People v. Walker

• Decision Date: 28 April 1994
• Parties: , 633 N.E.2d 472 The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Alvin WALKER, Appellant.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 118

611 N.Y.S.2d 118

83 N.Y.2d 455, 633 N.E.2d 472

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Alvin WALKER, Appellant.

Court of Appeals of New York.

April 28, 1994.

Marlene Vasquez and Philip L. Weinstein, New York City, for appellant.

Robert T. Johnson, Dist. Atty., New York City (Alan S. Rafterman, Joseph N. Ferdenzi and Billie Manning, of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

TITONE, Judge.

The narrow issue presented for consideration here is whether defendant was entitled to an order precluding the prosecution from cross-examining him about his prior use of aliases when the defense claimed that there was an alternative explanation for the defendant's use of aliases that potentially rebutted the inference of dishonesty. Concluding that the probative worth of alias evidence can be adequately assessed by the fact finder in most situations, we decline to impose a legal requirement of preclusion in these circumstances and hold instead that, like many issues involving the proper scope of cross-examination, the prosecution's use of alias evidence as cross-examination material rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.

I.

Defendant was charged with criminal sale and possession of a controlled substance in the third degree in connection with a November 20, 1990 sale of a quantity of cocaine to an undercover officer. Prior to trial, the court conducted a Sandoval hearing at which the prosecutor's plans to cross-examine defendant about his prior criminal acts were discussed (see, People v. Sandoval, 34 N.Y.2d 371, 357 N.Y.S.2d 849, 314 N.E.2d 413). The prosecutor noted that defendant had previously been convicted of two felonies, one involving a narcotics sale and one involving a robbery. There was also a string of 17 misdemeanor convictions between 1979 and 1989 that the prosecutor wished to raise if defendant chose to testify.

In addition to reviewing defendant's prior convictions, the parties focused at the Sandoval hearing on defendant's prior use of aliases and other false pedigree information. The prosecutor asserted that defendant had used 14 different names and 5 different dates of birth on the occasions that he had been arrested. Arguing that this use of false information "goes directly to the defendant's credibility," the prosecutor asked to be permitted to cross-examine defendant on the subject in the event that he decided to take the witness stand. Anticipating the prosecutor's request, defense counsel had noted in his opening remarks that defendant is a Muslim and that "that may explain why * * * he used the name of Ali." Moreover, according to defense counsel, defendant had been using his father's surname when he told the police in 1982 that his name was "Alvin Smith." Finally, defense counsel asserted, defendant had used the name "McDonald" when he "was under the influence of drugs and was not in his right mind."

After hearing both parties' arguments, the court ruled that the People would be permitted to question defendant about his use of "numerous aliases" and "various dates of birth." With regard to the prior felony and misdemeanor convictions, the court held that the People would be able to inquire about their number and dates but would not be permitted to allude to the underlying facts.

Defendant was subsequently tried before a jury. Having elected not to testify, defendant rested his defense on a challenge to the reliability of the People's witnesses, particularly the undercover officer who had actually purchased the cocaine and identified defendant as the seller. The jury found defendant guilty of criminal sale in the third degree, and defendant was subsequently sentenced to a 6- to 12-year term of imprisonment. On defendant's appeal, the Appellate Division found no reason to disturb the judgment of conviction, although it noted that the trial court "would have been more circumspect in its [Sandoval ] obligation" if it had limited the number of prior convictions that the People could use on cross-examination (189 A.D.2d 620, 621, 592 N.Y.S.2d 321). This appeal, taken by leave of a Judge of this Court, ensued.

II.

Initially, we reject defendant's contention that the conviction should be overturned because the trial court failed properly to balance the Sandoval factors in deciding to permit cross-examination with respect to each of defendant's 19 prior convictions. While, as the Appellate Division noted, the trial court might have been more discriminating, we find no legal reason to upset the court's exercise of its discretion (see, People v. Mackey, 49 N.Y.2d 274, 281, 425 N.Y.S.2d 288, 401 N.E.2d 398).

In this regard, it must be stressed that "in the usual case, appellate review of the exercise of discretion by the trial court * * * ends in the intermediate appellate court" (People v. Pollock, 50 N.Y.2d 547, 550, 429 N.Y.S.2d 628, 407 N.E.2d 472, citing People v. Mackey, supra, 49 N.Y.2d at 281, 425 N.Y.S.2d 288, 401 N.E.2d 398). The use of prior bad acts for impeachment of a testifying defendant "is 'largely, if not completely' a discretionary determination for the trial courts and fact-reviewing intermediate appellate courts, and * * * generally no further review by this Court is warranted" (People v. Mattiace, 77 N.Y.2d 269, 274, 567 N.Y.S.2d 384, 568 N.E.2d 1189, quoting People v. Shields, 46 N.Y.2d 764, 765, 413 N.Y.S.2d 649, 386 N.E.2d 257; see, People v. Pollock, supra, 50 N.Y.2d at 550, 429 N.Y.S.2d 628, 407 N.E.2d 472; People v. Brown, 48 N.Y.2d 921, 425 N.Y.S.2d 54, 401 N.E.2d 177). Because the trial courts have inherent power to control the scope of cross-examination and the use of prior bad acts is a generically accepted practice in that context, this Court will intervene only where "the trial court ha[s] either abused its discretion or exercised none at all" (People v. Williams, 56 N.Y.2d 236, 238, 451 N.Y.S.2d 690, 436 N.E.2d 1292; see, People v. Canty, 60 N.Y.2d 830, 831, 469 N.Y.S.2d 693, 457 N.E.2d 800).

Here, the record does not indicate a failure by the trial court to balance the relevant factors. To the contrary, the court's decision, which permitted inquiry about each of defendant's prior convictions but forbade reference to the underlying criminal acts, reflects sensitivity to the particular prejudice that may result when a jury is made aware of the fact that the defendant has previously committed crimes that are similar to the charged crime (see, People v. Smith, 59 N.Y.2d 156, 168, 464 N.Y.S.2d 399, 451 N.E.2d 157; see also, People v. Pollock, supra, 50 N.Y.2d at 550-551, 429 N.Y.S.2d 628, 407 N.E.2d 472 [Meyer J., dissenting] ["thrust of Sandoval is that * * * a jury may be led by such evidence (of prior crimes) to infer criminal propensity"].

That the number of prior convictions ruled admissible was large and that some of those prior convictions were remote in time are matters of substance that may properly be considered by the trial court but are not appropriate bases for this Court to second-guess the trial court's conclusion (see, People v. Patterson, 88 A.D.2d 694, 451 N.Y.S.2d 321, affd. 59 N.Y.2d 794, 464 N.Y.S.2d 751, 451 N.E.2d 498). Our law does not require "the application of any particular balancing process" in Sandoval determinations (People v. Pollock, supra, 50 N.Y.2d at 550, 429 N.Y.S.2d 628, 407 N.E.2d 472), and there are no per se rules requiring preclusion because of the age, nature and number of a defendant's prior crimes (see, People v. Pavao, 59 N.Y.2d 282, 292, 464 N.Y.S.2d 458, 451 N.E.2d 216; People v. Bennette, 56 N.Y.2d 142, 147, 451 N.Y.S.2d 647, 436 N.E.2d 1249; People v. Mackey, supra ). Similarly, an exercise of a trial court's Sandoval discretion should not be disturbed merely because the court did not provide a detailed recitation of its underlying reasoning (see, People v. Ellis, 183 A.D.2d 534, 535, 585 N.Y.S.2d 177, affd. 81 N.Y.2d 854, 597 N.Y.S.2d 623, 613 N.E.2d 529), particularly where, as here, the basis of the court's decision may be inferred from the parties' arguments (see, People v. Burke, 39 N.Y.2d 729, 730-731, 384 N.Y.S.2d 770, 349 N.E.2d 870).

Distilled to its essentials, defendant's present appellate claim is really nothing more than a disagreement with the ultimate outcome of the trial court's discretionary balancing determination. Such a disagreement does not furnish a cognizable ground for intervention by this Court, which is limited to resolving questions of law (see, CPL 470.35[2]. Accordingly, the only remaining question with regard to the propriety of the trial court's Sandoval ruling is whether the court erred in holding that the People could cross-examine defendant about his prior use of aliases despite defense counsel's representations that there were alternative, arguably innocent explanations for several of the incidents in question. It is to that question that we now turn our attention.

III.

The question of using alias evidence as a basis for cross-examining a testifying defendant has been referred to in a series of Appellate Division decisions. In most of the cases, the intermediate appellate courts have merely set forth the commonsense proposition that the People cannot ask about aliases used by a defendant in such a way as to suggest the existence of a prior arrest when the trial court has previously precluded all reference to the crime associated with that arrest (People v. Esquilin, 141 A.D.2d 838, 530 N.Y.S.2d 177; People v. Spivey, 125 A.D.2d 349, 509 N.Y.S.2d 74; People v. Walker, 119 A.D.2d 521, 523, 500 N.Y.S.2d 704; People v. Bannerman, 110 A.D.2d 706, 488 N.Y.S.2d 192; People v. Evans, 88 A.D.2d 604, 449 N.Y.S.2d 762; People v. Dowdell, 88 A.D.2d 239, 243-244, 453 N.Y.S.2d 174). These cases rest on the unexceptional premise that prosecutorial evasions of the trial court's Sandoval ruling are improper (see, e.g., People v. Dowdell, supra, at 243-244, 453 N.Y.S.2d 174; People v. Bannerman, supra, 110 A.D.2d at 707, 488 N.Y.S.2d).

The...