People v. Warrington
Decision Date | 22 December 2016 |
Citation | 2016 N.Y. Slip Op. 08584,68 N.E.3d 70,28 N.Y.3d 1116,45 N.Y.S.3d 345 |
Parties | The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Appellant, v. Brandon WARRINGTON, Respondent. |
Court | New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Kathleen B. Hogan, District Attorney, Lake George (Jason M. Carusone and Emilee B. Davenport of counsel), for appellant.
Paul J. Connolly, Delmar, for respondent.
The order of the Appellate Division should be reversed, and the case remitted to the Appellate Division for consideration of the facts and issues raised but not determined on appeal to that Court.
We agree with the People that the Appellate Division erred in concluding that the trial court was required to excuse prospective juror No. 383 for cause (see 130 A.D.3d 1368, 1371, 15 N.Y.S.3d 256 [3d Dept.2015] ). During voir dire, defense counsel asked prospective jurors whether "[a]nybody [had] a problem with the fact [that the case involved] the death of a five year old child." Prospective juror No. 123 responded that he could not be impartial given the circumstances of this case, which prompted defense counsel to inquire whether any other jurors had similar feelings. On further questioning by defense counsel, prospective juror No. 383 said, After that response, defense counsel asked whether the prospective jurors could agree that "[t]he burden is for the People to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [defendant] did do it."
All of the prospective jurors, including prospective juror No. 383, answered that query in the affirmative. All of the prospective jurors then responded in the negative to defense counsel's subsequent question whether "anybody ha[d] a problem with that," and the matter turned to the issue whether any prospective juror would "have a problem finding the defendant not guilty if [the People did not] meet their burden." Prospective juror No. 383 answered, "I don't know."
Defense counsel did not follow up with those jurors, but the trial court subsequently attempted to rehabilitate prospective juror No. 123 through an exchange in which the court asked prospective juror No. 123 a series of questions focusing on that juror's previously stated partiality related to the victim's age, which questions included the query whether he could "be [a] fair and impartial ... juror in this case" despite the fact that it involved the death of a child, allegedly at the hands of an adult. That prospective juror responded that he "would try," and through additional questions the court was unable to elicit an unequivocal assurance of impartiality from him.
The court's examination of prospective juror No. 383 yielded a different response. Immediately after finishing its examination of prospective juror No. 123, the court turned to juror No. 383. At the outset of its examination of that prospective juror, the court stressed that, as it had done with prospective juror No. 123, it would explore the issue whether prospective juror No. 383 could be fair and impartial if seated for trial. Specifically, and significantly, the court began its questioning of prospective juror No. 383 with the point that it had the "same questions for [her] " before initiating this exchange:
After briefly questioning prospective juror No. 132 regarding his ability to follow an instruction given by the court at the end of trial, the court returned to prospective juror No. 383:
Afterwards, the court excused prospective juror No. 123 for cause. Although he agreed that prospective juror No. 383 "got rehabilitated," defense counsel moved to dismiss that venire person for cause. The court denied that application, and defense counsel exhausted his peremptory challenges in removing her from the jury pool.
As our precedent makes clear, a prospective juror must, first and foremost, in unequivocal terms, "expressly state that his [or her] prior state of mind concerning either the case or either of the parties will not influence [the] verdict" (People v. Biondo, 41 N.Y.2d 483, 485, 393 N.Y.S.2d 944, 362 N.E.2d 576 [1977] ; see People v. Blyden, 55 N.Y.2d 73, 78, 447 N.Y.S.2d 886, 432 N.E.2d 758 [1982] ; see Johnson, 94 N.Y.2d at 612, 709 N.Y.S.2d 134, 730 N.E.2d 932 ). This link between the juror's previously articulated bias or state of mind and the ability to render an impartial verdict must be evident, because the very point of the unequivocal assurance of impartiality is to "allow[ ] a juror to 'purge' a previous opinion ... by expressly declaring that he [or she] will not be influenced by [that] prior opinion" (People v. Torpey, 63 N.Y.2d 361, 368, 482 N.Y.S.2d 448, 472 N.E.2d 298 [1984] ). Thus, "where [a] prospective juror [ ] unambiguously state[s] that, despite preexisting opinions that might indicate bias, [he or she] will decide the case impartially and based on the evidence, the trial court has discretion to deny the challenge for cause if it determines that the juror's promise to be impartial is credible" (People v. Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d 358, 363, 729 N.Y.S.2d 51, 753 N.E.2d 846 [2001] [emphasis added] ).
Under the circumstances of this case—including the trial court's direct reference to the questions it had asked of juror No. 123, which called to juror No. 383's attention her previously stated bias—the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's for-cause challenge to the prospective juror based on her subsequent unequivocal assurances of impartiality (see generally Arnold, 96 N.Y.2d at 362, 729 N.Y.S.2d 51, 753 N.E.2d 846 ; People v. Williams, 63 N.Y.2d 882, 884–885, 483 N.Y.S.2d 198, 472 N.E.2d 1026 [1984] ). Viewing prospective juror No. 383's statements in totality and...
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