People v. Williams

• Decision Date: 28 December 2017
• Docket Number: 106765
• Citation: 69 N.Y.S.3d 367,156 A.D.3d 1224
• Parties: The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent, v. Frederick WILLIAMS, Appellant.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

156 A.D.3d 1224

69 N.Y.S.3d 367

The PEOPLE of the State of New York, Respondent,

v.Frederick WILLIAMS, Appellant.

106765

Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department, New York.

Calendar Date: November 17, 2017

Decided and Entered: December 28, 2017

Kelly L. Egan, Rensselaer, for appellant.

Paul Czajka, District Attorney, Hudson (James A. Carlucci of counsel), for respondent.

Before: Peters, P.J., Egan Jr., Lynch, Clark and Rumsey, JJ.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

Rumsey, J.

Appeal from a judgment of the County Court of Columbia County (Koweek, J.), rendered April 2, 2014, (1) upon a verdict convicting defendant of the crimes of burglary in the second degree and robbery in the third degree, and (2) which revoked defendant's probation and imposed a sentence of imprisonment.

In the early hours of August 2, 2012, defendant, accompanied by four other individuals, drove a white suburban vehicle (hereinafter the SUV) to the home of Desiree Graziano. Defendant parked the vehicle in the driveway of a nearby property and remained in the SUV as the other four individuals broke into Graziano's home while she and three others were present and stole money and drugs. When the police responded, the suspects fled the home and returned to the SUV. Defendant then engaged the police in a short high-speed chase before he drove the SUV off the road where it came to rest in a pond. All five occupants exited the SUV and attempted to flee. Defendant successfully escaped, but was subsequently arrested.

In September 2012, defendant and codefendants Bobby Smith, Miguel Alcarez, Joseph Speed and Jeremy Cobbins were each indicted on one count of burglary in the first degree and one count of robbery in the first degree. Pursuant to defendant's motion, his case was severed from the codefendants' cases. Following a jury trial, defendant was acquitted of the charged crimes but was found guilty of the lesser included offenses of burglary in the second degree and robbery in the third degree. Thereafter, defendant was sentenced as a second felony offender to concurrent prison terms of 12 years, with 10 years of postrelease supervision, for the burglary conviction and 3½ to 7 years for the robbery conviction. The court also revoked defendant's probation stemming from a 2009 felony conviction for burglary in the third degree and resentenced him to a prison term of 2? to 7 years on that conviction, to run concurrently with the sentences imposed upon the new convictions. Defendant appeals.

Defendant initially argues that his convictions were not supported by legally sufficient evidence and that the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence. As defendant concedes, his challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence is unpreserved for our review because he made only a general motion for a trial order of dismissal at the close of the People's case and failed to renew that motion after he presented his proof (see People v. Newell, 148 A.D.3d 1216, 1220, 48 N.Y.S.3d 800 [2017], lv denied 29 N.Y.3d 1035, 62 N.Y.S.3d 304, 84 N.E.3d 976 [2017] ). Nonetheless, in conducting our weight of the evidence review, we must evaluate whether all elements of the crimes for which defendant was convicted were proven beyond a reasonable doubt (see People v. Spencer, 152 A.D.3d 863, 863–864, 59 N.Y.S.3d 499 [2017], lv denied 30 N.Y.3d 983, 67 N.Y.S.3d 586, 89 N.E.3d 1266 [2017] ). In determining whether the verdict is supported by the weight of the evidence, where, as here, a different verdict would not have been unreasonable, we must view the evidence in a neutral light and accord deference to the jury's credibility determinations (see id.; People v. Cooley, 149 A.D.3d 1268, 1269, 52 N.Y.S.3d 528 [2017], lvs denied 30 N.Y.3d 979, 981, 67 N.Y.S.3d 581, 89 N.E.3d 1261 [2017]; People v. Gunn, 144 A.D.3d 1193, 1194, 40 N.Y.S.3d 634 [2016], lv denied 28 N.Y.3d 1145, 52 N.Y.S.3d 297, 74 N.E.3d 682 [2017] ).

Defendant does not claim that the codefendants did not commit burglary or robbery; rather, defendant argues that his conviction was against the weight of the evidence because the only direct evidence that he intended to aid his codefendants in committing the burglary and robbery was the uncorroborated testimony of Speed, an accomplice. A person is liable as an accomplice for the conduct of another person "when, acting with the mental culpability required for the commission thereof, he or she solicits, requests, commands, importunes, or intentionally aids such person to engage in such conduct" ( Penal Law § 20.00 ). "A defendant may not be convicted solely on the basis of accomplice testimony that lacks the support of corroborative evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the charged offense" ( People v. Slaughter, 150 A.D.3d 1415, 1416, 55 N.Y.S.3d 473 [2017] [internal quotation marks, brackets and citations omitted] ). "The required corroborative evidence need not be powerful in itself, show the commission of the crime or show that [the] defendant was connected with the commission of the crime. It is enough if it tends to connect the defendant with the commission of the crime in such a way as may reasonably satisfy the jury that the accomplice is telling the truth. [Thus, c]orroborative evidence sufficiently connects the defendant to the crime if, when considered with the accomplice's testimony, it makes it more likely that the defendant committed the offense, and thus tends to connect him or her to it" ( People v. Godallah, 132 A.D.3d 1146, 1149, 19 N.Y.S.3d 119 [2015] [internal quotation marks, ellipses, brackets and citations omitted] ).

Speed testified that, on the night in question, defendant picked him up in the SUV and that, along with Smith, Cobbins and Alcarez, they drove around, drinking, before they decided to buy cocaine from Graziano. Speed further testified that the five occupants of the SUV—including defendant—decided to steal drugs and money from Graziano, based on a suggestion originally made in jest by Alcarez, and to divide any proceeds equally. According to Speed, the plan was for Smith, Cobbins, Alcarez and himself to enter Graziano's house while defendant, who did not want to enter the home, waited in the car and acted as a getaway driver. Speed asserted that the plan did not involve the use of weapons and that none of them was armed during the conversation. He said that defendant parked the car down a hill from Graziano's house near an adjacent property and that he and the other codefendants donned bandanas and latex gloves in defendant's presence before exiting the SUV. Speed explained that he and the other codefendants broke into Graziano's house and took money and cocaine from various places in the house while they held the four occupants of the house using weapons that they picked up at the scene. According to Speed, when police officers arrived, the four codefendants immediately exited the house and ran to the SUV, where defendant was waiting. Speed said that as defendant drove the SUV away, he heard a gunshot coming from behind the vehicle and later became aware that they were being pursued by a police vehicle. Speed further testified that defendant drove the SUV into a field, where all five occupants jumped out and attempted to flee. Speed admitted that he was apprehended shortly after leaving the vehicle.

Despite his testimony that he did not know of the plan for his codefendants to enter Graziano's residence for the purpose of stealing drugs and money, defendant's own testimony is sufficient to corroborate Speed's testimony. Defendant admitted that, during the night in question, he drove a white SUV he had borrowed from a friend, that he picked up Cobbins, Alcarez, Smith and Speed and that the five of them consumed alcohol at Speed's house. Defendant acknowledged that the codefendants engaged in various conversations as he drove, but claimed that he was not listening because he was mostly on his phone during that time. He said that he drove to Graziano's house because Speed wanted to pick something up from her, but denied that he was aware of, or took any part in, any conversation about breaking into her house or stealing from her. Defendant admitted that he parked nearby, at Speed's instruction, and that the codefendants exited the vehicle together and walked up the hill toward the house, but he denied seeing any of them cover their faces with a mask or bandana or wear gloves. Defendant further testified that he had originally parked the SUV "sideways across the driveway," but subsequently repositioned the vehicle so that it was facing towards the road. Defendant said that after the codefendants exited the vehicle, he reclined his seat and was taking a nap when they suddenly returned, looking panicked and yelling for him to drive away. He said that, as he began to drive, he heard a gunshot. Defendant asserted that he drove the speed limit and, after he became aware that a police vehicle was following him, he pulled over onto a grassy field, at Speed's suggestion, where he and the codefendants jumped out of the vehicle before it came to a stop and attempted to flee. Defendant acknowledged that he was arrested a few hours later.

Notably, defendant admitted that he provided the vehicle that was used as the getaway vehicle, that he used the vehicle to drive the codefendants to the scene of the crime, where he parked the vehicle—not at the residence but at a nearby secluded location—oriented toward the road for easy exit, that he drove the codefendants from the scene after being fired upon while being pursued by the police and that he fled from the vehicle after he drove it off the road. Such admissions are alone sufficient to corroborate Speed's testimony, notwithstanding defendant's assertion that he knew nothing of the plan to steal from Graziano (see People v. Jackson, 44 N.Y.2d 935, 937, 408 N.Y.S.2d 315, 380 N.E.2d 147 [1978] ; People v. Keitt, 42 N.Y.2d 926, 927, 397 N.Y.S.2d 997, 366 N.E.2d 1350 [1977] ; People v....