than those imposed by the Federal act or, if it desires, to prohibit wiretapping within its borders altogether * * * under pre-emption principles, any State law drawn more broadly than title 3's standards runs afoul of the supremacy clause (U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2; see Tribe, American Constitutional Law, p 379)" (see, People v. Shapiro supra, at 763, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 409 N.E.2d 897; see also, People v. Principe, 65 N.Y.2d 33, 36, 489 N.Y.S.2d 463, 478 N.E.2d 979). The avowed legislative objective sought to be achieved through enactment of Title III was the combatting of organized crime, in respect to which the framers expressly characterized authorized electronic surveillance as an "indispensable" investigative tool (S.Rep. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess, 1968, reprinted in, 1968 U.S.Code, Cong. & Admin.News, 2112, 2161; hereinafter Senate Report). Although deeply concerned with the pervasive growth of organized crime (Senate Report, at 2154), the framers were equally intent upon "protectthe privacy of wire and oral communications by confining State authorization for eavesdropping by wiretap to what in Congress' view are appropriate and compelling circumstances" (People v. Shapiro, supra, 50 N.Y.2d at 763, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 409 N.E.2d 897). Reflecting this concern is the Senate Report's recounting of the "dual purpose" of Title III as: "(1) protecting the privacy of wire and oral communications, and (2) delineating on a uniform basis the circumstances and conditions under which the interception of wire and oral communications may be authorized" (Senate Report, at 2153). Commenting upon the paucity of state legislation in the area of wiretapping and the resultant lack of uniformity, the framers of Title III recognized the need--through uniform Federal legislation--to provide guidance and supervision to state and Federal law enforcement officers (Senate Report, at 2156).
As prescribed by the enabling provisions of the Federal statutory scheme, a state is empowered to legislatively designate specified officials as wiretap applicants, provided that the designation comports with the restrictive parameters imposed by 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2). 2 Cognizant, however, of the disparity in nomenclature employed by the various States in describing their law enforcement personnel, the framers of Title III eschewed as impractical, any attempt to catalogue by name the state officials in whom the authority to make applications could be permissibly vested (see, United States v. Lanza, 341 F.Supp. 405, 410; State v. Daniels, 389 So.2d 631, 635 ). Instead, the framers implemented their intent to circumscribe the class of wiretap applicants by providing, in 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2), that "principal prosecuting attorney of any State, or * * * political subdivision thereof * * * may apply The legislative history pertinent to 18 U.S.C. § 2516(2) is instructive, inasmuch as it counsels against a procrustean application of the term "principal prosecuting attorney", noting that, "important question * * * is not name but function" and advising that state law was to govern with respect to identity of an official as a "principal prosecuting attorney" (Senate Report, at 2187). The Senate report further discloses that the legislative purpose in limiting wiretap applicants to "principal prosecuting attorneys" was to "provide for the centralization of policy relating to statewide law enforcement" (Senate Report, at 2187) with respect to wiretapping by placing the "power to seek electronic surveillance orders * * * with some central, responsible authority in order to guard against violations of personal rights protected by the fourth and fourteenth amendments" (State v. Daniels, supra, at 635; Senate Report, at 2187; see, United States v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505, 94 S.Ct. 1820, 40 L.Ed.2d 341, supra ).
When viewed within the context of the foregoing Congressional objectives, and guided by the precept that function, not name is the governing criterion (Senate Report, at 2187; Commonwealth v. Vitello, 367 Mass. 224, 327 N.E.2d 819, 838; United States v. Domme, 11th Cir., 753 F.2d 950, 956, cf., State v. Chiarizio, 8 Conn.App. 673, 514 A.2d 370, 379), it is our conclusion that the Director of the Organized Crime Task Force has been permissibly designated as an authorized wiretap applicant within the purview of controlling Federal law. We begin by observing, as the Court of Appeals has instructed, that in determining whether a challenged state statute is preempted by Federal law, the inquiry must focus on "whether the State statute at issue 'stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress' " (see, People v. Shapiro, 50 N.Y.2d 747, 763, 431 N.Y.S.2d 422, 409 N.E.2d 897, supra, quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66-67, 61 S.Ct. 399, 403-404, 85 L.Ed. 581; see also, Michigan Canners & Freezers Assn. v. Agricultural Mktg. & Barg. Bd., 467 U.S. 461, 469, 104 S.Ct. 2518, 2523, 81 L.Ed.2d 399; Capital Cities Cable v. Crisp, 467 U.S. 691, 699, 104 S.Ct. 2694, 2700, 81 L.Ed.2d 580; Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248, 104 S.Ct. 615, 621, 78 L.Ed.2d 443)....
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
US v. Private Sanitation Industry Ass'n
...warrant and summarily denied the remaining challenges as meritless or unpreserved for appeal. People v. Vespucci, 144 A.D.2d 48, 536 N.Y.S.2d 487, 490-92 (2d Dep't 1988), aff'd, 75 N.Y.2d 434, 554 N.Y.S.2d 417, 553 N.E.2d 965 (1990), cert. denied sub nom. Corrigan v. New York, 498 U.S. 814,......
- People v. Vespucci
-
People v. Leale
...that this provision of the statute conflicts with the Federal wiretapping statute (18 U.S.C. § 2510, et seq.; see, People v. Vespucci, 144 A.D.2d 48, 536 N.Y.S.2d 487, lv. granted 73 N.Y.2d 927, 539 N.Y.S.2d 312, 536 N.E.2d 641). Finally, in light of the authority provided to the OCTF in CP......
-
People v. Sail Carting & Recycling Co., Inc.
...in a motion to suppress this evidence. The denial of that motion was affirmed on an appeal by the codefendants (People v. Vespucci, 144 A.D.2d 48, 536 N.Y.S.2d 487, affd. 75 N.Y.2d 434, 554 N.Y.S.2d 417, 553 N.E.2d 965 [1990]. We find no reason to depart from that determination. The defenda......